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ABSTRACT
The thesis considers how the sacred, understood in the radical Durkheimian tradition, shapes the
phenomenological experience of pregnancy. Julia Kristeva viewed maternity as the meeting of
culture and nature, and between subject and other. Maternity is the point where biological
reproduction and social reproduction meet. By examining the sociological and phenomenological
aspects of Julia Kristeva’s work and supplementing them with radical Durkheimian and feminist
discourse, I argue that the image of the Virgin, sustained through the sacred, creates an alienating
experience of pregnancy and diminishes the ability to experience the semiotic in corporeal
experiences and transgressive acts. While Kristeva begins an analytic of the sacred, referring to its
duality, she misses the nuances of the social, the sacred, and irrationality articulated in Georges
Bataille’s work on which she draws. By using Bataille’s underexplored concepts such as the
sacred, sacrifice, experience and the irrational, we are able to develop his phenomenological
sensibilities, using them to supplement Kristeva’s more psychoanalytic approach. Powerful
irrationalities of social life are frequently structured by the dynamics of liminality, abjection and
sacrosanct principles. Moreover, the sacred is not the sole experience and there is experience
outside discourse. Pain, for example, has a foremost corporeal base, though it may at times be
mediated by discourse. By combining Bataille’s radical Durkheimian phenomenology of the
sacred, and Kristeva’s psychoanalytic cultural theory, a more adequate social analysis of the
pregnant body is articulated.
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ABJECTION AND THE MATERNAL BODY: RETHINKING KRISTEVA AND
PHENOMENOLOGY

Introduction
When discussing the maternal, and becoming maternal, the sacred very frequently shapes how it
is experienced, suggesting the need for a phenomenology of this form of human existence. Kelly
Oliver (1993) explains that, for Kristeva, “maternity calls into question the boundary between
culture and nature. She chooses maternity as a prototype precisely because it breaks down
borders between culture and nature and between subject and other" (p.100). This is an
intersection where biological reproduction meets social reproduction and the forces that
contribute to social reproduction. By examining the sociological and phenomenological aspects
of Julia Kristeva’s work and supplementing them with radical Durkheimian and feminist
discourse, I argue that the image of the Virgin, sustained through the sacred, creates an alienating
experience of pregnancy and diminishes the ability to experience the semiotic in corporeal
experiences and transgressive acts. Kristeva’s work contains an analytic of the sacred but never
fully develops it. Influenced by the radical Durkheimianism of Georges Bataille, Kristeva
references the ambivalence of the sacred but misses the nuances of the social, the sacred, and the
irrational that Bataille considers, by focusing too narrowly on "laws, norms, and authority"
(Datta, 2005, p.629). An extension, and necessary next step in Kristeva's understanding of the
sacred, and how it may influence the pregnant subject, is to productively interrogate her analytic
and its appropriation of Bataille's concept of the sacred. Using Bataille's theory of the sacred "as
a cultural resource in social and political mobilization; and as a conceptual tool for the analysis
of collective life” (Horgan, 2014, p.746), we are able to pull out the phenomenological strength

1. Some texts used in this thesis come before an era where gender neutral language was used. To avoid misquoting
such texts, the original terminology is retained throughout this thesis.
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of Bataille's theory. This includes Bataille's under-explored concepts of the sacred and sacrifice
(Shilling & Mellor, 2013) and in particular, Bataille's use of the irrational (Datta, 2005).
Similarly, Datta (2005) notes the importance of the unconscious in Bataille's account of the
sacred. In this regard, Bataille does well to supplement Kristeva given her use of psychoanalysis
facilitates her rigorous accounts of drives, desires, and passions behind behavior. Humans are
irrational and impassioned beings. These fundamentally human and social traits surround
liminality, abjection and sacrosanct principles found in societies. Oliver (1993) further highlights
the importance of exploring the sacred in relation to the subject when she explains "Kristeva
analyses maternity in order to suggest that all distinctions between subjects, objects, all
identifications of unified subjects, are arbitrary" (p.100). The subject, the object, and crucially
the abject as that which is radically excluded and negatively valorized, are perceived through the
sacred. For Bataille, as for Durkheim, nothing is inherently sacred but is created and sustained as
such through social dynamics (Datta & Milbrandt, 2014). Drawing on Bataille, one is in a better
position to explore and redress limitations in Kristeva's work through his more detailed
conception of the sacred.
This thesis reads and retheorizes the work of Julia Kristeva and Georges Bataille to
examine the contemporary Western experience of pregnancy. In the introduction, I contextualize
the need for more phenomenology driven theory on pregnancy and the method of symptomatic
reading. Chapter One highlights the limitations in Judith Butler’s understanding of subjectivity,
the body, and experience in order to demonstrate the necessity of revisiting Julia Kristeva and
other prior feminist writing. In Chapter Two, I review and explicate Julia Kristeva’s influences
and key concepts such as “the chora,” “the semiotic,” “symbolic elements,” and “the Symbolic
Realm.” This chapter also adumbrates criticism of Kristeva’s work and makes a case to continue
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despite her limitations. In Chapter Three, I focus attention on the sacred. In particular, I
foreground the necessity of supplementing Kristeva’s work with radical Durkheimian concepts
in order to create a more adequate analysis of the pregnant subject with Kristeva’s concepts.
Chapter Four expounds how the sustained image of the Virgin does not allow for women to
engage in the left sacred. Moreover, this chapter examines how the fetus transitioned to
becoming the sacred fetal subject and took precedent over the pregnant subject. The image of the
Virgin and the elevation of the fetus to a subject force the pregnant subject into a position of a
profane reproductive tool. Chapter Five forefronts the taboo and stigma pregnant women must
navigate. The Rule of the Father becomes evident when exploring how stigma and taboo, in the
form of benevolent and hostile sexism, sustains the image of the Virgin. Transgression under this
sacred order becomes an oppressive abjection as opposed to a means of liberating oneself from a
fragmented identity. The chapter concludes by examining abjection in relation to different
groups of “failed pregnant women” such as those who receive abortions, those who are childless,
or those who experience postpartum depression. In Chapter Six, I review a potential resistance in
midwifery and explore where the pregnant subject may find agency. I finish this thesis with a
final call to herethics, or an ethics of respect and a secular sacred, so that women may have more
control over their experiences of pregnancy.
This thesis considers the contemporary Western experience of pregnancy, specifically
drawing on research of heterosexual women whose primary societal referents are Canada, the
United States of America, and the United Kingdom. The main focus of the thesis is
predominantly theoretical, aiming to develop tools for analysing the social constitution of the
phenomenology of the pregnant woman in relation to the gendered dynamics of the sacred,
abjection, and liminality. The sacred ties social beings to the community, enforces obligations
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and taboos through fear and glory, and constitutes the primary existential reference points of
socio-political life (Datta, 2008). When the sacred is not respected, transgressed, or when it is
shown to be discourse and not objective reality, the community uses abjection to eliminate or
contain the threat, and reinscribe acceptable limits. This could come in the form of exiling a
person preaching against the sacred or flouting taboos. The liminal periods refer to thresholds in
the sacred that demarcate what is sacred, who is subject, and who and what are objects to be
regulated in relation to the sacred and its administration (Datta, 2019).
There is a complex array of dynamics and factors contributing to different experiences of
pregnancy including age, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, marital status, and religion, etc., each
of which warrant dedicated investigation in their own right. Rather than catalogue this
complexity, I contend that there are “social facts” (Pearce, 2001, p.15) that are external to,
coercive upon (especially in terms of morality and obligatory and expected forms of conduct),
and pervasive in society pertinent to the phenomenology of pregnancy, as a modality of feminine
corporality. In this regard, phenomenology refers to the social framing, through varieties of
“collective representations” and powerful symbols (Datta & Milbrandt, 2014) of the individual
and collective sense and evaluation of corporeal experience and its discursive rendering. This
kind of phenomenology thus extends recent Durkheimian work on the sociology of “perception”
that is produced by the synthesis of individual sensations, one’s particular social location, and
collective representations, including varieties of authoritative discourses like medicine, religion,
and cultural representations of maternity, femininity, childrearing, and family (Nakhaie & Datta,
2019). A phenomenology like this includes women who announce their pregnant condition and
women with a visible pregnancy stomach. Feminine corporeality refers to those bodily
experiences that are unique to women, which includes, amongst other biological functions and
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capabilities, pregnancy, labor, delivery, and motherhood. This phenomenology attends to the
sociological meditation on the sacred and the corporality of subject formation involving the
maternal body as defined by cis-gendered women with visible or social markers of pregnancy.
Woodiwiss (2005) refers to theory as the work of constructing ways of seeing (p.12),
including “seeing” what cannot be accounted for in strictly empiricist terms as what can be got
through our senses. Visualizing one’s conceptions, and explicating your conceptions so that
others may understand your argument are thus inherent in theorizing. Critical and dialogical
theory allows us to trace through a problem with different approaches in order to find the best
explanation (Woodiwiss, 2005; Pearce, 2001). This is important; however, when we consider
aspects of the corporeal that cannot be seen, or adequately described using language, we need to
also use a sociological form of phenomenology to highlight how experiences are inflected by
complex social dynamics. Phenomenology is the study of how people express their social milieu.
In other words, “phenomenology studies the basic structures of consciousness—especially the
tools and practical knowledge that underwrite action and intention” (Calhoun, 2002). Some
branches of phenomenology emphasize language and symbolic behavior in experience (Calhoun,
2002). Moreover, this thesis forwards aims to advance the study of experience outside discourse
as well. One example Woodiwiss (2005) gives is Durkheim’s model of social solidarity (p.49).
Durkheim explains the institutions that create social solidarity in order to create a “visible index”
(Woodiwiss, 2005, p.49). However, Durkheim also engaged with corporeal phenomenology,
especially in his discussion of “collective effervescence” and “ecstatic” experiences. During
moments of collective effervescence, people feel physically and spiritually removed from the
mundane experiences of daily life and connect to the community in unity (Datta & Milbrandt,
2014, p.487). This thesis uses both theory and phenomenology in order to grasp both the aspect
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of the social embedded in discourse but also the corporeal experiences such as pain that women
in pregnancy undergo. By focusing on Julia Kristeva and Georges Bataille, theorists with
dedication to the corporeal, a more adequate sociological phenomenology of the pregnant
woman is developed.
Maternity is an experience that shakes the foundations of identity, body, and social being.
Prior to experiencing a pregnancy, an individual may identify themselves with a profession, a
hobby, or a name. However, once the physical transformation of maternity begins, new signifiers
of identity such as “pregnant”, “mother”, and “patient,” begin to attach themselves to the person
regardless of preference. Many women who undergo pregnancy describe a loss of identity and
autonomy (Weeks, 2011). During the gestation period, the pregnant woman is no longer an
individual but is predominantly considered in relation to the fetus. The fetus, at this time, is
considered another being. Moreover, this other being is often considered equally, or in some
cases, more important than the woman carrying the fetus. A prime example of this is what
Jessica Benjamin (2013) refers to as a “split complementary.” A split complementary, in a
manner similar to a dialectical relation, is a situation where each identity is reliant on the other
party involved. In this case, the mother and fetus depend on each other. Without the fetus, the
woman is not “pregnant” nor an expectant “mother” and without the woman or girl, the fetus
would not exist. Just as the doer requires the object of their action, the mother and fetus can be
understood as a constantly fluctuating identity, dissolving in and out of one being. The mother
becomes an object to the fetus as a womb, and the fetus becomes an object to the mother as a
not-yet-subject. The limit of the inside and outside of the subject is questioned. Ambiguity in a
liminal state, paradoxically becomes the only stable point of identification.
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Maternal bodies experience a unique “objectification,” and “abjectification”—one that
reifies and conflicts with the actual subjecthood of the social being. Even within a shifting
cultural climate, one that emphasizes gender fluidity and equality, it is still disproportionately
women who sacrifice their financial, social, and professional lives in order to create and care for
their children or children that will be raised by others (Weeks, 2011). As Kristeva (2012) boldly
states, “do we need to be reminded of the numerous studies on discrimination against women in
post-revolutionary society” (p.51). If wealth translates into power in a capitalist society, and
women are constantly sacrificing their wealth in order to contribute to the domestic sphere, then
male societal dominance is still evident.
In a society that emphasizes individualism, and one that has caused extended families to
disperse in order to meet work needs, the task of raising children is no longer given to “the
village”. The majority of families rely on one parent to stay at home or to take time away from
work to some extent. This duty tends to fall on the mother. Traditionally, society has downplayed
women’s isolation and feelings, assuming all mothers “were married, white and terrified about
carrot cake making your fetus too fat” (Cooke, 2019, p.2). This means more pertinent issues such
as sexism motivating proscriptions towards pregnant women (Murphy et al., 2011) and "the laws
inability to deal with pregnant women" (Caldwell, 2002, p.28) have not been forefront. If
controlling reproduction is the “hallmark” of patriarchy as Weeks (2011) describes it, then far
more attention to women’s phenomenological experience of reproduction is necessary and what
systems patriarchy works through to channel power. A closer examination of Julia Kristeva’s
theory, with supplementary material from Georges Bataille, can yield a phenomenologically
fruitful analysis.

Revisiting Phenomenology through Symptomatic Reading
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Plenty of current approaches used in studying pregnant women are empirically focused but lack
the theoretical framework that gives sociological meaning to the various findings (Mykhalovskiy
& Weir, 2004). These studies focus on objective factors such as the effect of stress on the fetus
or the success rate of latching after a caesarean section. Some work has practical implications; as
Neyer and Bernardi (2011) mention in their overview of feminist activism on motherhood,
liberal feminist theory has tended to focus on rights-based claims especially regarding safe
abortion and contraceptives. Most of the literature disregards phenomenology as unimportant to
the end goal of policy change although most feminist literature on this subject works to ensure
women have a better maternal experience through political and policy changes. Moreover, when
literature does take experience into account, there is usually an intentional focus on the
experience of the fetus, newborn or child that is considered (Benjamin, 2013). Mykhalovskiy and
Weir (2004) call for more theoretical research on the topic as opposed to empirical studies
currently dominating the medical field. As opposed to seeing issues as isolated and unrelated
such as caesarean births as a medical phenomenon, and postpartum depression as a psychological
phenomenon, a look at the way society shapes pregnancy should be examined in order to grasp
the larger picture. We need to use the “sociological imagination” in order to see the institutions
and social forces that alter the individual experiences of pregnancy. Theoretical research
exploring the phenomenology of the pregnant subject, especially in terms of abjection and
subjecthood is necessary to fill the gap in this topic’s oeuvre. Abjection, in this thesis, refers to
the Kristevian notion of outcasting an individual or yourself for transgressing a social norm that
shakes the status quo of socially established identities, domains, and practices. Subjecthood
refers to the social constitution of individuals in their interrelationships with others thus shaping
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their active participation in social life. Subjecthood can come in opposition to subjectivity, which
can lead to abjection.
This thesis uses the theoretical methodology of “symptomatic readings” to explore the
issue of feminine corporeality in the maternal body using the work of Julia Kristeva and Georges
Bataille. Symptomatic reading is a method of rational and critical exegesis forwarded by
Althusser (2016). This type of reading acknowledges that there are issues in theories, but the
focus is on using the stronger aspects of each theory in order to uncover new answers to unasked
questions (Althusser, 2016). Pearce (2001) explains that in symptomatic reading, "the reader
finds his own symptoms in the text alongside the manifest concerns of the writer, and seeks
answers to his own questions, which may be different from those posed by the writer" (p.xiii).
Essentially, as opposed to a strict focus on finding problems within the theory, the theory uses a
new problem to encounter a voice in the text that was not yet uncovered (Althusser, 2016). As
Bataille (1989) notes, “a philosophy is never a house; it is a construction site” (p. 11). Theory
can always be synthesized, altered, or re-visited in order to think through a new issue. This
approach is also noted by Woodiwiss (2005) who explains theory can never be finished and is
only ever a way of thinking systematically through various issues. This particular strategy is
fruitful in visiting the influential social theorist Judith Butler, who has garnered widespread
attention in terms of theory focusing on corporeality and analysing gender constructions.
However, I argue that Butler’s strength in gender constructionism tends to obscure questions of
feminine corporeality which can be a particularly empowering concept for the pregnant subject.
By revisiting the voices of her predecessors, previous theoretical discourse can be used to more
adequately conceptualize the phenomenology of maternal corporeality.

10

Chapter One: Judith Butler and Her Limits
Introduction
In this chapter, I examine the limitations of Judith Butler’s work in order to make a case for
returning to Julia Kristeva. The strategy to return to prior feminist writing is done in order to
focus on developing both the theory and phenomenology to better conceptualize corporeal
experience in pregnancy and how these experiences are shaped by the sacred. This chapter
highlights the problem of the missing subject in Butler’s work. By missing subject, I am
referring to the lack of phenomenology in Butler’s theory. I first examine Butler’s engagement in
ontological idealism and then explore the less common critique of Butler’s linguistic monism.
Generally, the experiences and passions of the subject are not discussed by Butler even though
the subject is central to her work. This not only means that the individual needs of particular
bodies are ignored, such as pregnant women, but also that corporeal experiences that resist
oppressive discourses are not possible. However, the problem of the missing subject, or rather
missing phenomenology, in feminist and gender theory is not limited to Butler. Butler is simply
an example of a larger avoidance of phenomenology in contemporary feminist writing that needs
to be corrected. Though much of Butler’s work is concerned with the subject, subjecthood, and
subjectivity, she dismisses phenomenology and corporeal experience, asserting a discourse
dominant ontology of gender.

Missing the Phenomenological Perspective of the Subject
Judith Butler articulates a sophisticated, and influential theory of gender construction and play in
Bodies that Matter (1993) and Gender Trouble (1990). Second wave feminism sharply
distinguished sex from gender. It argued that gender is a social construct and not derived from
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sex (Chambers, 2007). Judith Butler, as a leading contemporary feminist and gender theorist
advanced the notion that sex too is a social construct thus opening the potential for freeing
identity from sex. Unfortunately, her work affords little agency to subjects and phenomenology
is most often passed over for ontological or epistemic arguments. In short, Butler discusses the
subject without regard to the experience of the subject. In terms of analysing the maternal body
from a phenomenological perspective, her feminist theory predecessors have greater explanatory
power. My aim here is not to discount Butler; rather it is to revisit the work of Julia Kristeva who
has been dismissed as a biological reductionist and passed over for gender construction theories
as feminism evolved. As Pearce (2001) explains, when reading symptomatically, the goal is not
to systematize or clarify, nor is it to point out shortcomings, but to use fruitful conceptions and
reformulate them to explain new questions (p.xiii). My hope is that taking a step back and
rediscovering Kristeva’s theory that influenced Judith Butler, through symptomatic reading, will
allow a fruitful reconception for a contemporary problem.
For Butler, identity is enacted in action and inscribed in speech (Chambers & Carver,
2008). Those with power are able to determine which discourses flourish and which are silenced.
It follows that our identity is tied to power. Subjection, according to Butler (1997) both
subordinates but also creates subjects. Taboos, prohibitions, and suppressions all function to
constitute particular subjects. Even the simple idea of having a name points to a social place
(Butler, 1993). This is not to suggest that the subject is the power structure or that the subject is
the discourse. There is more involved in creating and sustaining a discourse than individual
people but the subject does play a role in sustaining a discourse (Butler, 1997). Neither power
nor the subject can be reduced to one another, though both are intimately connected.
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For Butler, identity is never independent from others not least since common language
and discourse mediate social relations. In this sense, we can see a notable Hegelian influence on
Butler’s work (Stark, 2014). The subject is “negativity” and is never complete: the subject is
always in relation to what it is not. The subject for Butler is produced by being “separated and
differentiated” (Butler, 1997, p.9). For Hegel, the subject is dependent on others for recognition
(Hegel, 1977). This Hegelian notion is carried on in Butler’s explanation of identity, whereby
our ability to take on an identity—to perform the desired role—is negotiated and reliant on the
recognition of others: “you is part of what composes who ‘I’ am” (Butler, 2004, p.22). There is a
social dimension to the subject. Moreover, Butler calls for a recognition of corporeal
vulnerability (Butler, 2004). She describes Hegel’s slave and compares the analogy to the way
the body is negated in ethical demand, where the Foucauldian notion of the soul imprisoning the
body is called forth (Butler, 1997, p.33). Our social “souls”, our identity as persons within our
society determines what bodily expressions we are allowed to have and how each expression will
be interpreted by the community. Without this recognition, the subject becomes “abject”. For
Butler, this means the subject will undergo stigma and sanctions until returning to an acceptable
identity role. For instance, the lesbian becomes the “dyke”, the trans-man becomes the “freak”,
the black single parent becomes the “welfare mom”, and so on. These people are narrowed out
through derogatory titles as a means of excluding and punishing because these roles shake the
assumption of acceptable identities. Subjects who stray too far from the roles deemed suitable,
roles that keep the status quo in society stable, risk abjection. Perhaps more daunting though,
subjects risk undergoing regulation to contain or eliminate the abject. As Chambers (2007)
explains, “if one is to place Butler as Hegelian, she is far more guilty of ignoring the body than if
one were to read her in an alternative lens” (p.6). Though discourse mediates the way we interact
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with a body, ignoring the actual physical body takes away power from marginal groups. The
body still exists in its differences and unique needs.
In Gender Trouble (1990), Butler discusses the problem of using the category of
“women” as a common identity because it places gender at the forefront above all other aspects,
while at the same time being immersed in a language that only allows women to be discussed as
“lack” or “other”. She argues that unity in a category is not necessary or even desirable, arguing
for “a radical rethinking of the ontological constructions of identity” (Butler, 1990, p.15). Yet,
the body for Butler is not a suitable foundation for ontology. The body, she says, is “a process of
mineralization that stabilizers over time to produce the effect of boundary, fixity, and surface we
call matter" (Butler, 1993, p.9). While the body cannot be reduced to linguistics, bodily norms
are created through daily speech and enacting corporeal habits. With a call to focus on corporeal
habits and inscribed rolls, the phenomenological and the corporeal in itself are neglected.
The problem in Butler’s work with regard to subjectivity is that though identity and
subjectivity are central to her theory, the focus of her work is on ontology not phenomenology
(Meijer & Prins, 1998). Gambaudo (2017) notes that we cannot have a phenomenology of gender
under this theory “because it is always preceded by the terms by which we are meant to discover
it” (p.31). Moreover, if Butler is focused on ontology, this ontology of being rejects a cultural or
biological foundation for one without any essence (Chambers & Carver, 2008, p.4). Butler then
rejects the body as well. This amounts to ontological idealism, and tends to clash with Butler’s
other theoretical concepts. Woodiwiss (2005) explains that ontological idealism holds that social
reality depends on what individuals think and exists solely in people’s minds; however, it can be
dismissed once one considers the history of knowledge production, including scientific
revolutions (p.36). Experiments fail, and nature surprises us, which would not possible if that
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nature was dependent on human minds (Woodiwiss, 2005, p.36). The corporeal reality, and the
physical limitations it imposes—albeit diminishing restraints with medical advances—are not
adequately attended to when Butler discusses identity and how identity is experienced. For
Butler, “the subject is ontologically secured in a supposedly pre-political and even pre-social
realm…with that ‘foundational fiction; the political operations that continue to secure
legitimacy…are effectively concealed” (Chambers & Carver, 2008, p.21). A subject without
essence leaves nothing but a discursive idealism. Although Butler claims the ontology of
substances is superfluous (Butler, 1999, p.23), her claim that a subject is entirely formed only
after action is not convincing. As Meijer and Prins (1998) explain, “there is no doer behind the
deed” (p.279). The subject may only be recognized and defined after action, however, that
individual still exists, experiences, and thinks prior. There is some sort of being, some sort of
essence that is acting.
Feminist critical theorist Seyla Benhabib (1995) accuses Butler of a serious disregard of
any concepts of selfhood, agency, and autonomy (Benhabib, 1995, p.21). Moreover, Benhabib
(1995) doubts whether Butler's theory of performativity can explain the constitution of the self
but also the ability of the subject to resist power and discourse. For Butler, the subject is
constituted by language and the body is materialized through discourse, but that does not mean
that language is the sole determinant of the subject (Benhabib, 1995, p.135). Furthermore,
Benhabib (1995) notes the same issue with Butler’s conception of agency: “the notion of agency
as the effect of discursive conditions does not entail that these conditions control the use of
agency” (Benhabib, 1995, p.18). Essentially, the potentials and current means of resistance are
not adequately theorized.
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Chambers and Carver (2008) discuss Butler’s emergence as a leading figure in third wave
feminism. They explain that “third wave feminism names an extremely broad, diverse and
thoroughly conflicted group of thinkers, but it successfully pulls together those writings that
vigilantly question the notion of ‘the experience of women’” (p.4). The experience of the subject
is lost when we only consider how discourse works with the body, as opposed to how those
deemed abject experience their abjection. By revisiting prior feminist writing, we are able to visit
the phenomenology of pregnancy as an experience of women. Oh (2009) points out in her
discussion of motherhood as performativity that motherhood can never be fully separated from a
woman's body. She makes this claim based on the corporeal nature of caring for a newborn even
in the absence of birthing the child. The line between essentialism and culture is blurred because
of this in a way that Butler's work cannot account for.
Chambers and Carver (2008) come to the defense of Butler by rejecting her position as an
ontological theory and wavering about her as an epistemic theorist. Butler has expressed that “we
cannot have access to the body except through discourse” (Chambers & Carver, 2008, p.51).
This does not mean that the body is entirely reduced to matter but that the matter is materialized
through discourse. The body comes prior to the sign and is signified as such (Butler, 1993). The
only way to have access to the body in these terms is through discourse. When Butler is taken to
be an epistemic theorist, the problem reduces to linguistic monism (Vasterling, 1999). Butler’s
theory thus becomes guilty of discursive determinism. This means that the body for Butler is
linguistic or at least is only accessible through language meaning this is an epistemic argument,
as opposed to an ontological grounding in the body or a phenomenological reading.
The body for Butler is partially constructed by oppressive norms in this sense as the
norms prescribed onto the body will come to seem natural (Vasterling, 1999, p.24). However,
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Butler’s “tendency, reinforced by psychoanalytical interpretation, to equate accessibility and
intelligibility or, in other words, to restrict (pre)conscious experience to the intelligible, is
debilitating for such a theory” (Vasterling, 1999, p. 25). If this is the case, we are unable to use
corporeal experiences as a means of resistance (Vasterling, 1999, p.26). That leaves a depressing
conclusion of passive subjects, or subjects that can only be active and transformative in language
and signification. Vasterling also argues that Butler’s epistemological position rejects the
possibility of pre-conscious experience although it is notable that Butler follows the
psychoanalytic tradition. Psychoanalysis insists there is a space prior to discourse where the
subject exists. Butler (1993) states, "the idea and the conveying are phenomenologically
coincident...although Freud's language engages a causal temporality that has the body part
precede its 'idea,' he nevertheless confirms here the indissolubility of a body part" (p.59). Freud’s
concept of polymorphous perversity, discussed by Johnson-Eilola (2012), demonstrates the
psychoanalytic stance that bodies can experience sensory level pleasure be it through
transgression or prior to learning socially acceptable pleasures. Generally, Butler is less about
subjectivity than about “the material out of which such a construct is forged” (Grosz, 1989,
p.18). These notable issues with Butler’s work are further reasons to engage with her influences
and second wave feminism in order to create a more adequate analysis of the pregnant subject.
Chambers (2007) believes that critics ask about the body in Butler’s work because of its
implications for sex. While this may hold true in some cases, the body is an important lacuna in
Butler’s work because of experiences that fundamentally alter the body. Whether the maternal is
constructed or not, the body will change and the subject will experience this change, not least by
being construed in discourse and social relations as an object of medical knowledge, or an
abjected being. To ignore that phenomenology is to ignore that subject’s experience and, in this
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case, a particular group of women. Butler herself in Gender Trouble (1990) admits the subject is
important for feminist politics. Later, in Violence Mourning Politics (2004) she states that “it is
important to claim that our bodies are in a sense our own and that we are entitled to claim rights
of autonomy over our bodies” (p.23). In order to make claims to the body, we need to
acknowledge the body. While I acknowledge Butler’s advances in gender and sexuality studies,
Kristeva’s theory, though predating the current sociological climate towards the body, holds
more explanatory power with regards to the phenomenology of the pregnant subject.
The phenomenology of this female experience is lost when theories dispense with the
notion of a female experience, and of “female.” Gambaudo (2017) notes the second wave
feminist interest in phenomenology is lost in contemporary gender theories. Though there are
plenty of rich concepts in modern theories of gender and particularly constructivism, the
consequence of erasing the notion of “female writing” means displacing much feminist writing,
feminist theory, and a phenomenology focusing on “female experience”. As Chambers and
Carver (2008) suggest, “to think of sex as itself subject to gender norms cannot allow us to do
away with the specificity of sex” (p.12). If everything is performance, then the corporeal
experiences of women are performance. If the corporeal experiences of women are seen as a
performance, they are easier dismissed than if they are discussed as real. This puts women, all
women, in a dangerous position of minimizing their complexly constituted forms of agency.
Though Butler laughs at the “notion of a particular female problem or affliction” (Chambers &
Carver, 2008, p.19) she also acknowledges the severity these problems pose for people when she
claims to bring “laughter in the face of serious categories” (Butler, 1990, p.xxviii). The struggles
women undergo, including and especially women of color, trans women, and infertile women, go
beyond gender play and expression but are part of the core of their being. Of course, society

18

shapes the experiences of women but to deny an authentic female corporeality is to deny the
reality of their existence and experiences.

Conclusion: An Overall Need to Revisit the Body
Butler is far from the only theorist positing the mind as central. Generally, Western culture
assumes the mind superiority over the body (Grosz, 1989; see also Woodiwiss, 2005). The mind
has been central when considering subjectivity in Western culture. This displacement roots back
to Plato, where the body (“soma”) was thought of as a shell. There was, then, a non-corporeal
being trapped in the body. The larger influences of this movement for contemporary society
include René Descartes and Christianity, which, since the fourth century CE, has dominated
Western society and thus the discourse underlying Western society (Grosz, 1989). In the mind
becoming central to the notion of subjectivity, the body becomes the lesser of a dichotomy.
Grosz (1989) explains that subjectivity is thought about in a dualism whereby the mind is the
privileged term and the body is a “conceptual blind spot” (p.3). Grosz (1989) explains the body
is either studied as an organ in terms of function or as an object. However, in dualisms,
privileged terms tend to become associated. For instance, light over dark is associated with good
over evil. In a similar way, mind over body has become connected to male over female (Grosz,
1989). She calls for a need to displace the mind as central and understand subjectivity through
the body as well. Susan Bordo (1993) in Unbearable Weight: Feminism, Western Culture, and
the Body seconds this notion stating that we see the body “as animal, as appetite, as deceiver, as
prison of the soul and confounder of its projects: these are common images within western
philosophy” (p.3). Women, being the negative term are then seen as animal, appetite, aggression,
and as lacking reason or morality. Their bodies are seen as lesser and as tools to the privileged
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male mind. These dualisms alienate the subject. Bordo calls this the shift from Cartesian thought
to a body void of a subject. Luce Irigaray makes claims to the body as a process to be paid
attention to as opposed to a substance to dissect (Grosz, 1989). Julia Kristeva sees the body as
separate from discourse and capable of real experiences outside of discourse (Kristeva, 1980b).
Giving up corporeality when previous models in feminism faltered is not an adequate solution.
The necessity of attending to the body, particularly when discussing phenomenology, is not a
branch of sociology to be phased out and needs more theoretical attention.
This chapter demonstrates the problem of theorizing subjectivity without attention to the
phenomenological experience of the subject. By engaging in ontological idealism, or linguistic
monism as some theorists suggest, Butler dismisses the unique needs that come with having
different bodies and the possibility of resistance to discourse through corporeal experiences.
Instead of repudiating Kristeva’s conceptions of the abject and the corporeal in a
phenomenological analysis, reformulating these concepts to work alongside Georges Bataille’s
radical Durkheimian conception of the sacred can yield a new basis for analysing the subject
during pregnancy. Advancing a sociological phenomenology that reflects corporeal experience
as well as experience within discourse can help subjects claim experiences on their own terms.
This new symptomatic reading of Kristeva can be used to look at contemporary experiences of
pregnancy and potential solutions to negative aspects of the experiences.
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Chapter Two: Julia Kristeva’s Theory of Culture and the Body
Introduction
In this chapter, I discuss the return to Julia Kristeva in order to establish a phenomenology of the
pregnant subject. This chapter begins by introducing Kristeva’s primary influences; Hegel,
Freud, Lacan, and Feminism; in order to establish the necessary history of her important
concepts. An analysis of the criticisms forwarded against Kristeva is given, which are primarily
biological reductionism and essentialism, along with a defense against these criticisms. This
chapter also introduces Kristeva’s concept of “herethics,” which is later discussed as a means of
resistance. Additional concepts such as the “chora,” “the symbolic and the Symbolic Realm,”
and “the semiotic” are outlined. The latter half of the chapter explores Patriarchal Western
Culture and explores how this culture may be sustained through Marxist Feminist theory as well
as the sacred. Kristeva’s conception of the subject, the object, and the abject are outlined and
used to explore how women experience oppression. Lastly, I explore Kristeva’s view of
maternity in relation to the subject, object, and abject as well as its limitations. This is done in
order to make a case for extending Bataille’s radical Durkheimian concepts into Kristeva’s
theory in order to adequately analyse how the sacred sustains a dysfunctional form of abjection
for pregnant subjects without dismissing their corporeal experiences.
While Judith Butler has been at the leading edge of feminist theory, the limitations in her
work, discussed above, warrant substantial rethinking. However, Butler’s use of Julia Kristeva’s
work, Kristeva’s formation of the concept of abjection in particular, provides an important
theoretical opening to developing a phenomenology of abjection, and the pregnant subject, one
attentive to social relations, power, and the body. Additionally, Butler engages in Kristeva’s
interest in the body but focuses on ontology as a discourse about being as opposed to the
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phenomenology of embodied existence. Butler believes that Kristeva reifies maternity and
ignores the cultural construction of motherhood (Butler 1990). While Kristeva’s theory is rooted
in a particular context, her concepts of the Symbolic realm and symbolic elements in the
symbolic realm must be distinguished in order to avoid conflating the terms and construing
Kristeva as an essentialist. Symbolic elements need not always take the same form, and upon
examining a different society with different symbolic elements, Kristeva’s analysis may yield
different results. However, Kristeva chooses to look at the current and available categories and
discourses as opposed to an abstract future potential. By symptomatically reading Kristeva, we
can better analyse the phenomenology of pregnant women than if we were to dismiss her
concepts and focus on ontology-based theory such as Butler.
Kristeva is foremost a psychoanalyst, both clinical and academic. Her priority is to help
her analysands, which she believes is done through expressing themselves. Kristeva’s goal is for
the subject “to be found in the cure…this means producing subjects who are free to construct
imaginary fantasies (or works of art), to produce a new language, precisely because they are able
to situate themselves in relation to the Law” (Moi, 1986, p.18). By expressing their subjectivity,
found in the imaginary or the realm of love, her patients are able to feel better and experience the
world in a meaningful way (Moi, 1986, p.14-15). Kristeva calls for a relation of what she calls
“herethics”: an ethics of love demonstrated in the mother-child relationship. Herethics is a
relationship of respect and listening to understand. Kristeva’s work appeals to me sociologically,
but it also appeals because it considers and comes from a female and a maternal perspective.
Here, I attend to the main components of Kristeva’s theoretical system to provide a basis for my
own critical and synthetic work.
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Kristeva as a psychoanalyst is indebted to Sigmund Freud. She is, however, a postLacanian psychoanalyst whereby she reworks the perspective of the famous French
psychoanalyst Jacques Lacan who advocated for a return to Freud. Kristeva’s interest in and
attitude towards phenomenology and subjectivity also leave her indebted to Georg Wilhelm
Friedrich Hegel. Her interest in semiotics and psychoanalysis led to her notion of “semanalysis.”
Kristeva (1973) proposed this term in The System and the Speaking Subject to explain a study
that combines “bio-physiological processes”, which can be studied through psychoanalysis,
corporeality, and “social constraints”, which can be studied through discourses (p.28). Kristeva
describes semanalysis as a Hegelian dialectic with a material base (1973, p.31). Her final
influence, and one which she largely rejects, is that of feminism, at least of certain stripes.
However, due to Kristeva’s sustained interest and commitment to women’s issues, maternity,
and motherhood, she is exceptionally influential in feminist and cultural theory. Together, with
these four influences, Kristeva synthesizes a theory with phenomenological potential.

Kristeva, Hegel, and the Dialectic
Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel in The Phenomenology of Spirit brought phenomenology and
subjectivity to the forefront of social thought. He began his work, and continued much of it, by
revising Immanuel Kant’s critical idealism. Kant argues that we cannot know noumena, the
outside world, and that only phenomena, which he describes as our conscious representation
synthesized with empirical input (McCumber, 2014). Similar to a pin-point impression toy, we
will never know the physical hand on the outside—the noumena—we will only ever see the
image buffered by the medium of subjectivity. Hegel wanted to show that we can experience
noumena as noumena. For Hegel, the dialectic is a way of trying to reconcile this issue. The
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dialectic, as the constitutive movement of being through knowing, is a conception on how
“adequate concepts are reached, that is to say concepts which will enable a man [sic] to both
grasp and become reconciled to his [sic] experience” (Plante, 1983, p.139). Something cannot be
its opposite: Black cannot be white, up cannot be down. This is the general idea of thesis and
antithesis. The logic of noncontradiction means the concepts become related precisely by the
positing of a concept, but in conflict since to grasp an idea, means to also posit what does not fall
under its idea. The conflict between them drives an energy, a will to know, leading to a synthesis
whereby a new category subsumes the two opposing categories: “Their fluid nature makes them
moments of an organic unity in which they not only do not conflict, but in which each is as
necessary as the other; and this mutual necessity alone constitutes the life of the whole.” (Hegel,
1977, p.2). Sense and perception synthesize to understanding or as Hegel calls it in The Science
of Logic (Hegel, 1962) “immediacy” and “mediation”. “Immediacy” generally refers to sensory
input and “mediation” refers to subjective experience of sensory input. The synthesis keeps
going and building starting with simple, practical knowledge and leading to larger spiritual,
sophisticated, universal knowledge of the self and understanding. For Hegel, each synthesis
brings us closer and closer to god (i.e., the full self-consciousness of absolute knowledge) in the
sense that we get closer to the universal (Speight, 2008, p.23). Self-contradicting concepts break
down to show the mediation behind subjective and collective knowledge. Though Kristeva
clarifies how mediation comes to alter experiences and uses psychoanalysis to resolve the mindbody dualism, she nonetheless takes a Hegelian interest in a dual mediated being.
Hegel was working toward a project of conceptualizing totality while maintaining the
stance that the individual is important to the larger picture. For Hegel, this is how people
experience the world: subjective thought meets objective truth. Phenomenology is the
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spontaneous notion of sense certainty (Speight, 2008) or what McCumber calls rationally
mediated experience. Therefore, phenomenology is how the world spontaneously appears to us,
and how our truth, our grasp of being itself, appears to us. The mind does shape the world
suggesting that there is a social character to our knowledge, but this theory also acknowledges
that our experiences are real and important. As Nancy (2002) explains “the subject is what it
does, it is its act and its doing is the experience of the consciousness of negativity of substance”
(p.5), and that the subject is always changing and is “in infinite relation” (p.12). The subject thus
unreflectedly applies an implicit understanding of the world and themselves in their actions,
bumping up against what one does not fully understand or control. As our social relations
change, our form of subjectivity changes and the way we experience and act in the world
changes.
A key idea in Hegel’s writing is the loss of spirit (“presence of being”) to tools. Tools
have an established purpose and are created with a thought of future use, a concretized telos.
When we become tools, it can feel alienating because we, as human subjects, are being treated as
objects. Property begins to embody personality, and the person becomes an object. The universal
personhood of modern times is misleading: “the slave” is alive and well. The investment in the
corporeal, the subject and phenomenological as brought to the center by Hegel is an
underappreciated influence on Kristeva’s writings. What happens to the woman under specific
discourses, especially in terms of the maternal and the use of women as wombs, is an interest
rooted in the loss of spirit to tools. Though there are major, marked differences between Kristeva
and Hegel, the influence of Hegel should not be overlooked.
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Kristeva and Psychoanalysis
The more evident influence in Kristeva’s writing is that of psychoanalysis. Freud’s contributions
to psychology, sociology, social and cultural theory are numerous and far beyond the scope of
this thesis to detail. However, the notable and pertinent highlight in Freud’s work, in terms of
Kristeva and the maternal, is his interruption to the mind-body dualism highlighted by Grosz
(1989). Plaut (2005) notes that the Freudian “Id” is part of the unconscious which contains
drives, traumas and “the constitutional factor in the individual” (p.74). For Freud, drives are
somatically derived, instinctual needs that pressure us to behave in certain ways (Meissner, 2009,
p.817). This means the Id contains some sort of essence of the person and some sort of link to the
person that is corporeal. This also means that the Id cannot be fully controlled. There will always
be a part of the Id capable of transgressing. Freud believed that the Id experienced corporeal and
sensory perception: corporeal, unreflected input and agitations essentially; whereas the ego
added form to sensations and perceptions. Freud (1962) explains that if one were to only think in
pictures, in sensory input, there would be a closer connection to the unconscious drives in each
of us but no form to the thought. It would only be a partial consciousness and there would be no
way to navigate the input in a social context without the ego.
Freud claimed that the drives in our unconscious are the primary motivations behind our
behaviors. In Beyond the Pleasure Principle, Freud (1961) explains that drives are always trying
to break through or “discharge” through action. This once again forefronts corporeality. The
physical experiences, behaviors, of a subject are real and important. This highlight of
phenomenology is carried by Kristeva throughout her oeuvre. Though Kristeva relies on a postLacanian reading of Freud, she nonetheless draws heavily from his concepts of the mind and
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body being interconnected. She moves further towards discourse as an organizing, form giving
force but she holds true to the notion of foundational drives within each being.
Though Kristeva is influenced by Freud, she follows a post-Lacanian psychoanalysis in
her theoretical works. Jacques Lacan, notably associated with structuralism, is an essential
background as Kristeva draws heavily from his theory. For Lacan, “Psychoanalysis should be the
science of language inhabited by the subject. From the Freudian point of view the individual is
the subject captured and tortured by language” (Lacan, 2015, p.243). Post-Lacanian
psychoanalysis still follows and reworks Freudian conceptions; however, there is a larger focus
on the illusion of the self and lack of unity in a subject (Elliot, 2014, p. 117). How the subject
experiences their fragmented identity, and how their relationships connect to their identity is
important.
The Imaginary, defined by raw input, sensory perception, and an experience of totality
and unity with one’s self, and the Symbolic which is defined by symbols in the institutional
social realm, language, and social communication, is the mediation between the conscious and
unconscious (Elliot, 2014, p.117). For Lacan, the child enters the mirror stage around 6 to 18
months, which allows for the feeling of unity as a whole and separate being: “The mirror
provides the subject with relief from the experience of fragmentation by granting an illusory
sense of bodily unity” (Elliot, 2009, p.118). The mirror stage is when we recognize that we are
our own being, but this image of unity is exactly that—an illusion (Elliot, 2014, p.117). This is
because the infant perceives a coherent totality whereas their corporeal experience is of an
uncoordinated being unable to master is movements. As we grapple with resolving the
experience of our corporeal fragmentation with the desire and image of unity, we are further
fragmented by entering the Symbolic. Language intrudes on the imaginary which allows for a
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sense of unity, and a sense of unity with the mother (Elliot, 2014, p.121). For Lacan, language is
the “paternal metaphor”, the rule of the father, that comes between the infant and the mother
although it is necessary for the infant to become a speaking being (Elliot, 2014, p.121). We
understand and define ourselves as a subject that is separate from other beings and we become
aware that being recognized as a subject depends on speech and language, about which the child
has limited knowledge. The Symbolic thus comes to dominate in the social institution of the
family, displacing the Imaginary.
Prior to the speaking stage, the child is still one with its caregiver, most often mother.
The needs of the child are provided and are physical in nature. The mother provides the child
sustenance in other words. When language begins, the child’s needs turn to demands and as the
child becomes more independent and the caregiver begins to be less involved, the child
understands something is being lost. The child understands that mother is taken away by
something (as she is less and less involved in supplying the needs of the infant) and direct
nourishment is replaced by language. The child is immersed in language and grows resentful of
the mother leaving. This is where our longing for the lost object, i.e., melancholy, originates
according to Lacan (Gambuado, 2017). The critical difference between Lacan’s conception of
the mirror stage and Kristeva’s conception, is that Kristeva sees the separation as physical not
absolute. Kristeva states that the “child must agree to lose the mother in order to be able to
imagine or name her” (Summers-Bremner, 1998, p.182). A physical separation means the ability
to name the thing that is not you, which acknowledges that it is not you—"Mother is not me,
therefore I am not mother.” This does not mean an absolute rejection of the mother as a subject is
necessary and this is a key point Kristeva carries through her work.
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For Lacan, the imperfection of language is what causes us distress, jouissance and the
Real. The Real constitutes a place of trauma or rupture in both the Imaginary and Symbolic that
language cannot adequately conceptualize or convey. Since the trauma can never be expressed
adequately through language, and we can never consciously grasp it; it is referred to as a “missed
encounter” with the Real (Botting, 1994, p.24). The Real is the violent repression that haunts our
reality (Datta, 2005). It is something that cannot be consciously processed, and fears and desires
reside here. Kristeva takes up this notion and adds the addition of “the Semiotic,” (experience
that transgresses discourse) as well as the symbolic as in symbolic elements of our current
predominant discourse within the Symbolic realm which is closer to Lacan’s conception
Symbolic.
Moreover, construing Lacan’s “Real” as a lack of lack, or a place without absence,
means there is potential for subjects to try to immerse themselves in the Real in order to cope
with their fragmented identities (Botting, 1994, p.30). Where the Imaginary is an illusion of
unity, the Real poses a distressing but rewarding experience of the self—void of negativity. This
concept lends inspiration to Kristeva’s notion of the abject discussed in Chapter Two. The
Semiotic, as an emotional realm that disrupts the Symbolic, acts as a mediary between the
Imaginary and the Real. By doing this, Kristeva uses psychoanalytic extension to connect the
affective, non-discursive, and corporeal dimensions of subjectivity. Emotion now has a place in
the Lacanian imaginary (Gambuado, 2017), as do passions. Moreover, Lacan’s conception of the
Real, which interpolates aspects of Bataille’s concept of the sacred, foreshadows Kristeva’s
conception of the abject, particularly as a place on the outskirts of society and that which cannot
be included in the Symbolic domain of institutions with their rules, values, and practice norms.
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Kristeva and Feminism
Kristeva’s final influence discussed in this thesis is that of feminist literature. Kristeva’s place in
feminism, or some critics desire to exclude her from feminism, is one she herself may dispute.
Oliver (1993) states that “Julia Kristeva has become known for her rejection of feminism” (p.94).
Moi (1986) clarifies this point by stating Kristeva rejected what she deemed bourgeois feminism,
the politicising of all human relationships and the tendency of feminism at the time to emphasize
“women’s intrinsic difference from men '' (p.10). For Kristeva, the issue is not with feminism
itself, her issue is with feminism used by individuals to boost their status at the cost of harming
other women. For instance, “in ‘Stabat Mater,” Kristeva chastises feminists for circumventing
the real experience of motherhood by accepting the Western myth that motherhood is identical
with femininity” (Oliver, 1993, p.104). This stance alone makes Kristeva a powerful proponent
of women’s issues including the choice to become a mother. In consideration that Kristeva’s
work has an ongoing interest in matters concerning women, the maternal, and motherhood as
demonstrated through works such as Stabat Mater (1977), About Chinese Women (1974), and in
her concept of “herethics”, and the reworking of Lacan. Notwithstanding flaws identified by
critics in her work, Kristeva very clearly writes with a feminist intention.
Daniella Forster (2016) discusses four dualities of modern society. She explains that man
is in opposition to God whereby previously “God is at the level of man” (Forster, 2016, p.198),
current Christian/Judeo conceptions of God raise him above man. She explains that transgression
links meaning to nonmeaning. If this is the case, taboo and ritual, practices of the sacred, are
essential for analysis in the phenomenology of the subject. Kristeva draws on the sacred, though
she does not conceptualize it to the same extent as Georges Bataille. However, by drawing on
Bataille’s theory of the sacred in conjunction with Kristeva, understanding the way this duality
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affects maternity is possible and opens up the potential to resolve the duality. It is particularly
important for Kristeva to look at the way a monotheistic, perfect, male God changed society and
women’s roles in society compared to polytheistic, imperfect Gods. Man and nature are in
opposition through the creation and practice of science and that man and community are placed
in opposition by forcing duty to oppose desire and virtue to oppose happiness (Forster, 2016).
As Kristeva (1968) explains, science, including medical science, is always constructed through
an ideology. When this ideology is in opposition to the happiness and desires of a subject, they
may experience emotional turmoil. Lastly, the self and reality are alienated through the mindbody dualism. Forster (2016) notes that these dualisms emerge through discourse and explains
“conceptual thought requires a corresponding language” and that “language requires a linguistic
community” (p.83). She also claims that in overcoming these dualisms, one can be happy. Both
Hegelian thought and psychoanalysis are focused on reconciling this dualism. Dualities create
the feeling of fragmentation. If the mind is in opposition to the body, how can anyone feel
whole? From a phenomenological standpoint, dualities cause the subject to experience distress.
Kristeva’s theory of discourse and her studies of semantics are of clear use in analysing the
practices and knowledge that make these dualities possible.
The importance of corporeality in phenomenology is a lasting subject of interest for
Kristeva and her call for a politics of emotion, studying phenomenology and emotion but not
independent of the social basis that situates the subject. Becoming conscious of the self, of
objects, and of representation is the means of overcoming duality for Forster. I would add the
importance of becoming conscious of the abject and the power structures creating these
categorizations is essential to overcoming them, abjection in the Kristevian sense of a
transgression that shakes the status quo of an identity. Moreover, noting the difference between
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communal truth and universal truth in the analysis of these relations is necessary. Finally,
Kristeva posits an interesting perspective by specifically asking women's place in these dualisms.
Drawing on her predecessors, Kristeva creates a theory with a powerful analytic capable of
carrying out a phenomenology of the maternal.

Criticisms of Kristeva
The main criticism forwarded against Kristeva’s work is that she engages in biological
reductionism or essentialism. This criticism suggests that Kristeva favors answers rooted in
biology rather than examining culture to find a more adequate answer. This criticism also
suggests that she lumps all women under one set of characteristics. Though Kristeva does have
some instances of biological reductionism in her work, it is a hasty generalization to categorize
her as a biological reductionist and dismiss the totality of her theory. There is much rich
sociological theory within Kristeva’s work to engage with.
One particular criticism is rooted in the concept that the feminine has a greater link to the
Semiotic, meaning that women have a greater link to the Semiotic. This is not the case, at least
not in Kristeva’s work. As Grosz (1989) points out, by displacing the assumption that the
feminine equates to woman, the Semiotic, the ability to connect with the Semiotic and the
feminine is not privileged by any particular sex inherently. Another criticism on a similar note is
that the Symbolic is anti-women. Again, this is not the case in Kristeva’s words. Kristeva has
always placed women primarily as speaking beings. Women are just as engaged in the Symbolic
as any other sex. However, Kristeva discussed the symbolic element as it is currently organized,
under patriarchal terms, which is oppressive towards women. The distinction between the
Symbolic realm, which Kristeva tends to differentiate by capitalizing the “S”, and the symbolic
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element is not always noted by critics. It is nonetheless a key distinction as symbolic elements
can vary. This variance also means that resistance and change to the symbolic element is
possible.
Another criticism comes from the assumption of sex as a natural given. Much of
Kristeva’s work, and all of Bataille’s work, is situated from a pre-trans era. Butler assumes there
is nothing inherent about the body, and that there is nothing stable about identity. For Butler, the
body is only ever signified: “There is no body in itself, no natural sexual difference. Rather,
sexed bodies are always matters of representation” (Oliver, 1993, p.99). This allows the doors of
identity to open to a wide variety of possibilities. However, this also denies feminine
corporeality: a concept that allows for female experience to be taken seriously and, in particular,
pregnant women. For even if this corporeality is socially made, and sex does not exist, “it is
based on this sexual difference that culture is built” (Kristeva, 2012, p.53). Concurring with Gail
Schwab, Caldwell states “while theorists may envisage a future world of multiple sexes or no sex
at all, those forms of identity are not clearly available, or desired, by many women” (Caldwell,
2002, p.30). A future with a different categorization of sex may be possible, but it is not the
current state of society. Working within the categories, within what feels real right now, may
work better to help women than to theorize abstract potentials.
More than the argument of whether sex exists naturally or not, or whether we should do
away with sex or not, comes the criticism that Kristeva’s focus on sex diminishes the other parts
of identity. Caldwell (2002) discusses the way differences among women tends to be ignored,
which in turn ignores oppressive forces constituting these differences (p.31). A charge that has
been similarly leveled of Luce Irigaray, and a charge I dismiss with the same defense given to
Irigaray. Caldwell (2002) defends this stance when she endorses Grosz, stating that, “Elizabeth
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Grosz generously notes that it is not Irigaray’s task to list every form of fundamental difference”
(p.32). Though this approach is not the perfect solution, it is a better alternative than exploiting
the bodies of women while simultaneously denying their difference because we are unable to
explore every possible difference.
Some of Kristeva’s work does suggest essentialism; much of it stems from the difficulty
of reading through sex without diminishing difference. Oliver (1993) describes Kristeva’s
struggle to discuss identity and difference without dissolving it falling into a generalization when
she states, “While there is legitimate textual grounds for interpreting a slippage in Kristeva’s
texts, I think that this slippage can be productively read as Kristeva’s struggle against
representing sexed bodies as only two types of bodies'' (p.97). Despite this struggle, Kristeva
advocates through her work for a politics of individuals. Kristeva advocates for individuals to
turn within and remember who we are outside of society: “it is an essential kind of resistance in a
technocratic society to rehabilitate memory along with the questioning and to allow the conflict
of the individual to take place, thus creating a culture that would satisfy these needs” (Kristeva,
2002, p.101). She does so in her discussion about corporeal vulnerability, particularly in regard
to disabled bodies, and in her notion of herethics. Kristeva (1984) claims, “I have the deep
conviction that every person has a very particular sexuality” (p.24), a position consistent with the
best of clinical psychoanalysis that respects the unique fantasy forms of each analysand.
Caldwell (2002) explains this notion through the idea of equality. Equality creates a standard to
make all groups on par with and it assumes all groups want this standard. In this way, the idea of
equality comes with the idea of an ideal citizen (Caldwell, 2002, p.20). Diversity becomes a
hierarchy where all are subjugated by the ideal. The diverse are helped to become equal, and in
becoming equal they become the ideal citizen. However, when concepts repress differences in
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order to try and create equality, different needs of different groups cannot be met (Caldwell,
2002). Acknowledging differences among women is important, but so too is acknowledging
differences between women and men in order to meet the needs of women. In a similar notion to
Kristeva’s shared corporeal vulnerability, Caldwell (2002) describes a new ethics of sexual
difference where subjects look at themselves as other and acknowledge their own difference.
Much of Kristeva’s criticism is rooted in misunderstanding her concepts of the semiotic and
symbolic, though some of her work does engage in essentialism. This is why we must pull the
strengths of her theory as opposed to disregarding her fruitful concepts because of weaknesses in
other areas of her work.

The Symbolic and Semiotic
Kristeva developed an early focus on semanalysis. Her interest in semiotics stems from her
interest in discovering social law in the Symbolic dimension of language and how social
practices express this law. In terms of phenomenology, semiotics is a poor study as semiotics
cannot escape language (Kristeva, 1973, p.30). Semiotics is a part of language. However, the
study of semiotics does force a reflection of the discursive position of the subject, and that paired
with psychoanalysis, can be productive. Within semiotics, Kristeva explains there is a “genotext”
and a “phenotext”. The genotext is the drive, the Semiotic, behind the language. The genotext is
the “languages underlying foundation” (Kristeva, 1974b, p.121). The phenotext is the actual
communication, or the expression through language. The phenotext does not always precisely
translate the genotext, nor is it necessarily capable of translating the genotext.
For Kristeva, language does not merely represent the world, but it produces it (Moi
1986). Symbols and language interact with other signs and transform into new meanings and
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representations. Kristeva draws on Hegel’s dialectic in this aspect of her theory. The primary
example is that the word of the Lord becomes the marking that then produces the reality as it
“evokes a collection of associated images and ideas” as opposed to one reality (Moi, 1986, p.72).
By extension, the image of the maternal, of the Virgin Mary, and of immaculate conception by a
monotheistic, male entity, produces the images of idealized motherhood. These points in
semiotics are the precursor to Kristeva’s notion of the Symbolic and Semiotic.
Kristeva’s notion of the Semiotic is linked to the “Chora,” i.e., pre-verbal sensation. It
includes the experience of the fetus in the womb and the marks of this term in the fetus’ life.
Kristeva describes the Chora as “a rhythmic pulsion rather than a new language. It constitutes the
“heterogeneous disruptive dimension of language” (Moi, 1986, p.13) and as “discrete quantities
of energy [that] move through the body of the subject who is not yet constituted as such”
(Kristeva, 1974b, p.93). The Chora, then, is corporeal and posits itself as the foundational
experience of all beings. Butler (1993) describes the Chora as “that site where materiality and
femininity appear to merge to form a materiality prior to and formative of any notion of the
empirical” (p.17). While this commends the importance of corporeality to phenomenology,
Butler disregards this aspect.
Kristeva at times suggests that engaging with the Chora through the Semiotic may be
more accessible to women but she never states that men are not able to engage as well through a
“feminine particularity” that can be found in any human being especially through creative acts
(Kristeva, 2004). This is because “women take part in the symbolic order, but only as outsiders”
(Kristeva, 2004, p.497). Kristeva makes a distinction, not always noted in translations of her
work, between the Symbolic order and symbolic elements within the Symbolic. The subject
enters the Symbolic order during the thetic phase, which stems from the mirror stage (Oliver,
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1993, p.96). This is the time when children must separate from their mothers and enter into
language. The Symbolic realm acts as a stabilizer for our desires and drives as the Semiotic is
constantly trying to subvert our frames of reference (Elliot, 2009, p.234). Kristeva (1996)
explains, “by symbolic, I mean the tributary signification of language, all the effects of meaning
that appear from the moment linguistic signs are articulated into grammar, not only
chronologically but logically as well (p.21). This is the point where the subject’s drives and
desires are communicated through language and are therefore also filtered through language as
used in specific institutional contexts. Outsiders are better able to engage in breaks from the
dominant discourse which engages the Semiotic. This is because outsiders are transgressing the
symbolic in some way already. Mothers, for Kristeva, are also able to engage more actively with
the Semiotic. As the mother has historically been, and still generally is, the primary caregiver in
Western society, most infants’ pre-oedipal and pre-symbolic interactions are with the mother,
and there is a clear sensory quality to maternal care which includes touch, rocking, feeding, and
general caring. This allows mothers to engage more actively with the Semiotic.
The Semiotic then, is the corporeal and emotional realm of pre-oedipal drives constituted
in relation between mother and infant that disrupt everyday speech (Elliot, 2009). The Semiotic,
not to be confused with semiotics, is the connection to the Chora after language has been
introduced. The Semiotic cannot alone articulate needs and we require language to give form to
our thoughts. Without language, the Semiotic would simply be an overflow of emotion,
disruption, and even trauma. We would not be able to articulate or conceptualize these feelings
or experiences. Kristeva (1996) explains that, “by semiotic, I mean, for example, the child’s
echolalia before the appearance of language, but also the play of colors in an abstract painting or
a piece of music that lacks signification but has meaning” (p.21). Since the Semiotic works
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within language, not outside of societal discourse, children do not need to override the Imaginary
to enter the Symbolic order. By channeling creativity and emotion, the Semiotic is engaged and
connects an individual to both the Symbolic order, the Imaginary, and the Real. For Kristeva:
The semiotic element within the signifying process is the drives as they discharge
within language. This drive discharge is associated with rhythm and tone. And
because these sounds and rhythms are primarily associated with the sounds and
rhythms of the maternal body, the semiotic element of language is also associated
with the maternal. The semiotic is the subterranean element of meaning within
signification that does not signify (Oliver 1993 p. 96).
Botting (1994) compares the Semiotic to Blanchot’s “Other of Speech” (p.34). “Other of
speech” connects us to Lacan’s the Real and allows for communication outside and within
language. The Semiotic does with an affective dimension. Because the Semiotic allows a
connection to the Real, where we can be a “lack of lack” as opposed to an image of unity, the
Semiotic is associated with the authentic subject. This allows legitimate communication through
the body; however, this also means that experiences mediated by language in which patriarchal
values are dominant are likely to be filtered through frameworks facilitative of male domination.
No matter our awareness of this, the tendency is to reproduce patriarchal frameworks unless
forms of resistance, including art, poetry, psychoanalytic practice, and revolt, constitute
alternative subject positions that can be used as a basis for social transformation. The
overarching problem with feminine corporeality then, is that the discussion is always filtered,
mediated, tainted, or bumping up against a patriarchal discourse. The engagement with the
Semiotic is as close to a pure corporeal language that we can tap into.
For Kristeva, this engagement can be bodily, maternal, creative or poetic. Derrida (1978)
states that “to be a poet is to know how to leave speech” (p.70). It is precisely this leaving, that
allows for jouissance. Jouissance is the leftover joy after we have paid our societal dues (Datta,

38

2005). It is the surplus after the Symbolic, or that bit of us that we cannot symbolize but that
touches the core of who we are. This core is not that of an essential human nature but is
complexly constituted by internal subjective dynamics of biography and personality, including
conflicting unconscious desires, fantasies, an understanding of oneself, and how psychodynamics
even dialectically code our bodies, and parts of our bodies, as objects of potential desire for
others. Summers-Bremner (1998) explains, “For Kristeva, ‘poetic language’ stages the
confrontation between ‘semiotic jouissance and the thetic’ celebrating the maternal remnants of
language at the limits of sense “(186).
A notable example of such an exploration of language, the maternal, and the poetic is
found in Norbese Philip’s She Tries Her Tongue (1989). The questions Phillip poses include
whether women are fully included, active participants in speech. Do we have adequate speech in
language for women and mothers? And whether, as Derrida (1978) suggests, “Male discourse
protects itself against feminine perspective by subsequent silence” (p.38)? Creative acts allow for
a play with what seemed to be rigid structures and allows for a porous connection to the
Semiotic. The Semiotic transmits our drives to the Symbolic for expression through sublimation.
The act of sublimation is itself creative. This means that language requires creativity, as
creativity turns our drives into acceptable expressions, but this also means there is an open
gateway to the semiotic through creativity (Kristeva, 2004). Brophy (1998) discusses Kristeva’s
view of maternity as a creative act in and of itself, a poetry in the body that engages the
Semiotic. If the Semiotic is linked to the feminine, as the feminine is averse to patriarchal
discourse, it is because the feminine has been placed as a silent, invisible support, just as women
have been placed in this role. An intimate connection between the Semiotic and the feminine
emerges in this particular context.
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The symbolic element, the particular institutionalized discourses engaging each subject,
opposes the Semiotic element. However, the Semiotic relies on the Symbolic order. As the
rhythm of the sounds in language exert an unconscious pressure in the language itself, while at
the same time the symbolic element, the social discourse, can silence the Chora with only slight
access through the Semiotic. When the distinction between the Symbolic and the symbolic
element is noted, it becomes clear that “the Symbolic is not the order of man...both men and
women can access the semiotic and the Symbolic, although sexual difference as it is constructed
in our culture does come to bear on how and how much” (Oliver, 1993, p.103).
Though our particular language is phallocentric, this is not the only symbolic element
available. Kristeva makes it clear that women are first and foremost speaking beings. Though
“women cannot merely jump outside of the Symbolic order or patriarchy” (Kristeva, 1993,
p.101), they must take their place in language and in the Symbolic as it is necessary for our
drives, including love, which Kristeva holds in the highest regard. The relationship between the
Semiotic and Symbolic is not opposition but more a “dialectic oscillation” Kristeva, 1980, p.96).
Both rely on one another. Without the Semiotic, we would have no desire, drive, or generally
speaking, reason to speak and use language. Without language, we would have no form to our
subjectivity or desires but would merely be sense input.

Kristeva’s Conception of Western Culture
Kristeva views contemporary Western society as embedded within the patriarchal symbolic, and
dominated by phallocentric language (Oliver, 1997). Our symbolic world, or the world in which
we are socialized, is not inherently patriarchal but is currently organized in this way and sustains
itself through language, social institutions, structures and practices. Phallocentric discourse refers
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to the way society centers men as beneficial and women as lesser. Women and girls are not seen
as powerful subjects capable of experiencing unity but as objects to be used to further society.
According to Rosati (2003), “the normative content from modernity...is derived from the
Hebrew morality of justice in the Old Testament and the Christian ethics of love in the New
Testament” (p.188). This foundation in religion, and the sacred that constitutes and builds these
religions, then ultimately, carries patriarchal conceptions. Summers-Bremner (1998) explains
that the wide depictions of the Virgin and the crucifixion show “her to be a liminal figure who
articulates phallic culture’s refusal to acknowledge maternal contribution. Christian orthodoxy
which habitually uses the feminine-maternal to mark the fleshy and to outlaw it as excess”
(p.180). The work of women in terms of reproduction and motherhood is never fully
acknowledged in contemporary social structures: patriarchy as embedded through the sacred and
capitalism. Datta’s (2005) discussion of Kristeva and the sacred explains the view of the Collège,
whose work, via Bataille, one of its members, largely influenced Kristeva, that “contemporary
society was characterized by utilitarian and egoistic orientations of life under modernity,
capitalism and fascism” (p.621). The issue of capitalism becomes incredibly important when the
contributions of women, the work of women, in terms of the maternal is denied.
Juliet Mitchell, drawing on Lacan and Althusser in her work on feminist Marxism,
describes ideology not as faith, but as expectations and ideas we have about the world due to
how we were raised. As she puts it, “the dominant ideology of a capitalist society is a bourgeois
one” (Mitchell, 1971 p.33). Middle-class culture is so normalized that it is invisible in
discussions of culture. By remaining invisible, it stays dominant because it is rarely
problematized. Mitchell contends that ideology is rooted in the economy and unless the economy
changes, the ideologies rooted within will remain. While Kristeva would also likely argue that
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ideology is rooted in more than the economy, she would agree that capitalism supports patriarchy
through the rule of the father. This places women at a disadvantage in Western capitalist
societies. Glick and Fiske (2001), while researching ambivalent and hostile sexism, explain that
men are typically the dominant sex in society. However, there are exceptions to this. Patriarchy
is so powerful because it has been presented as a universal mode of power that spans time and
geographic location (Mitchell, 1971, p83). That universal quality is part of ideology and makes
the individual resisting that ideology abject because the person is resisting a hegemonic symbolic
reference point. It creates the idea that it is a single person against the world.
According to Julia Kristeva, patriarchal discourse surrounds us and influences us right
down to what we desire. Although equality has increased, and in a relatively short period of time
feminism and gender studies have advanced rapidly, patriarchy is still embedded in our
language, institutions, social systems, practices, and forms of subjectification. When Kristeva
claims that society is “male,” she suggests that the terms we live by, our norms, our taboos, and,
most importantly, that which is deemed sacred is defined in terms of the masculine.
“Chauvinism” describes an individual that has internalized male domination (Mitchell, 1971,
p.64) whereas “sexism” describes a society. Historically, when patriarchy was more blatant and
Western women were in a more disadvantaged position than today, these concepts were
cemented in our ideology. In psychoanalytic terms, the phallus becomes associated with the
penis by women's systematic exclusion from self-identification and autonomy (Grosz, 1990, p.
116). The penis becomes part of the Symbolic ideal making the feminine different and part of the
Real, or that which cannot be articulated in the Symbolic.
Ehrenreich (1976) suggests that the modern form of patriarchy is sustained and embraced
by capitalism. She explains that “patriarchy is not in the same form—capitalism does not have

42

the male head that patriarchy did but it is still male supremacy” (Ehrenreich, 1976). On average,
women make less than their male counterparts, are found in less managerial and CEO positions,
and tend to sacrifice the most in their career and finances when starting a family (Ehrenreich,
1976), and this is borne out by more recent analyses. Being a mother negatively affected hiring
decisions, salary decisions, and workplace evaluations (Kricheli‐Katz, 2013; Anderson, Binder,
& Krause, 2003; Budig & England, 2001; Correll, Benard, & In, 2007; Callan, 1985). Bornstein,
Williams, & Painter (2012) call this the “motherhood penalty” and the “maternal wall” (p.47)
and further note discrimination is still strong with many workplaces still using the assumption of
a caregiver housewife when making their policies (p.46). It is often the woman who stays at
home to care for the child after giving birth and this is generally the accepted social norm: “by
making childbearing out to be the natural vocation of women it becomes bio-historical fact”
(Mitchell, 1971, p.76). Moreover, even women who do not take leave often need some amount
of time to recover before or after giving birth: “women are exploited at work, and relegated to
the home” (Mitchell, 1971, p.99). Mitchell posits a theory whereby patriarchy and capitalism
work together to subjugate women and reproduce the two complementary systems. By
normalizing women birthing and caring for children, despite the sacrifices one has to make when
motherhood is carefully laid out, more women will be inclined to have children. Kristeva's
concept is similar in that our drives direct us towards certain actions and that we have to
transform those drives into socially acceptable acts. We become emotionally driven to have
children when it is presented as a necessary and natural duty and motherhood is the socially
acceptable form of this act.
This absence tends to label pregnant women as less dedicated to a company and with the
assumption caregiving will disrupt the dedication to productivity, pregnant women are not

43

deemed as valuable in a capitalist society. As Meg Luxton (2014) has highlighted in her feminist
political economy, capitalism generally benefits from “women’s unpaid caregiving labor”
(p.149)1 while also rendering her the most financially vulnerable and therefore less powerful. In
a capitalist market supported by patriarchy, men are productive and women are reproductive
(Grosz, 1989). Mitchell (1971) explains “reproduction in our society is often a kind of sad
mimicry of production” (p.108) and that “the chief institution of patriarchy is the family (p.64).
This is both in the sense that it falls on the woman to reproduce, but also that the woman is
responsible for socializing the child into the patriarchal ideology.
The woman, in becoming the maternal body, either through pregnancy, childbearing, or
child-rearing, is thrown further into this systematic inequality. Mitchell (1971) states, “another
biological element—her maternal function was one of the fundamental conditions that made her
economically dependent on the man” (p.80). The man is afforded the title of breadwinner. He is
given the freedom to work, to work late, and to work over caring for his children both in the
sense of literal, physical freedom but also in the often more daunting place of social freedom.
Ehrenreich (2005) explains, "it is women who are most isolated in what has become an
increasingly privatized family existence” (p.76). Because of the female ability to reproduce,
women are used for biological reproduction in capitalism with the purpose of producing children
that will continue the cycle of capitalism and patriarchy.

1

There is considerable debate regarding the relationship between capitalism and patriarchy. Some theorists suggest
it is in the best interest of capitalism if all forms of labour are socialized and market oriented. Other theorists draw
attention to the generally unpaid and underpaid work involving the general reproduction of labour power (including
the next generation of workers); and the tendency to extend capitalist employment to women in order to show their
connection. Though, capitalism and patriarchy are not necessarily dependent on each other and likely, are able to be
sustained separately. My position is that in our current system, it would appear that patriarchy and capitalism work
together.
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Male societal dominance is most evident when mothers are deemed jobless and by
extension deemed unproductive. Although this “unproductive labor'' determines her family’s
ability to contribute to the labor market (Weeks, 2011, p.34), it is constantly seen as secondary,
as some natural privilege women are given, and even spoken about as “leisure”. The lucky
housewife who is afforded “the privilege” to sit around all day is as common a narrative as is the
lazy welfare mom who is living off the system. Both are used to belittle the contributions of
mothers to the labor force (Weeks, 2011). However, women who forgo motherhood, or choose
to go back to work, receive the same scrutiny. The double-edged sword comes through what
Weeks (2011) describes as the “mommy wars” (p.37). Whether women are lazy stay at home
moms, or uncaring working mothers, they are faced with constant scrutiny—constant abjection.
Weeks explains:
The guilt being passed on to all women (‘‘working’’ or ‘‘stay-at-home’’) is sustained by
the language that hides the role that men can and do play in the domestic sphere, by the
impact that domestic work has on the public economy, by the moral imperative attached
to raising children, and by the impossibility of any woman ever successfully fulfilling
every social expectation (Weeks, 2011, p.37).
There is no correct, socially acceptable way of being a mother, of being a maternal body,
because the expectations in a capitalist society are constantly in contradiction. Motherhood must
involve an element of abjection in the experience. Moreover, to ignore the contradictions and
follow one set of expectations, the woman would still be required to be an ideal, a perfection that
is not humanly attainable. The ego-ideal is the form of the ideal "I" after it has overcome the
ideal-ego, or the idealization of itself (Buchanan, 2010). Simplified, the ego-ideal is seeing the
"I" through others instead of the "I" as it sees itself. An image presented by Lacan’s Imaginary,
the pregnant subject has to reconcile their reality with the unified Virgin, as this is the image
through which we view and judge mothers as opposed to how they want to see themselves.
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Ehrenreich (1976) is keen to note the systematic inequality inherent in capitalist societies,
but also the trend of inequality between the sexes—the most common form being male authority
and female submission (p.71). These findings continue to be valid as Bornstein, Williams, &
Painter (2012) find sex discrimination against women to be one of the strongest forms of
discrimination in the United States workplace today (p.46). Economic security is given to those
good, subjected, complacent women; however, those who dabble in the abject by refusing this
role, risk financial suffering and male violence which serve as a threat or as a punishment. While
there has been a cultural shift, one that gives women more power than historically seen,
especially in the domestic sphere, women are still at a disadvantage and will remain at a
disadvantage because Western capitalism was built within a patriarchal framework.
This point is poignantly addressed by Luce Irigaray in Women, Sacred, and Money when
she explains in demanding unpaid labor of women, women are forced to repress the desire to
trade amongst each other, which is a necessity under our economic system. She states,
The fuss caused by problems of contraception, abortion and the production of more or
less artificial children can be understood in terms of the fact that procreation has been the
value underlying our societies for thousands of years. The question isn’t expressed in
these terms—the ‘work’ is unpaid, the job is enveloped in an intangible aura of
sacredness, in masks commensurate with the repressions and ignorance which is
presupposed and continues to demand. (Irigaray, 1986, p.14).
Our society assumes the mother should raise the child without pay as it is her “natural” place and
sacred duty. The mother must “nurture both man and society—a totem before any designated,
identified or represented totem” (Irigaray, 1986, p.13). When money is not given where it is due,
when work is not credited adequately, the entire system is deregulated (Irigaray, 1986). By
positing mothers as undervalued nurtures, where labor is obfuscated by ideology, a dysfunction
in capitalism emerges. This is not to suggest it is the only dysfunction or possibility of
dysfunction, but that it is the pertinent dysfunction to mothers in capitalism.
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Kristeva (1968) explains that we need to think of “the relation of a body to expenditure”
(p.82), or in other words, surpass Marx’s notion of expenditure and extend to the corporeal. She
takes this concept from Georges Bataille’s notion of the “accursed share.” We need to think of
the excess energy that we all possess and how it is used just as we think of how excess profits are
used. The sacred has altered the maternal, naturalised it, as such women are not acknowledged
for their labor and are then disadvantaged in a society that values labor. Women become tools, or
objects, under this symbolic.

Subject, Object, Abject
Lacan argued that the subject was an absence rather than a positive entity (Datta, 2005, p.632).
The subject must carve out a space. For Kristeva, structuralism could not account for the
mutations of the subject. For instance, the way feminism changed the concept of the subject. She
uses psychoanalysis to get around this anachronistic fault. The subject enters the world in a pregiven role and relation. Any decentering of the subject within the Symbolic order is painful.
Understanding this emotional area is a strength in Kristeva’s theory: “Emotions belong to all
vertebrates...the passions, on the other hand, are specific to man” (Kristeva, 2012, p.80). The
passions come from a being capable of self-reflection and must be able to be shared or have “the
capacity for an encounter” (Kristeva, 2012, p.80). Kristeva compares the emotion of aggression
to the passion of hatred and attachment versus love. Passion is part of the imaginary, tapped into
by the Semiotic, and given form by the Symbolic. She claims that the language of the
unconscious is the language of passion. When we desire something that is against the determined
social structure, transgression and taboo allow an opening to the Semiotic.
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Botting (1994) connects the Lacanian Real to Kristeva’s concept of the Chora. As
mentioned, the Chora is a rhythmic pulsation, as opposed to a language (Moi, 1986, p.13).
Because of its ability to disrupt the Symbolic, but also that it denies rationality in the Symbolic
by denying signification and conceptualization, the Chora is a heterogeneous element. Bataille
conceptualizes heterogeneous elements as aspects that exceed reason and resist conceptualization
such as piss, shit, decay but also aspects of reality such as chance and irrationality (Botting,
1994). They are outside of societal organization and are unproductive expenditure (Botting,
1994). Chance threatens stability and resists signification which allows for the rational to be
questioned (Botting, 1994). “Bataille’s heterological sensibilities refer to the ambivalent nature
of the sacred as a source of both attraction and repulsion in social life” (Datta, 2019 p.87). The
Chora, and by extension the Semiotic, are an emotional heterogeneous element because it
sacrifices the order of language.
Kristeva (1980b) states in the Powers of Horror that, for the subject, “I am in the process
of becoming an other at the expense of my own death” (p.231). In order to become one’s true
self, in order for the pure subject to seep through the symbolic element, the death of the social
subject is necessary. This means displacing one’s self as the ideal citizen, the ideal woman, or
the ideal mother through transgressing the sacred. To explain, “in the dialectic of seeing/being
seen, the female occupies the place of being seen/because the pleasure of seeing is immediately
caught in the net of Christian logic” (Kristeva, 2012, p.59) that being love and incarnation. This
love and incarnation are not love of the other but of the self, the male self.
The subject is a passioned being and a being that engages in the Semiotic. Because of
this, the subject is a corporeal being and is partially a heterogeneous element in the Symbolic
order. The subject is capable of disrupting and destabilizing the Symbolic order, which also
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means the subject is an active agent and is capable of resisting oppressive symbolic elements in
the Symbolic order. This also means the subject can be in opposition to the social subject. The
social subject is the ego-ideal. What the ideal citizen looks like may vary but in a patriarchal
symbolic, the ideal citizen is male or created in an image ideal to the patriarchal social order.
When the subjectivity of the social subject is disregarded, the social subject becomes a tool for a
particular role or function in society. Bataille (1988) explains this when he states “servile use has
made a thing (an object) of that which, in a deep sense, is of the same nature as the subject”
(p.55). The subject becomes passive for the purposes of production.
Men, through creating images of femininity are able to identify with themselves, creating
a narcissistic love through the image of the female they imagine: “The history of femininity is
the history of the feminine as Western artists have depicted it '' (Kristeva, 2012, p.60). The ideal
woman is not a subject, but a discourse. Georges Bataille (1922) gives a similar analysis in his
account of Notre-Dame de Reims during the war in France. The earliest form of architecture as
art is the hut and the temple and what differentiates them (Hollier, 1992, p.6). It follows that
architecture concerns itself with using art to symbolize religion. It is created to be seen and
expresses society’s ideal being (Hollier, 1994, p.ix). In Bataille’s (2018) science of religion, what
he refers to as “heterology”, he examines the excluded aspects of unproductive expenditure
(p.30). Religion and art, both unproductive expenditures, were separated into dirty and clean.
Bataille uses the example of the slaughterhouse and the museum to demonstrate this (Hollier,
1992, p.xi). Art shows an ideal, clean image separate from the brutal, dirty, abject slaughterhouse
that threatens the pure image. Women in art show an ideal and hide the abject. The analysis
comes together in Bataille’s discussion of Notre-Dame or the mother of Christ (Hollier, 1992,
p.20). The beauty and strength of Notre-Dame, the mother, showed the endurance and sanctity of
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France (Hollier, 1995). When France fell, Bataille states, “I thought that corpses themselves did
not mirror death more than did a shattered church” (Bataille, 1922, p.17). However, “at the heart
of beauty lies a murder” (Hollier, 1992, p.xiii). The sacrifice of life made for France, made for
Christ, and made for the mother of Christ, make the church more beautiful and have deeper
meaning when it is in ruins than when it showed a false ideal.
When we use phallocentric language, and language that focuses on what is object,
women become symbolic elements: “The transfer of male fantasies onto female bodies, simple
supports, passive objects of male desire” (Kristeva, 2012, p.62). We are no longer speaking of a
specific subject, but just as the word of the Lord becomes a series of images painting a reality,
woman becomes a series of ideals. A similar note is touched on by Butler when she states, "and
as a nurse, mother, womb, the feminine is synecdochally collapsed into a set of figural functions”
(Butler, 1993, p.53). Women become tools under the rule of the father and the love given under
these circumstances is that of narcissistic love (Kristeva, 1987). It is love with an object. There is
more meaning to the experiences and images of women when we shatter the depiction.
Kristeva describes abjection as a physical place or position, not a subject or qualitative
state (Kristeva, 1982). She highlights social geography, whereby abjection is defined as the
outskirts. The abject is a place where the Semiotic threatens to collapse the Symbolic. She
further describes abjection not as filth, dirt, or bile but that which “disturbs identity, system,
order” (Kristeva, 1980b, p.232). Mary Douglas similarly understands the issue with dirt and
pollution as an issue of "contact with anomalous elements" (Datta, 2005b, p.301). These
elements do not conform to classification in the same way that transgression breaks social
organization and abjection is an effect of this break. This is why we treat dirt and bile as dirty,
contagious, or to be kept away from us. However, Douglas fails to account for the joy one feels
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when they choose to play in the mud. Kristeva and Bataille see the abject as both distressing but
also positive and freeing, whereas Douglas only accounts for the negative contagion in pollution
(Datta, 2005b, p.302). When a subject is forced into abjection and into contact with the abject it
is a distressing experience. But when a subject uses transgression to voluntarily strip away the
social subject, or to break away from the servile life of an object, the experience is ecstatic.
As mentioned, the Symbolic is that illusion of stability, rationality, and institutional
coherence, and “abjection is above all ambiguity” (Kristeva, 1980b, p.236). It is the opposite of
stability and shows the illusion of the stable subject in the Symbolic. Abjection, then, is situated
in the Lacanian Real, which as mentioned, is tied to the Chora (Botting, 1994, p.38). This
awareness is scary, it is outside of the societal thresholds and the subject thresholds, but the
abject is a process of creating a space for the “I” through transgression (Kristeva, 1982). Abject
is “neither object nor subject… [the abject] attract and reject each other...the pure and the
impure” (Kristeva, 2012, p.160). The abject subject, though a person is a monstrosity to the
social subject. It is described as a violent place, founded on an original trauma which Kristeva
states is birthing. The abject then is related to identity separating from the mother, but in a place
before language. Kristeva (2012) explains abjection as “the original repression, where the first
indications of neotenous demarcation are manifested with desire for the other and desire of the
other” (p.184). When we revisit this feeling, we are experiencing the abject. It is similar to
Freud’s understanding of the uncanny where we are repulsed and tantalized, drawn in and
terrified. The abject, at its core, is the subject void of the Symbolic. The subject, the real subject,
“is none other than abject” (Kristeva, 1980b, p.232). The possibility of jouissance in the abject
comes from this ability to carve out a space for the subject outside of the social subject. By
returning to the repressed, we open ourselves to the Real.
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In Powers of Horror, Kristeva illustrates the abject as a corpse. We understand our life is
limited because of death, and this matters to us because we are constituted as unique subjects as
opposed to a part of a larger continuity that continues past our individual life. We have divided
the soul and the body to make our particular life carry on past its biological lifespan. The tombs
we mark, creations we produce, memorials we hold, and pictures we take are all to keep a
specific name in memory. Bataille (1990) explains the dialectical being for Hegel is “temporal
and finite” (p.12). Awareness and the ability to revel in our pending death is what separates us
from animals. Even though the body has deceased, the social soul can live on. The corpse is that
aspect of the being that is left. The corpse is not an object, yet we would not consider it a subject
either: “A dead body cannot be called nothing at all” (Bataille, 1957, p.57). Death is the major
abjection for us as we cannot put it into language. We cannot know death in a communicable
way.
Those in this area of abjection are not included in the norms—they are different and must
be treated as such until they can—if they can—be brought back into common ground. This
includes controlling the abject so as to not collapse the Symbolic further much in the way a virus
contaminates others. In terms of a corpse, these taboo and transgression have minimal
consequences as the subject in question is deceased. However, the abjection of living subjects
can result in harm. In Liberty, Equality, Fraternity and… Vulnerability, Kristeva discusses the
exclusion of the disabled experience. Others experience the disabled person as a reminder of a
threat, and a bending of what they consider the image of a person. This discrimination against the
disabled is not a shared vulnerability (Kristeva, 2012). What is abject is determined by discourse,
and for Kristeva, this discourse is patriarchal in type. The necessity of how the sacred shapes
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taboo and transgression becomes necessary to developing the concept of the abject and how
transgression can be used for resistance without resulting in exclusion, prohibition, or regulation.
Butler, in a paradoxical definition, defines abjection as bodies that are deemed not to
matter—though that does not mean we pay no attention—these bodies actually matter too much
to us. For Butler, power “produces human subjects [as subjectivities]” (Chambers & Carver,
2008, p.22). Prescribed and approved of roles are freely given; however, if someone enacts a
taboo or takes on a role unsuited for them—for instance, transgender individuals—society works
to correct the actor: “there are punishments for not doing gender right’ (Butler, 1993, p.55).
Stigma and exile are used to correct subjects who are not appropriately enacting their roles.
These roles are by no means necessary nor unchangeable, but function to reinforce the current
structure of society and are thereby protected through marginalization and punishment.
Chambers and Carver (2008) explain that, “children must learn the already established norms of
the society into which they are born, and thus they have more occasion to deviate from those
norms than the so-called grown-ups. Deviation from norms, however, often proves to be a very
weighty affair with grave consequences” (p. 10). Society becomes obsessed with controlling,
studying, changing, and oppressing the abject. Discourse that controls what is an acceptable
norm, or role to play, is constantly reinvented and re-established through replaying those very
roles. Those who refuse these roles are viewed in reflection of the grotesque and abnormal.
Transgression reveals the boundaries of the Symbolic order. Bataille’s notion of the
sacred discussed in Chapter Three is helpful in analyzing this dynamic. If the subject cannot be
controlled and the left sacred enacted through them becomes threatening, they need to be
abjected in order to preserve the sacred order. As Datta (2000) notes, “practices of eliminating
produce the sacred at the same time that they attempt to regulate it” (p.30). Datta attends to two
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practices of elimination. First, we eliminate the accursed share in festival and ritual practices
which allow for transgression in a specific time and place, or rather in suspended time and space
(Datta, 2000, p.194). The accursed share refers to the excess, and in particular excess energy,
produced that must be expended (Bataille, 1989, p.37) Second, we eliminate subjects who
threaten the group when they transgress without consent. A basic example of this is a human
sacrifice in ritual in contrast to a murder. One is sanctioned and to sustain the life-force of the
totemic, whereas the other is done for the individual. In the latter case, the transgressor must be
eliminated to protect the group. However, there is also an attraction to transgression and
abjection. Bataille is not able to explain why we have this attraction beyond the notion that it
brings continuity; however, Kristeva is able to fill this gap with her notion of the abject, which is
rooted in psychoanalysis. We are drawn to the abject because it tells us something about
ourselves beyond symbolic elements. Bataille refers to this process as “unknowing”, which he
uses in reference to laughter (Trahair, 2001). Unknowing, in Bataille’s terms, is linked to the
Freudian unconscious but he never elaborates on this point as Kristeva does. The discomfort in
abjection comes from the subject re-establishing identity.
Symptomatically read, abjection defines a subject that is marked as marginal and on the
outskirts of society due to a constructed quality or stigma. Abjection occurs in the realm of the
sacred, when the left sacred threatens the status quo or social identity, regulation and taboo are
used to ensure the norm persists. Abjection is offensive because it pulls open the curtain on
society’s construction which forces us to reconceive our identity. Since it is uncomfortable, even
painful, we resist abjection but are attracted to it. Often, we resist abjection by marginalizing and
mistreating those who are already abject. This way, we can deny how close we are to being that
other person. We create, and inflate, differences so that we can deny we are them.

54

Kristeva on Maternity and the Subject
Maternity in Kristeva’s terms is an abject experience in that it shakes the foundation of identity.
She discusses the maternal experience as a subject-in-process. The fetus is in the process of
growing to fruition until the time comes to enter the social as a subject: “This not-yet-other
germinating within her who will be a new object and then, with a bit of luck, a subject and from
now on, a target of love, sometimes hate, and often both at one” (Kristeva, 2012, p.84). The child
physically separates from the mother, but also separates mentally by entering the symbolic as a
social being. The child, in order to become a subject separate and whole from its caregiver must
abject the mother. More specifically, in order to truly be an individual subject, the child merely
needs to separate themselves from the “maternal container” (Oliver, 1993, p104) not the subject
of the mother. Kristeva (2010) notes, “It is only thus that she allows the infant to create its
language, a language of its own, which is tantamount to choosing a language that is foreign to
that of the mother” (p.693). Entering the symbolic world splits the child from the mother
whereby the Semiotic reconnects us to our mother tongue. This foundational experience of
separation links the child and identity to experiences of abjection.
The maternal figure also experiences a transformative process; however, her abjection is
doubled. The first abjection comes from the mother negotiating her own subjectivity on her
terms with her child. During the process of pregnancy, “the future mother becomes an object of
desire, pleasure, and aversion for herself. We call this shift a ‘narcissistic withdrawal’ and
wonder about the exact status of the object in this maternal adventure” (Kristeva, 2012, p.85).
Kristeva discusses that few women with the intent to bring their pregnancy to fruition experience
their pregnancies as objects. The fetus for many is, “first a narcissistic double, then a target of
projective identification, then a separate and autonomous other, the link of the mother to her
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child is a veritable analysis in action” (Kristeva, 2012, p.88). The mother understands that the
baby is not her and must not stay a part of her. The emotions of attachment and aggression are
transformed by the maternal relationship to the passion of motherhood and of love. “Kristeva
uses maternity as an example of an experience that calls into question any notion of a unified
subject “(Oliver, 1993, p.100). This is because in pregnancy, there is a literal division of the flesh
along with the identity. At a time, the fetus is dependent, inside, attached to the pregnant subject.
In this sense, the fetus is part of the subject in the same way an arm or a leg would be. However,
the fetus will be an autonomous being, which means the fetus is at the same time an other. The
mother is destabilized and experiences a loss and a multiplication of identity through this third
party who was once a double and is now a loved other. This is why Kristeva (2011) refers to the
mother as a “multiverse.” This abjection, though it can be scary and a daunting process, results in
respect and love for all subjects involved.
A secondary abjection occurs not on the mother’s terms but from an outside force. As
mentioned, the child must abject the maternal container not the actual mother. Unfortunately, “in
our culture, however, because the maternal function is not separated from our representations of
women or the feminine, women themselves have become abjected within our society” (Oliver,
1993, p.104). In Stabat Mater, Kristeva explores the cult of the virgin and the paradox of
motherhood: That of the ideal subject and the abjection of women. Kristeva is quick to highlight
the influence of the sacred on motherhood. Kristeva states, “we are forced to note that we do not
have a secular discourse on the fundamental experiences of human fate….with the lack of a
secular discourse on motherhood, mothers are left with the consumerism of disposable diapers or
at best child psychiatry” (Kristeva, 2012, p.27).
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Religious mystifications paint the maternal as a passage or a threshold of culture and
nature, a liminality, as opposed to a subject. For Irigaray and Kristeva, the depiction of the
Virgin Mary is “a symptom of western society’s need to disavow maternal origin” (SummersBremner, 1998, p.189-190). Women become conflated with the feminine and the maternal. The
mother has a sacred duty as a vessel for the upcoming child and this abjection, this turning the
mother from subject to object, negates consciousness and turns motherhood into an ethic. The
maternal, “split the woman between identity and its collapse, between consciousness of self and
its erasure” (Elliot, 2009, p.231). The maternal under the influence of the sacred has forced
women to become tools of reproduction. As Kristeva states, “Religions and various
fundamentalisms have so brutally assigned women to reproduction alone” and “female liberation
movements have so ferociously opposed this ‘repression” (Kristeva, 2012, p.54). Women are
placed in a position to either succumb to the image of Mary whereby any detour from the ideal
results in social abjection or reject maternity entirely resulting in societal abjection. Either path,
the woman is forced into an abjection on the terms of others not herself.
Any form of abjection is uncomfortable or even painful. In maternity, identity is shifted.
Elliot explains, “all experiences of pregnancy and maternity call into play powerful unconscious
forces and primitive anxiety, reawakening the repressed division between flesh and word,
imagination and representation, nature and culture” (Elliot, 2009, p.230) Maternity then, for
Kristeva, is always an intersection of subject, object and abject.. Understanding how the sacred
organized the abject is essential to understanding how the maternal experience is restricted. We
can then establish a more adequate phenomenology as we will understand the relations and
institutions that deem the pregnant woman subject, object, or abject.
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Conclusion
This chapter explored the influences Kristeva used in creating her concepts of “herethics,” “the
chora,” “the symbolic and the Symbolic Order,” and the “semiotic.” Moreover, this chapter
highlighted the way misunderstanding these concepts can lead to criticisms of biological
reductionism and essentialism in Kristeva’s work. An additional topic covered includes how the
current patriarchal symbolic elements in the Symbolic order were created and are sustained
through capitalism and the sacred, particularly by reducing the value of women’s labor to a
sacred duty and natural vocation, which is further elaborated on in the next chapter. Lastly,
Kristeva’s view of the body, the subject, the object, and the abject were explored and in
particular the pregnant subject’s relation to these categories. Of concern is the dysfunctional
abjection pregnant women experience when the pregnant subject is rejected as opposed to the
maternal container. All in all, Kristeva’s theory is an excellent exploration of the phenomenology
of the pregnant subject; however, more information on how the sacred establishes the maternal
as a sacred duty and natural vocation, as well as how the nuances of the sacred interact with the
subject’s experience, is a necessary next step.
Kristeva draws on psychoanalysis in order to practice a phenomenology that is invested
in women and the obstacles they face. Moreover, Kristeva attends to the obstacles pregnant
women and mothers face in a patriarchal symbolic. She forwards the idea of corporeal
experience in her concept of the Semiotic but still attends to culture in her notion of the
Symbolic. For Kristeva, phenomenology is both corporeal experience, experience outside
discourse, and experience within discourse. Moreover, the condition subtending all of this is
rooted in the Chora and the Semiotic both of which are frequently in tension with the Symbolic
and these dynamics inflect subjectivity, objectivity, and abjection. Kristeva believes herethics, an
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ethics of love and respect that is demonstrated in the mother-child relationship, is necessary to
relieve fragmented and distressing lives. Those subjects who find themselves as objects, or tools
for utilitarian purposes, or those who find themselves abject, rejected from society. While
Kristeva understands that humans are passioned beings and that the sacred structures our
symbolic elements, she does not conceptualize the sacred to the extent Georges Bataille does. In
order to create a more explicit theory of the phenomenology developed here, the nuances of the
sacred and the irrational must be attended to especially, to understand why we deem some
individuals abject.
Kristeva’s work has its flaws, including essentialist aspects; however, as Kelly Oliver
(1993) points out, “It is important to resist the temptation to reduce Kristeva’s theories to their
barest elements and then dismiss them as essentialist, reductionist, or stereotypical. At the same
time, it is crucial not to accept uncritically all of her statements” (p.95). When taken on her own
terms, particularly when read symptomatically with Bataille’s theory of the sacred, Kristeva’s
thoughts are more engaging phenomenologically than many available alternatives due to her
radical commitment to the corporeal. As opposed to dismissing rich sociological concepts, we
need to retheorize them. Whether this corporeality is socially made or natural, it is nonetheless
the current available category and how it shapes experience is pertinent. It is therefore my
contention and theoretical decision to integrate prior feminist writing to examine the concept of
pregnancy in order to yield a model of subjectivity and resistance.
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Chapter Three: Kristeva, Bataille and the sacred
Introduction
This chapter focuses on how a thorough conception of the sacred is able to supplement
Kristeva’s work in order to more adequately theorize the pregnant subject. The chapter begins by
exploring how the semiotic and symbolic are tied to transgression and the way the sacred
determines the boundaries of what is acceptable and therefore, what is transgression. I then
examine Kristeva’s incomplete conception of the sacred in relation to her discussion of women
and motherhood. Because Kristeva does not explicitly theorize her conception of the sacred,
using Georges Bataille, who draws heavily from Durkheim, creates a more thorough
understanding of Kristeva’s concepts. After a complete view of the sacred is established, I revisit
Kristeva’s concept of “herethics” as a new secular sacred. Lastly, I examine how the abject,
created through transgressing the sacred, can be empowering or oppressive to those experiencing
it.
Kristeva’s use of the sacred can be related to Hegelian reference points. Plant (1983)
discusses Hegel’s interest in how religion can come to fragment community and personality
when “the task of any religion, in Hegel’s view, is that of fostering social morality” (Plante,
1983, p.33). He then goes on to discuss Subjective religion (religion that involves the whole
“man” [sic]), juxtaposed to Objective religion (religion based solely on reason which fragmented
the man). Clearly, the viewing of religion as both creative and dangerous is not novel in
Kristeva (see Datta 2005, p. 618). However, Hegel’s focus on morality as a given and not a
construct, often irrationally constructed at that, as well as his focus on religion as opposed to the
more foundational phenomenon of the sacred makes him a hinderance in Kristeva’s work.
Summers-Bremner (1998) discusses the importance of the sacred to Kristeva and Irigaray
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whereby, “both thinkers also address the relation between religion, cultural repression and
symbolic structures as these bear on the social construction of mothering” (p.181). The idea that
the sacred is a two-sided, possessing an inherent “ambivalence” or “ambiguity” (as opposed to
two types of sacred), and that the sacred is social while also central to identity formation and
recognition, are all Durkheimian and by extension, Bataillean. A serious social scientific theory
of the sacred was not developed until Durkheim and his team undertook a dedicated sociology of
religion in the late 1890s. Moreover, the irrational side of constructing the sacred, as well as the
“left-sacred” i.e., the darker element of the sacred, was brought to fruition by Bataille. Bataille
questioned the assumption that people act rationally which is a premise pervasive in social
science, from utilitarianism, methodological individualism, to functionalism. Bataille’s
intervention elucidated the dysfunction and irrational elements of society. Kristeva draws from
Bataille but does not fully extend her theory using his analytic of the sacred. This leaves an
untapped area of sociological theory that can be used to analyse the phenomenology of the
pregnant subject.

Kristeva and the Sacred
A precursor to Kristeva's concepts of the Chora and her theoretic of the sacred, came from her
studying semiotics and “carnivalesque” language. For Kristeva, “carnivalesque discourse breaks
through the laws of a language” (Moi, 1986, p.36). Kristeva follows Mikhail Bakhtin and defines
carnivalesque language as poetic language that inverts the regular rules of language. In other
words, carnivalesque language is a form of transgression. Metaphor, grammatical breaks,
allusion, and other such poetic devices are a few examples of how a subject is able to use
language to show the boundaries and construction of language. In exposing language through

61

this transgression, a creative process occurs whereby something is produced–namely art, a new
meaning, a fresh perspective. However, the subject too is involved in this creative process.
Kristeva maintains this general idea as she develops her concepts of symbolic elements in the
Symbolic and the Semiotic Realms. The Semiotic acts as a transgression and poetic language is
one means of attaining communication with the Semiotic. When the symbolic is transgressed, it
brings to light the immanent socially constructed “rule.” However, because the symbolic
elements are those elements that give our world form, the transgression shows the boundaries of
our own life world, the boundaries of the very subject.
In this sense, the sacred as a symbolic element in our Symbolic realm, and a powerful
element at that, is intimately tied to identity formation, and the discursive resources we use to
make sense of the world, others, and ourselves, and therefore, to phenomenology. The sacred
tells us about what is important and powerful to a society; whether rational or not, whether
emotionally driven or not, the sacred is created as a reflection of a society not as an independent,
objective reality (Durkheim 1995). Likewise, the identity of a person is formed within the
Symbolic including the structures of the sacred. Datta (2005) explains, "the sacred for Kristeva
implies some positive representation to which subjects refer in making their world and their
existence meaningful in the deepest way" (p.629). Subjects use the symbolic structure of the
sacred to add form to their experiences which then constitutes how they come to define their
being. The sacred, then, produces a social subject. When the sacred is transgressed, the
boundaries become evident and the subject's place among the boundaries becomes evident.
Though never fully developed in Kristeva, she frequently and even explicitly, ponders the
notion of a dual sacred. Kristeva (1980b) asks, “Could the sacred be, whatever its variants, a
two-sided formation?” (p.255). She hints at a darker sacred potential in her discussion of
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sacrifice. The “sacred,” a derivative of the Latin word sacer, has a link to sacrifice. Kristeva
describes this link when she states, “the sacred is a unifying ‘sacrifice’...that separates, forbids,
and pacifies the social pact. Yet a second type of sacred is suggested in the same societies,
signifying ‘overflowing life’ and ‘growth” (Kristeva, 2012, p.52). This notion in Kristeva's work
is heavily influenced by Georges Bataille's conception of the left and right sacred but it is not
spelled out with all the nuances of Bataille's analytic. For Bataille, “the sacred has been
generated by taboo violating rituals, and sacrifices” (Pearce, 2001, p.222). Transgression helps
release the excess energy and unproductive wastes in society (Pearce, 2001). After the sacred has
been established, a pure, clean form of the sacred can form in interaction. For instance, the
Eucharist, or receiving Corpus Christi, stems from the final supper before the literal sacrifice of
Jesus Christ’s flesh and blood. Because “taboo marks the place of horror”, mishandling the
Eucharist is perceived as a direct act against Jesus Christ (Pawlett, 2016, p.30). Regardless,
Kristeva does consider a dual-nature sacred, whereby both sides are intertwined, fluid, and
dependent.
Kristeva's use of the carnivalesque when forming her theory of the Semiotic and
Symbolic acknowledges sacred phenomena and events, including its ambivalence as found in the
duality of “food and excrement” (Moi, 1986, p.49). In many ways, the sacred mimics the
relationship of the Semiotic and Symbolic. Both the productive and destructive side of the sacred
need each other. One functions to support the existence of the other and together they demarcate
societal boundaries. Sacrifice, similarly, works in the destructive side of the sacred in order to
enforce and reproduce the productive side of the sacred. Datta (2005) explains, "human
existence is inherently bound up with the meaning of one's mortality, a problem that the rite of
sacrifice attempts to come to grips with...Social life is born, dies, is renewed" (p.621; cf. Hegel
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1990). Religion, and the sacred, is a way of facing death. Society chooses to sacrifice in order to
renew the produced values. A sacrifice represents a value, and the purification of a transgressed
value. As mentioned, transgression shows the construction; it pulls the curtain. In order to
maintain the sacred as a symbolic element in the Symbolic order, its construction must not be
exposed. This in itself is not an issue. However, when power imbalances are present in a society,
the issue of who holds the power of sacrifice and the sacred in society and who is affected by the
boundaries it creates becomes apparent.

Women and the Sacred
Religion, for Kristeva, is what separates sexes so drastically. This separation allows for
exclusion from the rights given to the group. Kristeva explains, "universality is our
god: this is what guarantees each citizen—regardless of sex, origin, belief, and so on—equal
access to rights, all rights...the metaphysical universal, like its republican variant, excluded
women in a similar way" (Kristeva, 2012, p.51). Kristeva likens the exclusion of women from
the sacred as similar to the exclusion of foreigners in the Roman empire in order to highlight the
construct of universality. Datta (2009) explains that, “sacral exclusion is argued to be the
foundational relation in the formation of western polities” (p.170). Exclusion is a social fact of
Western society and what is excluded is what we deem as a threat—any viable alternative group
that may have an “alternative life of its own” (Datta, 2009, p.170). Guaranteed rights do not exist
and we choose who is included; nothing is inherent.
Both Kristeva and Luce Irigaray focus on this question of power and the sacred in their
writings. Irigaray (1986) explains that "something else which is obvious: in sacrificial religions,
religious and social rites are almost universally in the hands of men" (p.8). Women are not
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permitted, are not given the power to be active subjects within the sacred (Irigaray, 1986). Gane
(1992) explains part of men's ascendency through the concept of pure and impure within people.
Following Durkheim’s analysis of the incest taboo, Gane explains that individual blood
represents the blood of the group (Gane, 1992, p.107). This is why if someone is murdered, it is
considered an act against the community. Women, who bleed during menstruation, are spilling
the blood of the group and are then impure and able to contaminate others in the group (Gane,
1992, p. 107). Bataille (1957) further explains that, “The menstrual discharge is further
associated with sexual activity and the accompanying suggestion of degradation” (p.54). To
contaminate the sacred is sacrilege. Datta (2019) defines sacrilege as “a failure to maintain the
separation of the sacred from the profane, resulting in serious harms to the offender and
potentially the community as a whole” (p.95). Gane (1992) further notes, "Mauss emphasised
that same point adding that this tendency was strengthened by the fact that women were also
considered the carriers of malign forces which rendered them dangerous" (p.109). Kristeva
(1974) narrows this notion to specifically Judaic and Christian religions in her writing. Judaic
and Christian religion conceive of women as the silent other and privilege the patriarchal as
opposed to previous religions that celebrated the maternal and were fertility oriented (1974).
Neither theorist suggests that religion or the sacred is inherently male-oriented, but they do
conceive of the current symbolic structure of the sacred as male.
For Irigaray, the imbalance comes from female exclusion in the realm of the sacred and
in the ritual of sacrifice. Irigaray (1986) explains how women, “are therefore reinserted into a
form of sociality that has been determined by sacrifice. They haven’t been included in it and
they’re still excluded from it. At this level they remain an inert body, paralyzed in and through
cultural bonds which aren’t their own” (p.9). Datta (2019) explains that sacrifice is
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hegemonizing. It creates a small in-group with a dominant discourse that can create a “system of
valuation”, where they alone can determine which subjects and objects are more important than
others (Datta, 2019, p.97). By denying women full participation, women can never be fully
initiated into the dominant group, thus "a sub-group that excludes women and children, and those
who don’t belong to the clan" is formed (Datta, 2019, p.99). Women are not permitted an active
role though they are subject to the restrictions and boundaries of the sacred. Irigaray discusses
sacrifice for the basis of subjectivity. Caldwell clarifies this point when stating that, “one term is
elevated as a regulative ideal or standard for order, and the other is reduced to the constitutive
but excluded ground of this order” (Caldwell, 2015, p.18). Male subjectivity is the ideal,
benchmark for subjectivity and female subjectivity becomes the sacrifice for it. By privileging
one form of subjectivity, “it denies the worldly conditions of existence such as embodiment,
sexuation, and the relation to others” (Caldwell, 2015, p.19). In turn, women are denied the same
conditions of existence. They are not subjects because their subjectivity is rendered a necessary
casualty to the male subjectivity.
Kristeva is cognizant of this female exclusion as well and argues much of it stems from
the way women are depicted and symbolized in Christian and Judaic religions. In particular,
Kristeva refers to the figure of Mary, and more generally, the virgin. Virginity is seen as a
necessary credential to the inclusion of women in the sacred: “this virginity imposes women’s
exclusion from sexuality, a punitive chastity that seems to be the price women must pay for
admission to the sacred—and to representation” (Kristeva, 2012, p. 64). An impossible ideal,
sustained by the ego-ideal, women are forced to navigate who they should be with who they are.
Should women be admitted to this regime of the sacred by upholding this ideal, they simply
become the fantasy of the Virgin. The place of the female subject, and the sexual female subject
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specifically, within this religious structure is an object or an abject. Denying the role of the
Virgin would question the very system, so exclusion or at least quarantine for maximum control
is necessary to uphold this sacred.

The Pregnant Subject and the Sacred
Kristeva carries this notion forward to analyse how the sacred has affected women’s
reproduction by controlling their experience of it. Kristeva (2012) states, "Christendom went on
to truly construct the maternal experience" (p.211). What she means when she states this is that
by switching from religions based on fertility and maternity, and by forwarding the image of the
Virgin mother, the notion of creation and externality is questioned. Women are no longer those
with power to create but are vessels for the monotheistic male subjectivity to reproduce His
being: "recognition of virginity as an unthinkable externality, a challenge to the logics of
beginnings, causes and effects" (Kristeva, 2012, p.211). Masculinity becomes central and women
are the antithesis. Women, in maternity, create life. That recognition of a physically and
emotionally challenging task is important. In monotheistic religions such as Judaism and
Christendom, they are the children of God not women. Though women give birth to children,
and it is their sacred duty to do so, the children are God’s will. Women become tools. This
notion still exists through the image of the Virgin and women’s unrecognized labor. The image
of the Virgin elevates motherhood to be a fulfilling, natural vocation that is necessary for female
fulfillment. Women are expected to want to be mothers. Irigaray (1986) seconds this notion
whereby the essential work women do remains unpaid due to lack of recognition: "there is no
constitution, development or renewal of the social body without women's work: their cathartic
function as loved mistress or wife, their function as reproducing mother, their functions as carer
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and housewife assuring life and survival" (p.15). None of these roles are paid and yet each one is
essential for society, in its current form, to be sustained. If society acknowledged these roles that
women carry, the masculine superiority is dissolved.
Georges Bataille also sees dysfunction in a Christian sacred. Christianity does not allow
for transgression. Transgression is always viewed as “repugnant” (Bataille, 1957, p.89). While
primitive cultures suspended the law and allowed for acts of transgression that created a feeling
of unity and belonging, Christianity enforces consequences to “sin” (Bataille, 1957, p.89).
Sacrifice is altered to become murder with the death of Jesus Christ and eroticism is deemed a
sin of the flesh to be contained (Bataille, 1957, p.89). The left sacred is rejected from
Christianity: “only in Christianity did the existence of the impure world become a profanation”
(Bataille, 1957, p.122). Enjoying and engaging in corporeal experiences is rejected under
Christianity. Though Christianity has become less common in contemporary society, the image
of the Virgin is still apparent. Women are denied pleasure in corporeal engagement when the
image of the Virgin persists. Sin is still evident in taboos and women are not permitted to freely
transgress many taboos, particularly those of eroticism.
Moreover, women are naturalized into believing motherhood is “essential”. The Western
naturalization of motherhood, and its equation with femininity is a notion Kristeva chastises and
what she calls a religious myth in crisis (Oliver, 1993, p104). In order to be a woman, a real
woman, there is an idea that we must have children. As Kristeva (1974) explains, "divided from
man...wife, daughter, or sister, or all of them at once, but she will rarely have a name. Her
function is to assure procreation" (p.140). Without women actively filling these essential roles, in
order to not risk protest, women must believe they should be mothers and that they should be an
impossible ideal mother. When they are unable to fulfill the role, as it is impossible to do, the
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women are stigmatized or abjected. Both Kristeva and Irigaray highlight this concept when
discussing the figure of the Virgin in hysterical terms with hopes of demonstrating how the
sacred uses the Virgin to neutralize the contradictions of the maternal experience (SummersBremner, 2008, p.179). Hysterical terms are extremely emotional and transcend social order in
order to juxtapose the ego-ideal of the Virgin with the abject reality. The hysteric refuses the
place others wish to interpolate them into.
By describing abjection as a place in society, the sacred acts as a threshold to that place.
Kristeva states, “The sacred appearing as a celebration of the passage of the border between two
structures or two identities (inside/outside, woman/man, child/mother)” (Kristeva, 2012, p.210).
She is describing the liminal quality of the sacred. Datta (2009) notes the distinction between
sacer and sanctus. He claims "Sacer defines the outside of the community as seen from the
inside or the inside of the community as seen from the outside" (p.179). Sanctus on the other
hand is the threshold separating that inside and outside that allows for the reproduction of the
sacred by sustaining the power relations that maintain the sacred (Datta, 2009, p.179). If the
abject is a place that shakes identity, and the sacred is the boundary of identity, transgressing the
sacred leads to abjection. However, if the identity being held as ideal is male, then women are
forced to transgress the sacred thereby being forced into abjection. Similarly, if the ideal image
of the woman or the mother is unattainable, the Virgin for instance, transgression is forced and
women are forced into abjection.
A seemingly impossible predicament, are women doomed to abjection? Drawing on
Georges Bataille’s concept of weak prohibition, Kristeva (1980b) claims, “collective existence
does not seem to have, in such cases, sufficient strength to dam up the abject or demoniacal
potential of the feminine” (p.255). Women are still active subjects. There is a clear desire to
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control female experiences such as the maternal, but there is also active resistance. The
boundaries demarcating sacrosanct principles are fluid and are not as simple as good versus evil.
The dual nature of the sacred, and uneven power relations, create a weighted scale where the
same action by two people is deemed differently. As Oliver (1993) puts it, "Kristeva argues that
without a secular discourse or myth of motherhood that absorbs abjection, abjection is misplaced
onto women" (p.104). A discourse is able to drown out another. For Kristeva, creating a stronger
secular discourse to overcome current discourse on the maternal is essential.

Examining the Influence of Georges Bataille in Kristeva
The sacred shapes the phenomenological experience of the maternal. For Kristeva, "maternity
calls into question the boundary between culture and nature. She chooses maternity as a
prototype precisely because it breaks down borders between culture and nature and between
subject and other" (Oliver, 1993, p.100). Biological and social reproduction intersect in the
maternal experience. While Kristeva begins an analytic of the sacred and its duality, she misses
the nuances captured by Bataille. By using Bataille’s concept of the sacred in conjunction with
Kristeva’s phenomenological strength, we are able to better theorize the phenomenology of the
maternal. This includes Bataille's under-explored concepts of the sacred and sacrifice (Shilling &
Mellor, 2013) and in particular, Bataille's use of the irrational (Datta, 2005). On the other hand,
Bataille’s analytic is enhanced by Kristeva’s use of psychoanalysis as the unconscious is
important to Bataille’s concept of the sacred (Datta, 2005). The sacred is not inherently rational,
though it is often presented as such. Understanding the emotional and irrational constituents of
the sacred is important for a more comprehensive consideration. The subject, the object, and the
abject are perceived through the sacred and nothing is inherently sacred but is created as such.
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This means how we treat the subject, the object, and the abject are directed through a constructed
perception that influences us. Bataille is able to explore these gaps in Kristeva's work through his
more detailed conception of the sacred.

Emile Durkheim and Georges Bataille’s Conception of the Sacred
Bataille’s theory of the sacred is an extension, albeit a darker and more phenomenological one,
of Emile Durkheim’s theory of the sacred. Durkheim’s conclusion, that individual experience
and collective experience can be trusted and is actually foundational to social cohesion comes in
opposition to the Kantian frame of thought pertinent in his time. For Durkheim, perception has a
social basis (Nakhaie & Datta, 2018, p.146). This social basis is a moral bond (Datta &
Milbrandt, 2014, p.483) and this moral bond, or solidarity, is what allows for shared values and
rules that enforce and sustain those values (Rosati, 2003). Bataille discusses the sacred as an
absence or something that does not have a place and yet it forces a space for itself through
transgressing the profane. The sacred isn’t then a thing as we make it out to be but an effect. In
transgressing, or interrupting the process, we connect to primal, fundamental experiences that are
essential to constituting subjecthood. Phenomenologically, we experience the subject beyond the
ego-ideal in transgression.
Often, the re-energizing of the community means “a sacrifice of self-centered desire if
individuals are to enjoy cultural existence” (Shilling & Mellor, 2011, p.23). For instance,
Kristeva describes the sacrifice of narcissistic love in maternity that must occur in order for the
mother-child relationship to develop without dysfunction. In order to create these moral bonds,
we need institutions as vehicles of social reproduction (Pearce, 2014). People have to want to
sacrifice their own wants for the larger society. Durkheim (1995) states, “it is in the school of
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collective life that the individual has learned to form ideals. It is by assimilating the ideals
worked out by society that the individual is able to conceive of the ideal" (p.425). The sacred
immerses the individual in the ideal of what life could be and should be if we follow the rules
and values given. This of course is not a reality but a necessary fantasy to ensure social cohesion.
Durkheim surpasses the notion of religion proper in his theory of the sacred. He defines
religion “as a system of obligatory beliefs and practices relative to sacred things” (Datta &
Milbrandt, 2014, p.474). Narrowing this definition further, “Durkheim argued that religion needs
to be defined in terms of the collective representations and practices that establish, refer to, and
reproduce a radical difference in a society” (Datta, 2005, p.618) The sacred is set apart and
forbidden, just as the differences between sacred set apart opposing societies. It is a social
marker of inclusion through exclusion. All collectivities are marked somehow to attribute them
to a particular social group (Shilling & Mellor, 2011). The sacred is created by moments of
collective effervescence whereby “a preceding collective subjectivity is emptied and what is left
is the experience of the force/drive of social existence” (Datta, 2005, p. 635). This moment is
relived in sacred rituals and celebrated in totemic collective representations (Datta, 2005; 2008).
These representations help determine how social subjects think about themselves and others. It
affects their judgements and their actual experience of an event, situation, or relationship.
Crucially, the sacred is constructed (Pearce 2014; Horgan 2014). The totem for Durkheim
"highlights the role of collective representations in legitimating a social order" (Datta, 2008,
p.285). The totem represents the sacred. It stands for the "classificatory schema of a cosmos"
(Datta, 2008, p.291), which orders how we act, what relationships we build, and how we view
our society. Datta (2008) refers to this as our beliefs, which determine how we view our society,
and our rites, which are the actions we enact in society (p.292). Nothing is sacred in and of itself
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but is made sacred. Rituals help sustain the sacred by recreating the process of the sacred
becoming sacred. As Shilling and Mellor (2011) explain, the sacred structures the expression of
rituals “rituals that are themselves focused upon the totem of the collectivity” (p.20). Rituals help
re-enact that moment of collective effervescence. The sacred is “a factor of social solidarity and
as the collective representation of social solidarity itself” (Rosati, 2003, p.174). Religion is able
to recreate its power, or draw its power from itself, through ritual practices that subjects use to
cope with the forces of power (Habermas, 2011). A cycle that refuels itself unless social
solidarity or the collective representation behind the sacred loses force. This notion is included in
Bataille's conception of "sovereignty" (Datta, 2019, p.176). Transgression is able to create new
moments of collective effervescence, which are able to cement a new sacred especially among
the group of individuals who are not included in the current sacred order (Datta 2008).
Anomie, according to Durkheim, refers to a state of existential impasses about the future
with no clear basis for choosing between them. It tends to present itself in times of social change,
where old norms are questioned, but new norms and alternatives have not been established
(Jones & Barbara, n.d.). Some theorists suggest an emerging anomie or an already present
anomie. Datta (2005) suggests the lessening of authority and increasing permissiveness in
contemporary society has led to anomie, or in Kristeva's terms, "new maladies of the soul" (p.
629). Elliot (2009) describes Putnam's interpretation of anomie in society whereby "disconnected
individualism replaces civic engagement...[and] transactional encounters replace genuine
relationships" (p.29). Finally, Pearce (2014) explains how people under these conditions
"become open to the influence of anti-communal discourse promoting anti-social conduct" (p.
625-626). The rise of the individual and the dissipation of the village, pregnant women find
themselves in a community only concerned with individual needs. When the sacred loses its
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power or becomes dysfunctional, leading to a questioning of its values, social cohesion falters
until a new sacred can secure and differentiate the "clan".
There is another element to sustaining the sacred, which provides cohesion. When a
hegemonic collective representation is questioned, the sacred evokes fear. Sacred things are
protected by prohibitions. Just as the sacred is constructed, the profane is constructed. Durkheim
(1995) states, “sacred things are things protected and isolated by prohibitions; profane things are
those things to which the prohibitions apply (p.38). Pearce (2014) explains, “collective
representations indicate what is sacred and what is profane. Sacredness does not derive from
qualities of the object itself” (p.621). Society determines what will be considered profane and
how those profane things will be oriented to the sacred. However, there is a key element missing
in this definition. Neither God nor the Devil are profane, but we certainly do not see them in the
same light. Both function together to keep a particular sacred protected and while the Devil has
the ability to profane the sacred, he himself is sacred. This is why “though the sacred and profane
are defined in opposition to one another” (Horgan, 2014, p.744), they are highly dependent on
one another, fluid, and interlinked (Datta & Milbrandt, 2011, p.488). There is clearly a
supplementary aspect to the sacred.
Durkheim mentions the potential of a dual sacred particularly when discussing how “the
hyper excitement associated with effervescent assemblies could for a time lead to transgression
and the overturning of social norms, and the injury and even death of participants'' (Shilling &
Mellor, 2011, p.28). The dual sacred points to the ambiguity in the sacred. For Datta (2008),
“attending to this ambivalence of the sacred is fundamentally important since it points to an
inherent instability and volatility in sacrality itself” (p.286). Moreover, negative rites, also called
prohibitions, in the form of taboo and stigma keep the sacred order and prevent profanation
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(Datta & Milbrandt, 2014). The profane world refers to individualistic, utilitarian, and/or
economic aspects of life (Datta & Milbrandt, 2014, p.482). To profane an object or a subject
would be to take it out of the sacred and into the everyday world for utilitarian purposes. For
instance, Durkheim in Incest, The origins of Taboo, discusses how menstruating women would
be excluded from the social for a period of time. As mentioned, the menstruating woman, able to
contaminate the sacred and turn it profane, is not herself profane (Gane, 1992). The totemic
principle of collective blood is transgressed in menstruation. She holds a dark power and a power
that needs to be controlled in order to protect the light sacred. Datta and Milbrandt (2014)
discuss the tendency for the body to be profane, whereas the soul or the social element of the
person representing the larger clan tends to be sacred. Female experiences of menstruation,
maternity, and childbirth tend to have a lot of corporeal experiences and elements of the totemic
life force of the group. The desire to control these elements comes from the notion of this darker
sacred being powerful enough to profane the light sacred. Georges Bataille champions this
notion in his works and theorizes the left sacred in a way Durkheim had not yet done.
The sacred is always presented as an "ought" question (Rosati, 2003, p.174), supplying
content to the ideal and exemplary form of social life. When there is disagreement on what ought
to be done, either because social change has brought about a new question not answered by the
current sacred or because social change has demonstrated a value that opposes the current sacred,
social cohesion weakens and anomie proliferates. An example comes from the rapid advances of
the feminist movement, which opposed patriarchal values. As mentioned, Western notions of the
sacred tend to be rooted in the Judeo-Christian tradition which carry male-centric values. This
rooting in Christianity is also noted by Cornel West (2011) in The Power of Religion in the
Public Sphere, reproducing male dominance.
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In order to redress and remedy anomie, but reject the dysfunction in current sacred
reference points, both Durkheim and later Kristeva call for a new secular sacred. For Kristeva,
this secular sacred looks like a sacred based on the values of respect and love, which she claims
is mirrored in the healthy mother-child relationship. She refers to this secular sacred as
“herethics”. For Kristeva, herethics could replace the male-centric sacred that currently
dominates. By changing the discourse associated with an experience, the experience changes.
This means women would be able to experience pregnancy on their own terms. Such a
possibility must start with examining the experiences of different people in relation to the sacred.
A phenomenological approach is necessary in order to determine how to ease the maladies
experienced. Moreover, understanding the dynamism of the sacred in these experiences is
necessary. In this area, Durkheim mentions but never fully develops a dual nature sacred.
Bataille takes up this task with particular attention to phenomenology in his work.

Georges Bataille’s Left Sacred
In addition to Durkheimian social science, Georges Bataille drew on the surrealist movement,
including its experimentations with psychoanalysis. His relation to surrealism includes his
skepticism of external data that does not consider unity and connectedness in experience
(Campbell, 1999). This is not to suggest Bataille ignored social reality. As Richardson (1994)
points out, Bataille was an avid researcher. Simply, Bataille’s projects at their core have the aim
of transgressing to escape the bourgeois individual “I” in order to connect to the larger social
group or ultimately, to the cosmos. Durkheim’s influence on Bataille weighs heavily in this goal,
and Kristeva also takes up this notion in trying to break away from power imbalances in certain

76

discourses in order to allow subjects to feel moments of unity. All at heart are projects of totality
that are concerned with the experiences and enrichment of the human experience.
We experience the sacred as both “captivating and terrible” (Bataille, 2018, p.30). We are
drawn into it and at the same time disgusted and fearful of it. For every pure element, there is an
impure, or an “ecstatic horror which is at the root of religion” (Bataille, 2018, p.34). Bataille
(2018) explains that, “the impure is generated from the pure and vice versa. It is in the possibility
of these transmutations that we discover the ambiguity of the sacred” (p.33). This ambiguity
presents us with an attraction and repulsion to the sacred. Bataille's analysis of attraction and
repulsion is best described through "heterology". As mentioned, heterology is what Bataille
(2018) refers to as his science of religion and it includes the study of the excluded parts of life
that are censored by our need to idealize (p.29). Bataille (2018) explains that, “ambivalence
begins only from this base. It appears in the obsessional neurosis as a desire to touch sexual
objects, a desire contradicted by a strong prohibition, but it only acquires its human meaning at
the moment when we see the abyss that separates such objects from the rest of the world” (p.35).
When we transgress, we are able to reveal the thresholds holding the sacred together. More
importantly, we are able to see them as constructed. The influence of the ego-ideal in heterology
should be noted in order to understand the human need to idealize though Bataille does not
explicitly use this term. Heterology is related to scatology, or the science of excrement because
both are entirely other from the profane world (Bataille, 2018, p.30). Reflecting back on
Bataille's notion of heterogeneous elements as those aspects of life such as chance which escape
social order, heterology brings forth an irrational and unstable point in the sacred. Importantly,
heterology brings forth an area of phenomenology that is outside social order. Lacan’s The Real
surpasses signification, and therefore, it is a place of excess (Botting, 1994). A very Bataillean
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point, this excess, beyond what is normally delimited and permitted, is what surges and
interrupts the symbolic (Botting, 1994). The sacred for Bataille, is experienced not known
(Pawlett, 2016, p.21). Similarly, the Real is only ever felt through the body. In this respect, it is
similar to the Lacanian Real, but in a more sociological vein.
Unlike the conventional understanding of the sacred, which generally sees those things
outside of the mundane as good, cherished, and beneficial, Bataille saw two intermingled genres
of the sacred realm that were both separate from the profane utility focused realm. As Riley
(2005) notes, sacer means both holy and damned (p.28). The sacred is the world of diffusing
power into objects so as to relate to the social. The sacred has a social basis that creates cohesion
and a volatile order. Bataille’s examination of the right sacred is very much in agreement with
Durkheim’s analysis of the sacred. The right sacred is that which is beneficent, good,
traditionally thought of as sacred. Rosati (2003) defines the right sacred as “what is pure, sane,
good, valuable...the right side is a factor of social solidarity, a religious element that overcomes
religion understood in a strict sense, a factor of collective attraction” (Rosati, p.181). Generally,
the right sacred is rational and moral. Bataille extends Durkheim’s work through his notion of
the left sacred. The concept of the left sacred is not novel to Bataille’s work. Rosati (2003)
discusses Mircea Eliade’s notion of an ambiguous sacred referred to as “nouminoso” (p.178).
Rosati (2003) defines the left sacred as “what is impure, disturbing, bad, all that a collective
identity would like to refuse to acknowledge as part of itself, what it perceives as radically
negative” (p.181). The left sacred is that with the power to instill fear, reduce social norms, and
create change. Both the left and right sacred are separate from the profane and both create social
solidarity, either by fear or connection.
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Taboo, stigma, and ritual extend from the left sacred. Specifically, the left sacred is used
to protect the status quo and the norms cherished in the right sacred. Pawlett (2015) explains that
Bataille distinguishes the left sacred as those parts of life that are repulsive and horrifying yet are
awe inspiring. The left sacred is the executioner that ensures laws are followed, or the devil that
ensures society’s morals are followed lest a lifetime of punishment in hell. The dark, scary
portion of the sacred is crucial to ensure the right is followed and remains dominant. The right
sacred must be kept pure, which is why there must be a devil to carry out the punishment. Where
initially, one might think of God and the Devil as opposite, they are actually intricately
connected and work together to instill moral standards. Moreover, the sacred for Bataille, as for
Durkheim, extends beyond strict religious domains. For Bataille, “the sacred is a way of
conceiving of, and relating to, a realm of things” (Pearce, 2003, p.55), and the way creative and
destructive energies are used in these processes. The sacred is a constraining force, and at times
oppressive but we do not necessarily feel it is. When taboo and stigma in the left sacred are
masked by the benevolent right, we do not feel our freedom being constrained, we feel social
cohesion and empowerment. We feel that we are part of the group.
The profane, for Durkheim, as for Bataille, is simply the world that is concerned with
utility and the individual subject as “I” (Leuba, 1913). To use an item as a tool is to have an end
in mind. The sacred, on the other hand, has a connection to us as a social whole. It is an end in
itself. The sacred is connected to tradition but only so much as the tradition “come[s] to us as the
expression of powers superior to us and connected with us…and when failure to conform to
these ways entails danger” (Leuba, 1913, p.327). For instance, a slave is no longer a person. The
slave has a specific use attached to them and their active subjecthood is taken. The slave is a
profaned person. Important to this definition are the fluidity, the dynamism, and the movement
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that this conception allows. Objects can move from a sacred to a profane state, and the right
sacred can interact with the left as opposed to older conceptions of the sacred that kept
maleficent and beneficent separated (Riley, 2005). Returning to the mind-body divide that
Bataille (1989) also discusses, the body tends to be considered profane, a tool for the mind. The
corporeal subject is slave to the social subject. For Bataille, this divide does not allow for
continuity and to truly engage with the sacred, we need to reach a state of continuity (Bataille,
1989). This also means that any left sacred heavily associated with corporeality tends to be
dismissed as illegitimate and profane (Bataille, 1989). By rejecting the mind-body divide, a
whole new area of sacred phenomenological events can be explored through the left sacred.
Religions, then, are beliefs combined with practices that seek to control, to an extent, the sacred
through action (Leuba, 1913). Here, Datta's (2019) notion of sanctus, or the "reproduction of an
already existing set of dominant normative coordinates" is evoked (p.179). When properly
performed, experiences of the sacred affect the soul and the body. The profane is the world
concerned with individuals as individuals and objects whereas the left sacred has active energy to
alter the relation of subjects to objects.
Bataille tends to discuss sacrifice in terms of bodily communication through violence and
eroticism far more than he does through creativity as Kristeva tends to do. Though Kristeva
(2011) does argue in Reliance, or Maternal Eroticism that motherhood is erotic as it is a passion
meaning there is an intimate connection to another. Sacrifice is “socially creative, but also
potentially violent” and modernity lacks this energy (Shilling & Mellor, 2013 p. 322). Sacrifice,
and transgression allow for collective effervescence to form. Collective effervescence allows
people to step out of the profane and connect to each other. Not only does this allow for social
cohesion in the feeling of belonging, but it reminds the group of the totemic principle which
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solidifies the sacred (Datta & Milbrandt, p.490). Datta & Milbrandt (2014), drawing on
Durkheim, explain that in moments of collective effervescence, "the sacred, is produced on such
occasions. This social force is ecstatic (from the Greek, “ekstasis”) in which people “stand”
(stasis) “out of” (ek-) their usual placement in the order" (p.487). These traits of humans are able
to create a feeling of continuity within us. For Bataille, eroticism is violent in the sense that we
are taken out of our normal “I”; The individual identity is dissolved.
“But sexual reproduction, basically a matter of cellular division just like asexual
reproduction, brings in a new kind of transition from discontinuity to continuity. Sperm and
ovum are to begin with discontinuous entities, but they unite, and consequently a continuity
comes into existence between them to form a new entity from the death and disappearance of the
separate beings” (Bataille, 1962, p.14)
The subject that we are in everyday social life is completely stripped away. The body is
not born social but becomes social when that which connects us to animality is destroyed
(Bataille, 1989). People, just as animals, all begin as “water in water” but are immediately
separated from all other people as named individuals (Bataille, 1990) thus introducing the social
as a form of negativity, in the Hegelian dialectical sense. Our name is a unique marker of who we
are away from all other species. It is the first question we are usually asked in order to establish
ourselves. Our imminence, or our natural animal state becomes conflicted with our sense of
immediacy stemming from our consciousness of death (Bataille, 1990). We understand our life is
limited because of death, and this matters to us because we are constituted as unique subjects as
opposed to a part of a larger continuity that continues past our individual life. We have divided
the soul and the body to make our particular life carry on past its biological lifespan. The tombs
we mark, creations we produce, memorials we hold, and pictures we take are all to keep a
specific name in memory. Even though the body has deceased, the social soul can live on. In
other words, as subjects we seek to transcend social organization as opposed to living in non-“I”
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immanence. Often, we do this by rejecting the sacred but this transcendence is just an illusion
though, and only in moments of immanence, when we lose the “I” do we have moments of
continuity and intimacy where we are connected to other beings and our “self” in its purest form.
Direk (2004) sees Bataille’s discussion of violence and the sacred in terms of “immanent
violence” and “transcendental violence”. Immanent violence, that moves us into continuity and
temporarily destroys the “I”, comes through sacrifice, eroticism, and laughter (Direk, 2004).
These extreme bodily states bring us outside ourselves in a sovereign experience. Transcendental
violence has a utility attached to it because its purpose is to lift us above the immanence, and
animality, we come from. Transcendental violence subordinates or has a clear hierarchical order
involved (Direk, 2004), which means transcendence can never be “water in water”. The
individual is no longer the social self but becomes dissolved as the “screaming bitch” during
climax (Bataille, 1962).
Moments of extreme bodily pleasure or pain bring us back to our animal state and thus,
back to moments of continuity of dynamic being “in itself,” and we are able to experience
corporeality outside of discourse, our noumenal aspects. That is why in most cases, pleasure
(including jouissance) has to have some element of transgression and the simplest sin is that of
nudity (Bataille, 1989). Clothing is entirely social and takes us away from our animality.
Removing it takes us closer to immanence since the sacred is communication through the body.
Shilling and Mellor (2013) state, “It is not just the existence of things set apart from the profane
world...but the precise manner in which sacralization occurs: diverse processes of making things
sacred cultivate very different forms of society, and very different social subjects” (p.324). The
violence of dissolving oneself into a partner can occur erotically or through literal violence as
Bataille suggests; however, immanent violence can occur maternally much in the same way or
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creatively. There is a fundamental need for continuity that drives people towards art, religion,
creativity, and the sacred (Pawlett, 2015). Direk (2004) suggests reaching Bataille’s notion of
immanence through poetry is possible because it is a sacrifice of language as rational discourse.
Both are a self-sacrifice, not of death but of dissolved identity, which is what Bataille links to
continuity (Pawlett, 2015). Specifically, death of the social self. Things are made sacred through
“ritual expenditures” (Shilling & Mellor, 2013, p.232). In engaging with the Semiotic, the
symbolic element is temporarily sacrificed. Sacrifice itself is the offering of something good, or
in other words expenditure for the sake of expenditure. It does not need to be in the form that
Bataille suggests though there are societies that are structured for erotic and violent sacrifice.
The left sacred is intricately tied to the abject—walking a fine, flexible line between
protective and dangerous. The left sacred evokes the disgust and fear that is used to control and
contain. The dual nature of the sacred then marks it as ambiguous. It attracts and repulses
(Rosati, 2003). With an intricate connection to the abject, the left sacred is a fine, soluble
boundary between protective and dangerous. Where the profane subject is an object, the abject
subject has the potential to surpass the individual “I”. As the subject engages in transgression,
they are marked as profane in order to strip away the uncontrollable power. The “subject and
object are a series of flows...fragments capable of being linked together” (Grosz, 1989, p.167).
The abject is overdetermined and has numerous relations shaping it. Together, the relations work
to reproduce the social being, not the biological being.
The sacred establishes norms that are profoundly intertwined with the body and how we
experience the body. Importantly, it is not the sole experience and there is experience outside
discourse. Butler (1993) explains, “Freud will state quite clearly that bodily pain is the
precondition of bodily self discovery” (p.58). Pain has a corporeal base first and foremost. At
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times, discourse may mediate pain but it is foundationally physical. It is a phenomenological
experience beyond discourse. By combining Kristeva’s psychoanalysis and Bataille’s
phenomenology with the sacred, an analysis of the interiority of social constituted existence,
inside the body but beyond law or corporeal acceptable habit is possible (Grosz, 1989, p.117).

Abjection in the Sacred
The most notable intersection between Butler, Kristeva and Bataille concerns a consideration of
abjection. Bataille’s concept of abjection is centered on the filth, shit, piss and the horror that
draws us in and disgusts. It is the body being pulled from the wreckage as we stare, the homeless
person yelling on the subway, or the uncanny feeling of being alone in a wax museum and
importantly, the notion that we are one small step away from being that—subhuman. We have a
curiosity that gravitates us towards the abject, but we never want to be immersed on anyone
else’s terms. We are voyeurs and we are animals. This is why what can be seen and what can be
felt is immensely important to Bataille. His focus on corporeality, bodily flows and movement,
and how these connect people, are central to his phenomenology. Under current societal
structures, “Kristeva argues that without a secular discourse or myth of motherhood that absorbs
abjection, abjection is misplaced onto women” (Oliver, 1993, p.104). Women’s bodies, women
as real subjects, are not represented in the sacred, are not active subjects in the sacred, but are
bodies that matter too much. The need to control women’s reproductive power, sexuality, and
maternity, force women into a space of abjection. Both motherhood and women’s sexuality are
heavily policed (Mokobocho-Mohlakoana, 2008). So long as the process is controlled, the left
sacred is controlled. The moment the pregnant subject transgresses, the left sacred—not the
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Virgin but the whore—appears into identity and into the sacred. Abjection is used to eliminate
the threat to the myth.
We are drawn in to the abject not from enjoyment of disgust but because it tells us
something fundamental about ourselves. It sorts through our identity and is familiar because it is
a place we have visited before. Both Butler and Kristeva theorize discourse as an organizing and
oppressive force. However, whereas Butler rejects any ontology grounded in the body
(Chambers, 2007), Kristeva posits a foundational human experience that is separate, though
admittedly intertwined, with discourse. Due to her corporeal engagement and interest in
sacrosanct principles, Kristeva works far better than Butler in synthesis with the sacred and
abjection. The Semiotic, as theorized by Kristeva, is the body and soul in communication
(Oliver, 2010). The Semiotic is rhythmic, corporeal, and largely related to what Bataille calls
immanent experience. Both Kristeva and Bataille see the importance of bodily communication,
though Kristeva places the origin of this desire in the Chora: the pre-symbolic world of the
womb that the fetus begins in that comes to direct our drives (Oliver, 2010). Essentially, the
Chora is the language we speak before we are socialized into discourse, a basis of continuity in
human existence and experience. Once we are brought into discourse, we can no longer be
submersed in the Chora and can only occasionally reach these freeing moments of continuity
through engagement with the Semiotic.

Conclusion
Though Kristeva mentions a dual sacred, she does not adequately theorize it. Using Bataille’s
radical Durkheimian sacred, and especially his use of the left sacred, a better analytic of the
pregnant subject can be made. The restrictions, taboos, and expectations of the pregnant subject
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become more apparent when viewed through the boundaries the sacred imposes. This is evident
in the image of the Virgin, which encourages women to have children as a natural vocation or
even a sacred duty. In order to remove these expectations, a new secular sacred to replace the
image of the Virgin must be brought forth. For Kristeva, this is “herethics.” By using herethics,
women will be able to control more of their pregnancy experience and be able to enjoy the
corporeal elements of the experience. Moreover, herethics allows women empowerment through
abjection as opposed to an oppressive, punitive abjection.
Hegel, Bataille noted, saw that discourse separated parts from totality (Bataille, 1990,
p.14). This leads to a fragmented experience of the self and a longing for feeling whole. For
Kristeva, the Semiotic is most often reached through poetry that breaks away from discourse but
can also occur through bodily experiences that are rhythmic such as fetal pulsations,
contractions, fetal hiccups, etc. Because the fetus is incapable of Symbolic language, the
maternal figure experiences the Semiotic through the bodily communication of the fetus. For
Bataille, engaging in transgression can lead to ecstatic moments where collective effervescence,
a feeling that exceeds discourse, allows for moments of continuity. Importantly, the transgression
must be on one’s own terms. We must abject ourselves as opposed to being deemed abject,
shaking loose the constraints of acceptable bourgeois subjectivity.
However, the experience of the maternal is largely constituted through the sacred, which
is socially variant but always consists of the same structural elements. As Horgan states,
“symbolic power is moral power...symbolic power must be affective” (Horgan, 2014, p.758).
The sacred tells us something about how society is organized and thinks of itself (Rosati, 2003).
The sacred is emotionally charged, and uses symbolic elements in the Symbolic realm to
structure the social. This, of course, alters how a subject experiences events and evaluates and
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understands themselves. Women, as beings capable of giving life, held reproductive power both
biologically and socially. They also have the power to destroy life, particularly social life. In
order to control reproduction, the Virgin is evoked in order to assure mothers follow a particular
role. This symbol becomes cemented in the ego-ideal and pregnancy becomes a pre-ordered
process. Women become tools of reproduction--objects. If women are to reject the Virgin, they
transgress and are deemed abject. This can lead to experiencing pregnancy as distressing.
Kristeva suggests using herethics in order to allow women to experience pregnancy as they wish.

87

Chapter Four: Analysing the Sacred and Pregnancy
Introduction
In this chapter I discuss various contemporary examples of the Virgin which are depicted and
juxtaposed in cinema and literature. This is done in order to demonstrate one of the many ways
the sacred sustains itself outside of religion proper. In juxtaposition to contemporary images of
motherhood, historic images of creator goddesses were shown that tapped into both the left and
right sacred. The Virgin strips the left sacred away, and when women experience the left sacred,
they are abjected. The only option is to deny the experience of the left sacred making the
experience profane. I then examine how the threshold of the subject was changed from birth to
pre-birth. This change, creating the concept of fetus as a subject, altered how women were
constituted in pregnancy. Instead of subjects, women become wombs in order to secure the life
of the fetus. This is necessary to examine in order to depict how women experience their
pregnancy as objects, not subjects and in order to demonstrate the unrealistic expectations put
upon the pregnant subject.
Modern cinematic and literary depictions of women tap into the abject and left sacred of
women. By showing this image of women as negative, the image of the Virgin is reinforced. The
Twilight (Condon et al., 2011) film series shows its main character, Bella, deteriorating into a
zombie-like state as her crossbred vampire fetus, described as “monstrous”, an “abomination”,
and “unnatural”, sucks the life from her. However, her ability to create biological reproduction
that is not social reproduction is where the abjection and fear of the left sacred takes place. It is
this fear that drives the desire to profane and control women in reproduction. Similar depictions
take place in I am Mother (Sputore et al, 2019) which takes out feminine corporeality entirely
focusing on a robot who uses focus and function to efficiently mother. This film ends in a
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dystopic play on the fear of what might happen if women stop their essential mothering roles.
The movie Mother! (Aronafsky et al., 2017) roots itself in the abject depiction of a mass
metaphor of nature versus God. God of course represents the social order and the necessity of
women’s natural function being in harmony with the social order. The movie ends in the death of
the mother, representing nature, due to the father’s careless actions, representing society. The
movie then ends with restarting the relationship between a reborn mother and father. The
repetition of the cycle shows a flaw in the social order.
Perhaps the clearest depiction of the abject in motherhood comes through the classic scifi movie Alien (Scott et al., 1979). This movie presents an alien creature hunting and killing
astronauts but at the core of the alien, it is a mother. The alien begins attacking in order to protect
the eggs—the alien’s offspring. The eggs are born in a parasitic fashion whereby they enter a
person, take over the corporeal function of the person as codependent until they are fully formed,
and then they birth themselves with the sacrifice of the carrier. In this depiction of motherhood,
the mother does not have to sacrifice and those who are sacrificed for the eggs to hatch are
depicted as subjects as opposed to wombs. Moreover, by depicting the half-formed aliens as
aliens instead of children, we do not give them the same subjectivity as a human fetus forming in
a woman. The abject in Alien comes from the familiarity and fear of uncontrolled maternal
power.
Margaret Atwood (2006) plays on the depiction of women becoming profane to the
sacred fetal subject in The Handmaid's Tale. In this novel, female sexuality is forbidden and met
with communal hangings to reinforce the belief system through the left sacred, through fear of
punishment and sacrifice of women. Sexuality is for reproduction and only socially accepted
reproduction. Only affluent families are given children to socially reproduce and men are not
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tested for infertility demonstrating that biological reproduction falls on the women. Women who
do not want children are painted as disgusting, evil, and to be expelled from the community.
Ritualized regulation and women are highlighted, illustrating a separation from autonomy and
corporeality by becoming an extension of the wife as a tool for reproduction. These are only a
few examples of how images and symbols of the Virgin are cemented into contemporary culture
without explicitly using religion proper. Although such depictions are hyperbolic and brought to
dystopic extremes, many aspects ring true.
The link between the sacred and the maternal seems to be far less at the forefront today in
contemporary North American culture than the historical importance attributed to fertility and
the gods. However, these depictions demonstrate the way the image of the Virgin is still held as
an ideal to achieve. The Virgin is not an inherent sacred symbol and historically, women tended
to be depicted as both creator and destroyer—embodying both the left and right sacred as
opposed to only depicting the right. Instead of celebrating the maternal in its creative and
sacrificial aspects, the sacred works to profane women and control the maternal experience. With
this in mind, it is essential to reconsider Kristeva’s work and the problematic of the sacred as
conceptualized by Bataille in order to analyse pregnancy in contemporary Western society. Both
Kristeva and Bataille discuss the concepts of subject, object and abject, as well as how the sacred
interacts and creates these categories. Both theories maintain a commitment to the corporeal and
an interest in the way the corporeal interacts with subjectivity. What is most important in
developing a theory of the maternal through Kristeva's analytic in conjunction with the sacred is
that we are able to both see a phenomenology of the maternal experience as well as the problem
with examining the phenomenology of the maternal (we see the social forces that shape and
constrain the experience) in which abjection plays a significant role. This allows us to examine
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social practices silencing female voices, excluding maternal corporality, as well as grounding a
theory in women’s embodied experience and their own accounts of it.

The Left Sacred in Pregnancy
Mothers and fertile women have historically and cross-culturally been depicted as creator
goddesses with both the power to give life but also the power of destruction. While hardly the
only example, Medusa was both mother and killer. She created life, but she also created art
through her destruction of life. This dualism, both left and right sacred in Bataille’s terms, follow
the pregnant subject into contemporary Western experiences. This is evident in the way hostile
and benevolent sexism are used to both protect the pregnant subject and the life she gives the
society, but also to control the female subject in order to restrict that ability. Historic examples of
mothers engaged in both the left and right sacred are abundant. Tobin (1991) highlights both
Egypt’s goddess Isis, and Greek goddess Dementer who are both mothers and agriculture Gods
capable of creating and destroying harvests. Ge, a minor fertility goddess in Greek cities, is
related to Gaia or the mother of earth, ocean, and titans (Press, 2011). All these things are
necessary for life but left unruled bring mass destruction. Klein (2008) highlights the Aztec
goddess Coalitice who was the mother of Huitzilopochtli but also sacrificed (along with her
sisters) to put the sun in motion. She, along with many fertility goddesses, is associated with
snakes. In The snake goddesses of the LM IIIB and LM IIIC periods, Gesell (2010) discusses the
many snake goddesses who are depicted as mothers but also as sacrificial goddesses. The snake,
both capable of shedding its old skin to renew itself, but also dangerous was depicted as sacred.
The image of the snake changed over time to represent evil. Chakravarty (2012) explains how
women in Manasa Mangal Kavya in Bengal use stories of snake goddesses as a counter
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discourse to patriarchy. The attraction and repulsion of the snake goddesses, and the fertility
goddesses mimic the dialectic tension between women and the ingroup amongst a volatile social
nucleus.
However, with the sustained image of the Virgin, the balances of power in the sacred
cannot be maintained. These goddesses, both to be praised and feared, now have their left sacred
stripped away. The powers of the left and right no longer work to reaffirm. The left sacred
becomes something strictly to be contained or radically excluded, feared, and controlled. The
goddesses had to be abjected or profaned in order to regulate the now imbalanced left sacred.
The snake came to represent evil. Eve is warned to stay away from the snake in the bible. Using
a prior sacred symbol as a sign of evil works as a warning to not engage in that prior sacred
order. This has seeped into the social world as demonstrated by Cardozo-Freeman (1978) who
discusses the Mexican fear of snakes who invade the womb and come after children. The sacred
is never inherently good or bad. It is merely a construction. Prior to the construction of the fetus
as a subject, a creation of God not woman, women themselves were seen as beings with the
potential of both left and right sacred. Without the power to control women, it was necessary to
profane them. To take away sacred power and render them objects to be controlled. The sacred,
both left and right, went from being a power of women to being a means of controlling women.
This was done through patriarchal notions of the sacred enacted through sexism.
As women are profaned, by being turned into tools or instrumental vehicles during
pregnancy, rituals are less pertinent and sacrifice holds less power. While there are still examples
of ritual-like activities such as the wedding, the baby announcement, the baby shower, and the
gender reveal, most techniques focus on proscription and risk assessment in medical terms.
Rituals exist to protect thresholds. As Weir (2006) states, “thresholds have techniques facilitating
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entry and exit, techniques which organize the relations between inside and outside, before and
after” (p.3). The fetus was profane, but the child was sacred and in need of protection. When the
sacred fetal subject emerged, that threshold was blurred. There is nothing sustaining the middle
so women have fewer rituals for childbirth. Capila (1998) talks about Himalaya women in
Garhwal who have songs of celebration for life events which are called Mangal Geet. These
ritual songs are sung during birth, naming, weddings, etc. For these women, Mangal Geet shapes
their experience of the maternal in relation to corporeal changes. In Western women’s cases,
controlling biological reproduction to ensure reproduction is all that matters. This means women
are obliged to find meaning in the experience of being a medical object.
The pregnant subject tends to sacrifice her personhood, putting other aspects of identity
aside to be “mother”, and the pregnant subject tends to sacrifice financially by disrupting their
careers. Moreover, corporeality forces pregnant women, and even birthing and non-birthing
mothers, to sacrifice. Childbirth is an immense corporeal sacrifice in itself that can still result in
death. Moreover, the nature of caring for a baby is corporeal and requires that the child’s needs
be met before the parent. By framing women as objects, rather than subjects actively engaging in
the left sacred, the woman’s sacrifice is no longer her sacrifice for the child that she can make
meaning through but society’s tool to secure social reproduction. This new framing of pregnancy
and birth developed from the concept of the fetus as the subject.

A Change in the Subject
Children are sacred. We protect them, we keep them separate from the abject, and we nourish
them. Those who harm children are looked at as the most despicable people and we make claims
to children’s vulnerability as the reason for our investment in them. However, children also
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represent the next generation and the future of the clan and the continuity of the totemic
principle, or in modern cases, the state. The focus on fertility rates, population sizes, and
citizenship show the importance of children. Michel Foucault (1990) demonstrates this in his
discussion of population, not as individual people but as “its specific phenomena and its peculiar
variables: birth and death rates, life expectancy, fertility, state of health, frequency of illnesses,
patterns of diet and habitation” (p.25). Children keep the totem of the state alive and it is the
state’s vulnerability that must be protected by protecting children. Agencies protecting children’s
welfare and laws against child abuse demonstrate this desire to protect children. Our children
need to be safe more than the outsider’s children need to be safe. It is then a sacred duty to have
and protect children; however, what constitutes a child has evolved.
A shift in the maternal experience comes from a liminal shift in subjecthood. The liminal
period, rooted in limen, is referring to the threshold of corporeality in relation to the mother’s
physical agency and the fetal social subject. At some point, the fetus becomes a child and liminal
thresholds can change when that happens and the process by which that happens. Lorna Weir
(2006) explains, “the threshold of the living subject constitutes the zone of transition into and out
of human bodily substance” (p. 1). For Kristeva, the mirror stage is the point where the child
distinguishes itself from the mother and a separate social being in natural development. Today,
“in contemporary medicine, law and politics of the global north, the living subject is often
claimed to pre-exist birth” (Weir, 2006, p.i). This means that pregnancy is the new threshold of
the subject, not birth, and not the mirror stage. The fetus is constituted as a being from the
moment it is discovered. The act of naming the fetus itself is a social act to solidify a subject
within the woman. Grosz (1989) agrees the body is a threshold from internal to external and
from self to other and that pregnancy disrupts the boundary. By the liminal period of subjecthood

94

shifting from after birth to in the womb, the fetus is constituted as a child much earlier and
becomes a subject buried alive with the mother as its coffin. The implications of this liminal shift
on the pregnant subject will be explored below, but first I will discuss how this shift occurred.
One such factor in shifting the liminal period comes from challenges to the law. Though
ultimately unsuccessful, the presentation of the fetus as a subject in the court of law shook the
threshold. Weir discusses this notion in detail and states a series of cases, for instance, Montreal
Tramways vs Léveillé (1933) 4 DLR 338. Lévellé went to court for damage against the fetus after
falling on their property but was not successful in the case. This outcome tended to be the norm
particularly in Canada and the United Kingdom. The law prevailed and “the courts turned away
from the authoritarian potential of the perinatal threshold to use women as a vessel for fetal
health” (Weir, 2006, p.27). Perinatal refers to the moment right before birth. The perinatal
threshold then refers to what we constitute as the transition from fetus to child. Canada has even
created a maternal immunity from legal consequences in regard to fetal harm. However, the fact
that maternal immunity was created shows how often the mother is blamed for any harm the
fetus undergoes. Moreover, some cases where the child had some long-term damage because of
an event that occurred while they were a fetus have successfully won their cases. An example
comes from the Canadian civil case Duval v. Seguin (1972) where Duval sued Seguin for injuries
the fetus sustained during a negligent car accident. Whether the court ruled in favor of the fetus
or not, the act of bringing a fetus to court as a subject was enough to shift the thresholds and
change the liminal period in pregnancy.
An additional shift comes from property rights. In order to own property, one must be an
adult juridical subject. Objects do not own other objects, subjects own objects. When the concept
of child en ventre sa mere appeared in estate law, a notable shift in the subject was seen. Child
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en ventre sa mere literally means “child in the mother’s womb” and this concept was used in
order to give an estate to a child who was not yet born (Weir, 2006, p.131). Usually this occurred
in the wills of a parent who would not live until the child was actually born. This concept did
eventually branch out to discuss the rights of the fetus as well. By constituting the fetus as a
subject with rights to property and implies potential other rights, the fetus becomes a child much
earlier.
Ultimately, medical advances focusing on statistics, that Michel Foucault links to
“biopolitics”, shifted the fetus to a subject at a much earlier period of time. The study of perinatal
mortality in the 1950’s brought the perinatal threshold into dispute (Weir, 2006). Studies in
North America began counting stillbirths in infant mortality statistics as deaths from 1920
through 1950 (Weir, 2006); if the fetus is able to die, then it must be living. By bringing this
notion under the light, the fetus becomes an object of knowledge under a dominant discourse and
the idea of the fetus as a subject in the making is formed. With medical advances and studies on
pregnancy, where the fetus is the subject of the study and the woman is the environment, fetus
viability became earlier. As technology advances, earlier detection and intervention becomes
possible. Pregnancy was now viewed through medical risk assessment in order to lower infant
mortality. Women had to make lifestyle changes in order to keep the fetus’ risk as low as
possible. Child welfare agencies were able to call for forced medical care on women in order to
“reduce unhealthy wards of the state” (Weir, 2006, p.27). Reducing infant mortality was the
priority and maternal mortality was a second consideration.
Some theorists advance the idea that resistance may be possible with advancing medical
technology. While this technology made the sacred fetal subject possible, it has also allowed for
reproductive choice both in preventing pregnancy, terminating pregnancy, or in assisting
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pregnancy. Kristeva (2012) states, “The control of procreation has not made women superfluous”
(p.55). For her, technology gives women power. Medical advances may prove to alter the
potentials of motherhood or of sex allowing for greater variance in identity or control over the
tasks attributed to an identity; however, an important note comes from Irigaray (1986) when she
states, “an artificial womb isn’t yet an artificial nurturer, at least not a post-natal one” (p.13).
Though contraceptives brought freedom in the notion that women, with the privilege of access to
these medical advances, are no longer forced to bear children, they have not yet allowed women
a completely free choice. Petersen (2004) explains that an autonomous choice requires informed
subjects making decisions that they understand without undue influence. Without a secular
sacred, a potential form being herethics, this simply is not the case. Since we rely on women to
reproduce in order to continue the system, we use the sacred as a discourse to sway subjects to
the desired path.
Moreover, medical advances can also work against women. Just as the sacred fetal
subject was brought to life by medical advances, “advances in the scientific understanding of
childhood have been widely used as an argument to reassert women’s quintessential maternal
function” (Mitchell, 1972, p.118). Many women do not have the privilege of contemplating
patriarchal implications of choices or do not have access to medical technology that can assist
them in their desired choices. Watson (2014) notes that more than half of the United Kingdom’s
pregnancies are unplanned and doctors tend to feel more comfortable assuming that each
pregnancy is desired. Though Mitchell claims new technology can be freeing, Grosz (1989)
notes that overcoming a biological function may not change the meaning if the power dynamic
remains. The use behind the technology may still be channeled by power dynamics. For instance,
in-vitro fertilization tends to have expenses tied to it meaning that only people of a certain class
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are able to use it to assist their pregnancy. Lastly, if women are viewed as no longer valuable in
reproduction, they may achieve more autonomy or they may be pushed out as useless objects.
The key is that the discourse must be changed along with the technology.
The liminal period in pregnancy marks a threshold where the fetus becomes a subject and
where the fetus becomes a separate entity from the mother. The inside and the outside of the
subject are demarcated by the threshold. Weir (2006) explains, “when the birth threshold of the
living subject came unfixed, so too did the relations of before and after, inside and outside, that
had been held apart by birth. Moving the threshold before birth attached the arrival of the living
subject to the inside of the maternal body during pregnancy” (p.29). Birth no longer sustained the
threshold. This corporeal boundary was now seen as revealing the subject but not constituting it
meaning that when the subject actually becomes a subject in the womb is not entirely fixed.
There is much debate, particularly in abortion discourses, about when the subject actually comes
to be. The result of these changes tends to heavily affect women.

The Profanation of Women
As the fetal subject becomes more important, and the womb is thought of as the fetus’ home,
women become the houses that secure the fetal subject. This conflict of determining who has
bodily autonomy in pregnancy is referred to as the maternal-fetal conflict and arose from the
creation of the sacred fetal subject (Paltrow, 1994). However, discourse is not linear. It has
exceptions, flaws, and resistance, which is good for the pregnant subject as it avoids the
handmaiden dystopia Atwood (2006) envisioned. However, when women are conceptualized in
this way, they become profane objects as opposed to subjects with the ability to engage with the
left and right sacred. Moreover, their transgression is seen as a threat and their abjection is meant

98

to be punitive as opposed to liberating. For instance, female sexuality is met with slut-shaming as
opposed to being considered an ordinary human need (Harding, 2015). Only certain individuals
are given the social approval to reproduce. Mothers who are single, non-white, immigrant,
lesbian, or who have low socioeconomic status experience characterization as deviants
(Summers-Bremner, 1998, p.165). Those women who do not adhere to the form of
“motherhood” experience stigma, isolation, and even physical abuse ranging from sterilization to
torture. An instance of this is observed when examining the very recent treatment of pregnant
women in prison (Hewko, 2014). Only 6% of incarcerated women are pregnant (Hewko, 2014).
These women do not have ready access to prenatal care, birthing options, alternate food, or
vitamins. It was only in 2014 that 18 states in the United States of America passed anti-shackling
laws for women, which prevented women in active labor from being restrained; however, 23
states still allow some form of restraints (Hewko, 2014). The experience, humanity, and life of
the pregnant woman did not take precedent. The only concern was to use the woman’s body to
birth a healthy child that would shortly be taken from her. Hewko further notes that forced
termination amongst incarcerated women, especially those who become pregnant after entering
the prison system, is not unheard of. Susan Bordo (1993) lends credit to these findings and states,
“the causal and morally imperious approach medicine and law have taken to non-consensual
medical interference in the reproductive lives of women-particularly when they are of nonEuropean descent, poor, or non-English-speaking" (p.75). Both Hewko and Bordo discuss
coerced sterilizations to prevent those deemed unworthy from reproducing. Bordo (1993) notes,
from 1900 to 1960, approximately 60,000 people in the United States were sterilized without
explicit consent. Hewko (2014) adds 148 female prisoners in California underwent tubal
ligations without receiving the proper process to gain consent. The lack of bodily autonomy
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given to many women, with the above being only a few examples, demonstrates that the physical
experiences in pregnancy do matter and that discourse which prevents women from controlling
these aspects of pregnancy causes the experience of pregnancy to be distorted.
These modern depictions represent a profound and powerful social ambivalence towards
mothers and how we profane women to control the anxieties stemming from an imbalanced left
sacred. The problem is not in the maternal body itself, but in the way we as a society have
polarized and classified it. Glick and Fiske (2001) refer to this as the “Madonna-whore”
dichotomy. To put this in Kristeva's terms, because the symbolic world is threatened by the
Semiotic, as the Semiotic itself is the collapse of the Symbolic, careful measures must be taken
to ensure the potential power coming from this experience are controlled and channeled in a way
deemed appropriate. By changing the threshold of subjectivity to pre-birth, the fetus as an object
inside the mother as a subject is reversed. The fetus becomes a subject and that subjectivity
comes before the mother. The mother becomes a womb, an object to house the fetus. If a mother
rejects this role and asserts her subjectivity, she transgresses into abjection. Medical discourse
helps to maintain the fetus as subject and dominant patriarchy discourses are used to regulate the
threshold. Without enforcing the threshold, the boundaries of subject, object, and abject break
down. The sacred, in its current gendered order, turns the pregnant body into one single ideal
pregnant body (Grosz, 1989). This ideal is depicted through the Virgin Mary and enforced by
feminine ideals in discourse. Bartlett in sacred traditions explains that when we claim our own
sacredness, we no longer need to rely on others to create the experience. In this sense, the
Semiotic is indeed a form of a “left sacred” experience with immense potential to cross into the
abject on one’s own terms.
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Weir (2006) explains the way we use risk assessment to control people. Following Ulrich
Beck’s theory of the risk society, Weir (2006) explains that we force pregnant women to prepare
for risks they cannot control and when we do this, the focus is on future harm and lifestyle as
opposed to an actual diagnosis indicating an unhealthy state. Every action a pregnant woman
takes from sleep schedule, exercise, food, bowel movements, weight, etc. can be monitored and
controlled this way. Moreover, some medical practices place the subjectivity of the fetus above
the subjectivity of the woman. For instance, induction rates continue to rise in order to follow a
schedule for the fetus to be delivered at an optimum time, though induction raises the risk for
caesarean section (Mei-Dan et al., 2017). Trying to control this much of anyone’s lives is
incredibly alienating and domineering. Women are profaned when they are used as medical tools
for reproduction. There is no “I” that is “We” or “water in water”. Pregnancy under medical risk
assessment is not an experience of unity for the community whereby a woman sacrifices her
body for a child, because medicine aims at efficiency with a precise order to a procedure to
which women are subjected.

Conclusion
This chapter focuses on the way the status of the fetus as a subject helped to profane women.
Three aspects brought the sacred-fetal subject into life: property inheritance, law, and medical
advances focusing on risk assessment of the fetus. By transforming the fetus into a subject, the
autonomy of the woman is in question: whose body is it? When the woman undergoes these
corporeal changes, it is no longer under the discourse of her body changing but of changes
necessary to keep the fetus healthy. Her experience of corporeal is now under medical
assessment. The kicks she feels are not to be enjoyed but to be tallied and reported at the next
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visit to see if she should be worried or not. The pregnant subject becomes a medical tool. She
becomes an object, not a subject. The shift in the perinatal threshold from birth to before birth
alters the view of when the subject's life starts. By using Kristeva’s phenomenology, and radical
Durkheimian concepts of the sacred, we can see how the sustained image of the Virgin
encourages women to undergo pregnancy in the reflection of an ideal image. By forcing this
ideal experience to be the only acceptable experience, women are alienated by experiences
outside of the ideal and are forced to become tools with an intended purpose and path.
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Chapter Five: Experiencing Stigma
Introduction
Chapter five examines how the rule of the father creates taboo and stigma in order to control
women’s choices and sustain the image of the Virgin. Taboo and stigma are seen through
ambivalent sexism, which is hostile and benevolent sexism combined. Under this form of the
sacred, abjection does not become a process where women can become “lack of lack” but one of
expelling social threats to the status quo. Women who do not enact pregnancy properly, those
who receive or endorse abortion, the childless by choice and the subfecund are some of the
groups of women who experience oppressive abjection. Because of this, pregnancy as an
experience that shakes the foundation of identity, is not able to be a liberating experience but
becomes an alienating one.
The phenomena Kristeva’s conceptualizes as “the father” is evident in pregnancy
discourse. Most notably, we see the father acted out through benevolent sexism. Medical risk
assessment and benevolent sexism takes away bodily autonomy from the woman but guises the
control in the cloak of protection, concern, and goodwill. As Moya et al. (2007) explain,
“ideologically, paternalism is manifested by subjectively affectionate attitudes that are
nevertheless condescending and reinforce women’s lower status (p.1422). By situating a female
experience in a phallocentric symbolic, women are unable to fully engage as female experience
is found where phallocentric discourse is broken down (Gambaudo, 2017, p.25). Women who
reject benevolent sexism are met with stigma in the form of hostile sexism. Hostile sexism is a
means of abjection, used to eliminate the threat or the subject if they do not correct their
behaviours. Women become an object and target of expert discourse that enforce patriarchal
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values. Women are symbolically blocked from tapping into the power of reproductive corporeal
sacrifice.

Taboo and Stigma
Taboo and stigma extend from the dangers associated with the left sacred and are used along
with the right sacred in order to uphold the totemic principle. In a patriarchal sacred order, male
dominance is an important principle to maintain. As mentioned, transgression is a sin in
Christianity (Bataille, 1957). This means “the feelings roused by the transgression of the taboo
had to be suppressed at all costs” (Bataille, 1957, p.125). While Christianity is not as common in
contemporary Western society, the image of the Virgin is persistent, which means female
transgression is still suppressed. Women cannot have ecstatic experiences, they cannot step “out
of place,” as they need to understand their subordinate position in the sacred system of valuation.
Sexism is commonly discussed in terms of hostility; however, sexism is actually a means of
controlling and dominating a particular sex and this does not necessarily have to happen through
hostility or even be resisted. Hostile sexism is what is normally thought of when discussing
sexism. It is chauvinism, it is lesser pay, it is rape culture, and the like. This form of sexism
functions via taboo and stigma. It sanctions women to certain roles in order to ensure they do not
threaten identity. Benevolent sexism includes those acts that seem protective, perhaps almost
paternal, but that restrict the autonomy and respect of the person. Ambivalent sexism is the
combination of both types, and this is what Murphy studies. For Murphy et al. (2011), sexism is
fluid and women can easily move from receiving benevolent sexism to hostile. This fluidity
reflects the status that women move in and out of. Generally, the ambivalence that women are
viewed with is what necessitates both types of sexism to work towards sustaining an ideal.
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Women are either sacred objects, those that are housing a child for instance, or they are abject,
those that are ignoring the risk assessments in pregnancy for instance. The fluidity of this
seeming dichotomy is reflective of a prior left sacred state that has been suppressed and occluded
in order to forward a monotheistic sacred whereby reproduction is in the hands of one male God.
Many women do not resist benevolent sexism and even enjoy its protection and comfort.
Benevolent sexism refers to actions and attitudes that are “ostensibly protective, motivated to
preserve the welfare of pregnant women and their children...The second function of
proscriptions, whether intended or not, is that they are potentially derogatory” (Murphy et al.,
2011, p.813). Cases of women being put second to the fetus are plenty; however, I have detailed
a few below for example. Murphy explains taboos as “both ancient and modern, [and] surround
the types of food and drink women should consume during pregnancy, the places they should go,
the exercise they should take, and even the states of mind that they should experience” (Murphy
et al. 2011, p.812). Sutton et al. (2011) noted a case where a woman in a restaurant was denied
cheddar cheese despite pasteurized cheeses being perfectly harmless to both the woman and the
fetus (p.4). More disturbing was a case where a woman was court ordered to follow her
obstetrician’s bed rest orders (Sutton et al, 2011, p.5). Cases of women in Europe subjected to
pre- and post-natal confinement, and dietary exclusions which included nutritious and beneficial
foods were also found by Sutton et al. (2011). These findings were supported by Meyer-Rochow
(2009) who explain, “it is often pregnant and lactating women in various parts of the world that
are forced to abstain from especially nutritious and beneficial foods” (p.8). These practices are
excused as a way to protect the woman when in reality these restrictions are solely to protect the
sacred fetal subject and control the woman as its pre-birth environment (Sutton et al, 2011, p.6).
Any proscription is restraining. However, it is important to note that the restraints placed on
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women are solely in order to protect the fecundity of the group. It is not about the woman but
about the ability of the group to continue through protecting social reproduction.
Who in particular is affected by benevolent sexism and who enables this system? Murphy
found that men scored higher than women on acts of hostile and benevolent sexism; however,
both men and women equally endorsed proscriptions. So, while both men and women are part of
this system, men tend to be active participants more often. Endorsed proscriptions included
alcohol consumption, foods such as deli meat and seafood, and rigorous exercise as well as
pregnant women who were openly “flouting these taboos” (Murphy et al, 2011, p.814). Men
perceived enforcing proscriptions as their duty and a good deed, whereas women were more
likely to see these as restrictions and sexism (Sutton et al. 2011). Women found benevolent
sexism to actually be appealing; however, women’s endorsement was associated with a higher
awareness of men’s hostility suggesting that these women are picking the lesser threat (Sibley &
Wilson, 2004). It is safer to be coddled, even if the motivation is control, than to be physically or
financially harmed. Sutton et al. (2011) found that women were particularly accepting of
benevolent sexism with intimate males. Unfortunately, much of this advice and policing over
women stems from misinformation meaning the proscriptions and control over the pregnant
women are not protecting her or the fetus (Clair & Anderson, 1989). When determining which
dichotomy one is placed on, it is unlikely to want to be abject and met with exclusion and
violence as opposed to being glorified and condescended. Leaning into the image of the Virgin is
less alienating, though it is a nearly impossible ideal to sustain.
Social stigma is likely to be passed by both sexes onto pregnant women, though, it seems
men are more inclined to actively engage in benevolent and hostile sexism than women. This is
true of most aspects of the sacred as previously noted. As Nakhaie and Datta (2018) explain,
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perceptions play a large role in how we interpret our experiences. Both men and women are
endorsing the perception that benevolent sexism is protection for pregnant women. Ignoring the
paternal rule evident in this type of behavior, the larger threat stems from the fluidity of
benevolent to hostile sexism which is being endorsed by both men and women! Ambivalent
sexism is important here, as these restrictions come from benevolent sexism, however, hostile
sexism was associated with the idea that those breaking these rules deserve to be punished
(Murphy et al., 2011, p.815). Even more disturbing is that punitive attitudes were directed at the
woman for engaging in risky behaviour towards herself (Murphy et al., 2011, p.815). The
punishment is individual and punitive measures are used for the “woman’s sake”, an echo of
atonement for a sin.
As mentioned, ambivalent sexism is the fluidity of benevolent sexism to hostile sexism.
Ambivalent sexism encompasses both the paternal and the punitive attitudes not as separate but
as interconnected and dependent parts of sexism though they are distinct. Moya et al. (2007)
found in cross-national comparisons that benevolent and hostile sexism were positively
correlated and predicted “structural indicators of gender inequality” (p.1422). Patriarchy refers to
gender inequality that disproportionately favors male rule. Benevolent sexism creates the
proscriptions imposed on women, but those women who do not follow, either actively or
accidently, the restrictions are deemed abject and even punishable. An example of the extreme
attitudes towards women is clear in Crandall, Eshleman, and O’Brien (2002) who found
prejudice towards pregnant women that drink, was deemed more acceptable than to gang
members, drug dealers, adulterers, and negligent parents. This prejudice exists even though the
official medical advice, though against consumption, states that a small amount is harmless
(Murphy et al., 2011, p.812). Yet there is something deeply offensive about profaning pregnancy
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(Sutton et al., 2011, p.6-7). Women are treated as though a drop of alcohol will cause fetal
alcohol syndrome, even when this is far from the medical reality.
Another example comes from Glick, Singletary and Kazama (2007) who conducted a
field experiment where female participants posed as customers or job applicants in America.
These women were made to be visibly pregnant through a prosthesis. Those who came in as job
applicants were treated significantly more hostile than those who were customers. Hebl, King,
Glick et al. (2007) further found that pregnant women were rated as less competent, unfit for
hire, and unfit for promotion in a video analysis. These findings were found through Halpert,
Wilson, & Hickman (1993) and Bragger, Kutcher, Morgan, & Firth (2002) whereby they used
the same woman doing the same work in each video and had people rate their work ethic;
however, they have the woman wearing a pregnancy prosthesis in one video. The ambivalent
state of pregnant women is threatening to social norms and tends to be met with hostility in order
to sustain the current sacred order.
It is not that pregnant women themselves are hated, but that society works to protect its
current form. Glick and Fisk (1996) argued that cultural representations of women are
ambivalent. Throughout history and across cultures, women have been revered as well as reviled
(Glick & Fiske, 1996). Sibley and Wilson (2004) provided further insight into how these
subjectively positive and negative sexist ideologies complement each other by showing that
ambivalent sexism tends to generate more polarized female subtypes. Moreover, this form of
sexist ideology, as are majority of sexist ideologies, are linked to patriarchal social systems
(Sibley & Wilson, 2004). Sexism, benevolent and hostile, work together to reinforce malecentric values. This mirrors the left and right sacred, working to enforce a sacred that favors
men. In order to control reproduction, both biological and social, controlling women is
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necessary. The Virgin Mary; ideal mother, wife, and woman; is a large part of that image. By
using women’s reproduction and sexuality as cultural characteristics in a patriarchal symbolic
(Grosz, 1989), women become very vulnerable as the sacred will be used to control or abject
them. Hebl et al. (2007) suggests that the treatment differs based on what is socially acceptable.
Future mothers can shop, but not work. This suggestion is further reinforced whereby those who
were pregnant and attempting to secure “masculine work” such as a janitor were treated more
hostile by the public than those securing “feminine work” such as a maid (Sutton et al., 2011).
The difference between a maid and janitor is minor; however, the social characterization of the
two positions creates a juxtaposition. Pregnant women defying traditional roles of the “feminine”
by working may incite hostility, where women who play into the traditional role may elicit
benevolence: “Symbolically, the pregnant worker may pose a threat to “traditional family
values” among some perceivers, whereas pregnant women who do not work would implicitly
affirm, rather than challenge, such values, eliciting a positive (rather than a negative) reaction”
(Hebl et al., 2007, p.1500). These polarized reactions are dependent on how the behaviour of a
pregnant woman makes the other person think about identity. Essentially, this study showed that
pregnant women most definitely faced sexism, but if they were seen as playing along in their
role, they were able to dodge threatening behaviors.
Hostile sexism allows pregnant women to be thrown into further financial vulnerability.
In a capitalist system, where these women already experience financial turmoil, social attitudes
enforce and subordinate pregnant women. Aside from the actual physical and material harm that
this does to pregnant women, ambivalent sexism also causes psychological strain. Though these
women are not actually harming their unborn child, “in contemporary Western cultures, pregnant
women who flout conventional prohibitions may experience confusion, guilt and stigma
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(Murphy et al., 2011, p.812). By creating an atmosphere where women feel the need to internally
police themselves, more control over reproductive actions can occur. The phenomenology of
pregnancy is tightly kept within a storyline created not by the woman but by the sacred. This is
why hostile sexism tends to be directed at women who challenge men’s power and the image of
the ideal mother (Glick et al., 2000, p.764). Benevolent sexism, though still controlling and
evident of the rule of the father, is used to protect and thereby reward women who do follow the
standing order.

Conceptualizing Abortion Stigma: From Object to Abject
This shift in status, both of fetus as subject and woman as object, changed the notion of abortion
as well. Abortion transgresses the ideal maternal. Kumar, Hessini, and Mitchell in
Conceptualizing Abortion Stigma state,” that abortion transgresses three cherished 'feminine'
ideals: perpetual fecundity; the inevitability of motherhood; and instinctive nurturing” (p.625).
These aspects of the “feminine” are societal ideals used to create an acceptable identity or role
for women. In other words, these ideals are the sustained image of the Virgin. When they are
actively denied or transgressed, women no longer fit that ideal and they are treated as abject in
order to contain the threat to the standing order. As Goffman (1963) states, “the term [stigma] is
applied more to the disgrace itself than to the bodily evidence of it” (p.2). Abortion does not
have a visible physical marker so the abjection is only to those women who refuse to actively
hide the act. However, some women are able to have private and safe abortions in order “to
avoid self-identifying or adopting a tainted identity linked to the experience” (Goffman, 1963,
p.630). With only 35-60% of abortions being reported in surveys (Jagannathan, 2001), we see the
desire to hide the act. Unfortunately, this tends to reinforce the cycle of silence and makes
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abortion look like a rarity. Goffman (1963) explains, “once the exceptionality of abortion is
rhetorically established, it is possible to create a category of 'women who abort' as deviant from
the norm” (p. 629). Without women who nurture children and birth children, we at this time have
no alternative to sustaining society. This threatens women’s social identity which is why the
notion of the sacred fetal subject is sustained.
Additionally, a stigmatized act or condition can bring shame and stigma to the larger
group. Das (2001) states “stigma is seen as contagious’” (10). It is this fear of contagion, that
woman's “sins” or acts against the future generation will spread to other women. If abortion is
not stigmatized, the hysteria that all women will suddenly have the desire to abort every fetus
arises. The Heartbeat Bill, a recent American initiative, exemplifies the hysteria. This bill was
used to defund Planned Parenthood, even though none of Planned Parenthood’s received
funding, from the government, went to abortion services. This act ultimately gives women less
medical attention in all aspects of reproductive health and choices, without stopping abortions.
Women who need an abortion but have no safe place tend to abort at home. These women face
title changes anywhere from classless to murderer. Religious rhetoric fuels this abjection because
the fetus is a child of God not the women. The act of abortion is an act against God. The
religious rhetoric fuels the notion of the sacred fetal subject and the womb, as an object.
Abortion is only protected under privacy laws, not laws on bodily autonomy because the woman
in pregnancy is an object (Caldwell, 2002). The assumed autonomy of the fetus claiming a right
to life comes before the autonomy of the woman carrying the child.
With early detection of pregnancy, the fetus is presented as life earlier than ever before,
meaning even early abortion, use of Plan B, or miscarriage can be stigmatized with the woman
undergoing forced abjection. It is important to remember, as Kumar, Hessini, and Mitchell
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(2009) states, “stigmatised behaviours need not be visible to be stigmatised” (p.626). Abortion
rhetoric fueled by the sacred allows for a persistent stigma against women who transgress the
ideals of the feminine. There is clear resistance through the Pro-Choice discourse and “the fact
that so many women do have abortions, despite powerful barriers, indicates that this is contested
space where agency and resistance are dynamic” (Kumar, Hessini, & Mitchell, 2009, p.628).
However, even some of these discourses are dangerous to women as they once again place them
as a passive object. Cannold (2002) explains the soft strategy of “portray[ing] women who abort
as unwitting victims, duped into abortions by amoral providers and feminists” (p.633). Of
course, this strategy places less abjection on a particular woman, but in general the image of any
woman who does not fit the nurturing, birthing, fertile mother is abject on society’s terms not
their own. Women are still not given power in this strategy. Pro-Choice discourse, that aims at
unmasking the sacred in order to contest the notion of the sacred fetal subject, is the more viable,
present solution to allow women to only abject themselves on their terms and not undergo
abjection for their reproductive choices. These are met with harsh resistance: the right sacred is
in place to keep norms established. However, with more traction and growth, a potential for a
sacred of herethics is possible as these discussions on how the sacred is used to control certain
people are presented.

Abjection: The Childless
A similar abjection is faced by women who do not have children. Women who do not have
children tend to be divided into two groups: childless by choice and subfecund. The latter
categorization, those who are defined in terms of subfecundity, refer to those women who
physically have difficulty or cannot conceive and/or carry to full term (Loftus, 2009, p.395).
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Infertility is a relatively common problem, though its taboo nature makes open discussion
amongst social groups scarce. When society paints motherhood as a duty, as a natural desire, and
as necessary to success and happiness, subfecundity becomes shameful. How can a woman be
incapable of what she is naturally endowed to do? This is the unfortunate discourse that is
directed towards the subfecund. In fact, “without the right cultural ideology, it is not possible for
women to be ‘infertile’” (Loftus, 2009, p.412). Infertility becomes a monstrosity and an act
against nature. Indeed, the subfecund are abject the moment they let the secret out.
Moreover, it is presumed that infertility, in situations where a heterosexual couple are concerned,
is the fault of the woman. Watson (2014) explains that the male is commonly absent during
fertility consultations, assuming the responsibility, and hence too, the blame and stigma should
belong to the woman. The option that the male counterpart has the fertility problem is only
considered after the female is ruled out. The aspiring mother must prove herself fit to conceive
under the eye of the Western medical model that privileges men). In fact, “the medical model has
become the dominant cognitive framework the infertile use to interpret their experience” (Loftus
2009p.395). Here, the woman is once again an object, a patient, a tool, and a risk as opposed to a
person with subjectivity, emotion, and experience. Here, women are reduced to a biological
function in an eerie resemblance to the handmaidens of Atwood’s dystopia.
What of the former category of women, namely hose who could, to their knowledge,
have children but actively choose not to? This could be women who are in relationships and they
have no desire to extend that family through children or those who remain outside of a
monogamous relationship who have chosen to stay childless. Summers-Bremner, in his study of
voluntarily childless women, noted some fascinating findings. First, “nearly all childless women
felt that they faced some disapproval from friends and family” (Summers-Bremner, 1998, p.165).
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This disapproval was directly related to the choice to not have children. Loftus (2009) explains
that the choice to have children takes place in a framework that suggests women must reproduce
both as biological destiny but to ensure society continues.
Western society depicts a series of life events that are critical to pass through in order to
be a successful woman: marriage and children. In contrast to the seeming natural flow of this
order is the Beti women of Cameroon who organize adulthood by individual social interactions
rather than life stages (Johnson-Hanks, 2002). So, while there is a choice in the matter, the
choice is constrained by the sacred whereby to choose against the path of the Virgin is to choose
the path of the abject. Social stigma, then, extends inward from the overall societal expectation
that women are to become mothers into the core social group of these individual women.
Veevers (1975) noted that this disapproval was the basis of numerous social sanctions placed
upon the woman which were either to simply show displeasure with the choice, or to attempt to
change their minds. Social pressure largely came from those close to the woman, including
“pressure from their parents, in-laws, siblings, work associates, friends, and doctors” (Veevers,
1975, p.473). This core makes up the support system for these individuals who have to navigate
and explain their choice to live a certain way. This finding remains true as Sharp and Ganong
(2011) found “Women, when compared with men, experience more pronounced pressure to
confirm to the SNAF ideology” (p.957). SNAF stand for a Standard North American Family,
which includes one intact marriage with children. Being childless by choice is in no physically
way dangerous or harmful to the individual, though it is treated as such.
Summers-Bremner (1998) found that childless women were perceived as less happy and
with less rewarding lives than those with children. Important about this finding was that these
voluntarily childless women were aware of these negative attitudes towards them. To be aware
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of the judgements being passed on to us affects the way we navigate through our subjection.
Awareness of the discourse about you, and navigating whether you believe it, foundationally
changes the phenomenological of one’s existence. Summers-Bremner (1998) found “some of
these women struggled with perceptions of themselves as unfeminine; however, this was less
common among voluntarily childless women compared to involuntarily childless women
(p.167). One way women protected themselves from negatively stemming from disapproval in
their deviant belief system was by isolating themselves (Veevers, 1975). This includes cutting
ties with friends that choose to have children, or finding friends who actively choose not to have
children. The struggle with navigating identity seems to be harder on those trying to fit with
societal expectations without being able to rather than those actively choosing an alternative life.
However, for the voluntarily childless, their identity was intricately tied to not having
children. Kelly (2009), in her study of the voluntarily childless, found these women “perceived
motherhood as entailing a loss of identity” (p.164). This rings a familiar narrative, whereby
women are defined first and sometimes solely as mothers. The idea that children must come
before a mother’s career, her goals, and her other relationships, including her relationship with
herself. Veevers (1975) found that the stereotyping works on both ends of the debate. The
childless are stereotyped and “constitute a deviant category: statistically, socially, ethically, and
perhaps even psychologically” (Veevers, 1975, p.472). However, “the childless also stereotype
housewives and mothers. Their expressions of superiority involve two related themes: one, that
the fact of motherhood per se does not reflect any special talent, skill or ability; and two, that the
act of mothering is of minimal significance for society” (Veevers, 1975, p.480). As these women
create their own group, individuals isolated from the larger group create a subgroup. This group
with their own belief system, and their own sacrosanct principles and sacred beliefs around
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identity and freedom of choice, use different discourse to reaffirm their position. One such
practice is using the term “breeders” to refer to those who choose to have children in reference to
animals (Veevers, 975). By lowering people to the state of animals, the childless are able to
symbolically become superior whereas in the dominant’s group discourse they are abject. On
either side, these women are being defined only in relation to their potential reproduction as
opposed to any other dimension of their identities.

Abjection: The Inability to Sustain an Ideal
Stigma and exile extend beyond non-mothers to those mothers who do not fit the ideal. The ideal
mother fulfills the feminine discourse of fertile, birthing, and nurturing. When women struggle
with their presupposed roles, they may become abject. Approximately 13% of women experience
postpartum depression. Likely an underestimate, this number relies on those who have sought
treatment and does not include additional mood disorders. Still, this lower estimate is higher than
the 10% upper estimate of pregnancies that suffer from gestational diabetes and the average 12%
estimate of women who will suffer from breast cancer. While there are plenty of screening
processes for both the latter diseases, there is still a stigma posed against mothers with
postpartum depression—mothers who do not fit the idealized notion of motherhood (Beck 2001).
In an extremely alienating system, sustaining investment is difficult. Women are further judged
on their ability to parent and bear children with scrutiny. Lorna Weir (2006) conceptualizes this
phenomenon in terms of the “public fetus.” The public fetus is when the public feels they have a
valid voice in the rearing of the child. Unfortunately, judgement falls harsher on minority and
poor women showing that even within maternity the balances of power are uneven (Weir, 2006,
p.6). Moreover, women are expected to look and function in their careers as though they have
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not had a child. Fox and Neiterman (2015) found that women appreciated their postpartum
bodies so long as they performed maternal functions without flaw; however, they also noted that
they experienced distress with their appearance when they returned to work. All of these women
reject the status of an object, a tool for reproduction, and become abject. When they are unable to
function as a “tool” for their “intended” purpose, they are classified as a threat to be exiled or
eliminated.

Conclusion
The Rule of the Father is demonstrated in benevolent and hostile sexism. Both sides of sexism
function together in order to enforce the image of the Virgin. Much as the sacred holds a right
sacred and a left sacred, women are encouraged to be “ideal mothers” through condescending
praise and control or through taboo, stigma, and even violence. With many different ways to
transgress this ideal, indeed it is almost impossible not to transgress, the pregnant subject may
feel stigma, alienation, and abjection. Unfortunately, while abjection can be a liberating
experience, when it is forced onto a person it can be very oppressive. There are examples of
some women who take this abjection and use it to empower themselves. For example, the
childless by choice who created their own identity as separate and superior to “breeders”.
However, a system of valuation is still being used in this experience. Rather, a mutual respect
and understanding of the choices and experiences each of us wishes to undergo and how we wish
to navigate those experiences should be forwarded.
The ego-ideal projects an image that we feel we must sustain. This image is upheld by the
sacred. We feel that we are obliged and that it is our sacred duty to meet this ideal. Ordinarily,
there is a system of valorization in the sacred (Datta, 2019, p.97). For instance, men are not
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expected to act as priests because it would be too challenging to uphold that standard for those
who are not as pious. However, women are still expected to meet the image of the Virgin as
though that image is not an ideal. With so much variance in all aspects of pregnancy and the
maternal, how can we pinpoint what the experience ought to be? When the sacred functions to
sustain male dominance, taboo and stigma in the form of sexism extend from the left sacred.
Opening the symbolic elements up to new discourses can allow women to take their experiences
on their own terms without feeling stigma.
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Chapter Six: Critical Discussion
Introduction
This chapter briefly discusses how pregnancy allows subjects to connect to the semiotic through
corporeal experience. However, the importance of allowing subjects to experience this corporeal
phenomenon on their own terms is essential in order to avoid experiencing alienation.
Midwifery, as a form of herethics, allows pregnant subjects to transgress boundaries that
constrict their experience. This transgression, and experiencing pregnancy on their own terms,
whatever that may look like, allows for agency.
The way we frame reproduction tells us about our society. In the radical Durkheimian
account, social reproduction is typically viewed as something precarious and risky for the group.
The maternal figure is the intersection of biological and social reproduction (Luxton, 2014).
When sexism is the ideology fueling risk assessment, legal cases, and financial sacrifice for
pregnant women, we stop protecting women as subjects of our group and instead protect them as
resources. There is no village to help them, no community, only an audience to monitor them as
they become objects of expert and moral discourse. Moreover, the fact that we desire limited
reproduction demonstrates that society only wants a certain type of child born, which places
unnecessary pressure on pregnant subjects to yield acceptable offspring (Veevers, 1975).
Children take a lot of resources to bear and rear, so it is desired that those invested resources
yield a socially appropriate subject in return. Under these conditions, it is hard to argue that
pregnancy is not alienating.
In order to ease alienation, women need to have more control over their birthing
experience. Bartlett (2001) advocates for a sacred birth where the couple, but particularly the
woman, manages her own pregnancy in order to achieve a peak experience. The effervescence is
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lost when culture devalues self-management by stigmatizing the woman, or when someone else
manages the process. Here, again, Kristeva’s notion of herethics comes through as a necessary
new sacred order. We need to sacrifice the Virgin in order to pave the way for a secular sacred.
A focus on understanding and respecting differences in the maternal journey, along with viewing
our own choices as abject as opposed to abjecting others for their choices, is a starting ground to
healing a dysfunctional cycle. Women can use herethics to develop a means of resistance
through self-abjection in an alienating system. This allows them more control over their
experience and to view their experience on their own terms. The phenomenology of pregnancy
can be created by the subject as opposed to dominant sacrosanct discourses and their agents.
Abjection by definition is a threat to a current socially acceptable identity and social
order. When women are forced to be abject in order to sustain socially acceptable identities, it
becomes oppressive. The subject feels constrained in their choices and limitations are put on
their freedom of choices. However, women can undergo abjection on their own terms in order to
explore various aspects of their own identity. By engaging in counter discourse, and meaning
making, resistance is available against oppressive discourses. Rosati (2003), Kristeva (1984),
Habermas (2011), and Durkheim (2008) have all occasioned a secular sacred. For Kristeva, this
looks like herethics.

The Semiotic and the Corporeal
The maternal body, due to the immense corporeal experiences associated with all phases and
potentials of pregnancy, birth, and motherhood, is deeply engaged with the semiotic. From the
earliest and simplest experience, described by Weir (2006) as the quickening, is “the moment
when the hidden presence is felt, the woman senses she is pregnant” (p.12). This feeling has no
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rational Symbolic basis; it is nothing more than trusting in a feeling. Often women’s relationship
to their bodies is questioned though they are the only people able to directly communicate with
their bodies as well as the fetus in the womb. Bartlett (2001) explains that when birth is viewed
as sacred, and women are given control over the sacred process, the consciousness of the
community is raised in a similar way Durkheim refers to collective effervescence. The decision
may involve pain or even death, but women need to be able to make their own choices in order to
engage in the left sacred during birth. By using herethics, we can understand how each individual
woman’s needs and desires in her birth are different and allow her to control her experience of
her pregnancy. Recognizing this type of communication as valid, and the experiences women
have during this process as valid is essential to safeguarding the experience of the maternal.

Midwifery as Herethics
A basis for further resistance comes from discourse and practices in midwifery. One discourse is
able to silence another. While patriarchal symbolic elements have tended to silence women’s
voices, it also means that the reverse could to an extent be true. Kristeva (2004) claims the
feminine genius is the ability to “challenge the sociohistorical conditions of your identity”
(p.504). Though phallocentric language may mediate the counter—discourse, resistance and
transformation are still possible. Bartlett (2001) in her practice of being a midwife encourages
women to claim their own sacredness and rely less on others to carve out what they believe the
path should be. She explains that rules and regulation is used to create the proper experience,
which prevents the flow of the sacred. Women are tools as opposed to active subjects in their
own sacred experience. Women have explicitly stated that lack of control in their birthing
experience is a main source of discontentment but that they were dependent on the medical
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system (Broderick, 2008). For instance, the tendency of medical intervention to lead to a cascade
of interventions, and the use of unnecessary cesarean sections for profit by some doctors was not
well known by women (Klein et al., 2009). Midwives were able to inform the women they work
with of these aspects and were found generally to be more client centered (Reime et al., 2004).
These women also underestimated the impact a midwife could have on their birth experience
meaning that the midwife has not yet become mainstream though they are part of the healthcare
system.

Complex Questions of Agency and Social Change
A possible definition of agency is the ability for subjects to make their own decisions, to
experience life on their own terms, to make meaning in their experiences, and to take seriously
their experiences, including experiences outside of discourse such as corporeal experiences.
While Kristeva and Bataille do not explicitly detail their conception of agency, both took a deep
interest in understanding phenomenology and its corporeal aspects. Bataille detailed the way the
sacred restricts our experiences but also the pleasure and delight we have when we transgress
those boundaries. Kristeva allowed us to understand how transgression brings delight through
semiotic engagement. Again, both Kristeva and Bataille saw discourse and symbolic elements as
restraining and something to transgress in order to feel unified. Through transgression, be it
through effervescent moments, corporeal experiences of pain and pleasure, creative endeavors,
and other experiences of transgression that engage the semiotic, we reveal the boundaries of
what is socially constructed and gain agency as individuals. For Kristeva, revealing the Virgin as
a false construction in favor of herethics, what she envisions as the new secular sacred, is a
necessary change to be established by connecting to others through respecting vulnerability.
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When we understand that the boundaries of the symbolic elements are constructed and we are
able to think and act in any alternative way, we are able to change oppressive discourses.
Oppressive discourses that do not allow for transgression and blocking experiences that
engage in the semiotic restrict agency. As mentioned, symbolic elements within the Symbolic
Realm are not inherently oppressive and can change. Symbolic elements are inherently
restrictive, but can be structured to allow for transgression as play and identity forming instead of
punitive. Abjection does not need to be forced but can be a liberating experience. To clarify,
pregnant subjects could experience abjection on their own terms. Pregnancy shakes the
foundations of identity whether or not the symbolic elements tied to the experience direct it in
such a way because of its corporeal changes. The corporeal changes that will occur during a
pregnancy allow the semiotic to be engaged. Engaging in the semiotic always has some element
of transgression but this abjection is not in order to punish and regulate the subject in order to
keep the status quo secure, but to show the subject the “lack of lack” and the construction of their
boundaries to elevate the community as effervescent moments do. However, the sacred sustains
the image of the Virgin, a symbolic element that seeks to control female experiences and a
sacred that does not allow for transgression, which makes agency difficult and alienating. On the
other hand, although agency may be uncomfortable and be met with hostility, it is still a
possibility. By creating meaning in one’s abjection, or rather breaking meaning and revealing
boundaries to show the possibility of alternatives in the construction of symbolic elements, and
by engaging in and enjoying those experiences of the semiotic, the subject can use their agency.
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Conclusion
Midwives embody Kristeva’s notion of herethics and her metaphor of “Cura” as the ideal
medical model. For Kristeva et al. (2017), Cura is the entity that holds together the spirit and the
material with love. This means a strong consideration of how culture influences our view of
these aspects as well. When this view is used, the process of healing can occur as opposed to
trying to force all women into one state deemed as healthy. The focus is not on risk assessment
but on ensuring each pregnancy and birth reflects what is sacred to the pregnant subject in order
to allow her to enter an ecstatic state. Midwifery is able to transgress the sacred by putting the
woman’s wishes as a subject above risks to the fetus. It is important to remember that risks are
not diagnoses and often risk is used to constrain the woman with very little probability of coming
to fruition. Still, to engage in midwifery that allows for women to experience pregnancy on their
own terms is to engage in self-abjection. It is resistance and it is allowing women to transgress
the Symbolic on their own terms. Phenomenologically, it is a freeing experience where the
subject breaks the ego-ideal and is able to experience an absence of absence.
By calling attention to the obstacles women in the midst of the maternal environment
have been expressing, obstacles that are guised under notions of the sacred, this research can
help express those frustrations experienced. In Kristeva’s discussion of vulnerability and the
disabled, she explains her vision, or her utopia, that would come about from respecting
vulnerability, understanding we are all vulnerable and ultimately sharing our vulnerability. For
Kristeva, the subject is essential for this to be possible for if “the question of the subject is not
raised, there is no sharing” (Kristeva, 2012, p.31). By engaging in the subject
phenomenologically first, we advocate for more control over their experiences, alternatives, and
active listening. By doing so, I hope women will have more control over their birthing
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experiences including medical decisions such as termination and prenatal care. At the very least,
I hope women will find empowerment through being able to discuss their experiences, even if
these experiences are mediated by symbolic elements.
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Conclusion
Generally speaking, Julia Kristeva, grounded her approach in Freudian psychoanalysis
and literary theory emphasizing subject formation, objecthood, and the boundaries between. By
symptomatically attending to the sociological influences of Kristeva's work, Georges Bataille
and Emile Durkheim in particular, I have been able to develop a more adequate analytic of
subjecthood and a sociological phenomenology of pregnancy. The sacred adds a dimension to
the complexities of power by showing the way abjection sustains forms of sacral social order
such as the image of the Virgin. Contemporary feminist theory, gender theory, and queer theory
scholars largely focus on political strategy and ontology of the subject or social conditions
surrounding the subject. A major theorist exemplifying this point is Judith Butler, who admits to
focusing on ontology and epistemology rather than phenomenology and the dynamics of social
relations. While this part of theory is important, it reminds us that adequate theoretical models
frequently must address how various levels of theory and social analysis are articulated together.
In this regard, Butler’s focus on discourse and ontology at the expense of other ways of
considering subjectivity and social life, is unnecessarily narrow and dogmatic. Phenomenology
allows for an intimacy with the subject as subject, one who experiences and actively participates,
as opposed to the subject as an object of study.
That is not to suggest that there is one authentic female voice which must become the
reference to all of womanhood—historically that voice being white, cis-gendered, and middle- or
upper-class. Simply, I am stating that the white woman’s voice is different from the black
woman’s voice which is different from the poor woman’s voice which is different from the
mother’s voice and so on in any number of intersections that can be mentioned, but that there is
something authentic in each of these voices. Moreover, this authentic trace is able to bring these
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women together in a connection through the feminine, or rather, a connection through the
Semiotic. While respecting the advancement in the area of gender construction, this thesis
focuses on the notion of pregnancy and motherhood from a stance that there is a female voice
that is possible and important. It is not to limit the female voice to cis-gendered, fertile women or
motherhood, but to engage with that particular niche within the broader spectrum of female
voices.
Kristeva’s conceptions of the symbolic and Semiotic allow for an analytic capable of
tapping into the lived experience of pregnant women contributing a rich phenomenology. By
understanding the difference between what is internal language and experience, that which is
Semiotic or the subject removed from discourse, and what is Symbolic, or that which is socially
organized and learned, we are able to tap into moments of social experience with meaning made
by the subject and society with the subject in primary as opposed to society driving the meaning
making experience. The grounding in corporeality that Kristeva articulated, and certainly that
Bataille and Durkheim agree with, has previously been dismissed as biologically reductive in
many contemporary theories. However, by dismissing corporeal experience, and in particular
corporeal experience that strays from the fictive norm (be it trans experience, female experience,
black experience, or maternal experience) takes away the power of these experiences and makes
phenomenology of these experiences impossible.
The Chora, a foundationally physical language that constitutes social being for Kristeva,
a conception consonant with Durkheim and Bataille’s conception of the immanence of
subjectivity in the social, continuously remains present in each individual being regardless of
gender, sex, discourse, etc. It is the foundation experience of the subject, as a social and
relational being. In other words, the Chora is purely the subject untouched by discourse, which of
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course, can only exist prior to the tainting of the subject upon birth when they are immediately
immersed in discourse. It is this corporeal grounding that is highlighted in the maternal
experience discussed above as “feminine corporeality.” Regardless of fertility technology and
regardless of who is experiencing pregnancy, be it a woman, or a trans individual, etc., the
importance is in the physical changes the subject undergoes in the corporealisation of existence
in a dynamic social milieu and how they find meaning in those experiences outside of imposed
discourses. The nuances of the embodied experience are then shaped by discourse. Without
discourse, all these individuals would still have unique corporeal experiences of pregnancy;
however, the meaning and subject formation attributed to their condition in society changes
according to the sacred.
Kristeva’s conception of the abject, that being a differentiated place of symbolic and
ritual exclusion, highlights the liminality tied to subjecthood and the relations surrounding and
affecting subject formation. These boundaries are determined by the sacred demarcations of in a
society. A fetus, not only in being deemed a social being but in being a social being
representative of the future fecundity of the group, is treated with the utmost importance and
sacred measures. In becoming a subject prior to birth, the fetus takes precedent over the pregnant
subject who must follow medical risk assessment recommendations.
This aspect is where we see the importance of Bataille and Durkheim for rendering a
broader account of the social constitution of the pregnant woman and extending Kristeva’s
theory in a sociological way. Bataille’s ability to systematically create a theory of the sacred that
attends to the left sacred, highlights an aspect of subjecthood not usually attended to. Indeed,
pregnancy is full of love and beauty, but it is also filled with fear of mortality, bile, and the
abject. The balance is in constant flow and the meaning tied to each aspect is largely dependent
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on where the woman, now sacred object of fertility, is placed on the sacred scales, or worse, if
she departs from the sacred entirely and becomes abject herself. Durkheim’s keen understanding
of the way these relationships affect us, the way the sacred organizes our life and how these two
crucial areas of the social come together to shape our sense of subjecthood, is what made him a
crucial source to include in this new analysis.
All three theorists hold corporeal experience as pertinent and grounded in social reality.
Pregnancy is a truly physical, corporeal experience one intimately tied to the social and the social
to it. It does not matter what meaning we tie to our pregnancy, our stomach will stretch, our body
will undergo many possible side effects, and our body will expel the fetus at some point in time.
A physical manifestation will unfold. Of course, our social climate changes the way these
physical changes are experienced, but experienced nonetheless they will be. This is why
examining theories attendant to corporeal phenomenology are essential to revisit.
The aim of this thesis was to retheorize Julia Kristeva’s fruitful analytics in a sociological
way to analyse dynamic movement of the subject in relation to the sacred. The research showed
that Bataille’s theory of the sacred and Kristeva’s notion of the Semiotic and symbolic remain
pertinent and complementary resources for generating a sociological understanding of subject
formation, abjection, objectification, and the overall phenomenology of pregnancy. By attending
to Kristeva, and analysing prior source material, particularly that of Bataille and Durkheim, we
see a new, symptomatic reading of her works: tracing a new question, not yet asked of the
theory, in order to find answers to a contemporary problem. This method of theoretical reading
and revision, has been exceptionally important in neo-classical sociology. By using Kristeva in
conjunction with intersecting theories, she can be symptomatically read to account for
contemporary phenomena.
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As noted, the phenomenology of pregnant women is an underdeveloped area of
sociology. Instead, the topic has been saturated with medically-oriented research focusing on the
development of the fetus and physical viability of the mother. The research rarely includes
emotion or meaning-making in the process of pregnancy. This research intended to depict the
current restrictions in the process of pregnancy that turn women from subjects into objects.
Taboo, prohibition, and proscriptions, reinforced by patriarchy and the medical model of health,
force pregnant women to walk a particular trail. The issue comes when the woman’s subjectivity
calls upon herself to walk a different path and her autonomy is met with punishment and
violation: social exclusion and judgement through to violence and legal action against women
who do not carry through their pregnancies as instructed. The point is not merely to state women
have been objectified, but to explain the effect that this treatment has in a particular setting—
how objectification and abjection affects pregnant women as well as how women can use
abjection to resist objectification. Moreover, the goal extends to further phenomenological
research that will allow pregnant women a voice in their pregnancies and freedom as subjects to
choose how they would like to experience their pregnancies and the meanings they personally
attach to the various stage
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GLOSSARY

Abject. A person who has shown the construction of identity and social boundaries through
transgression. In order to protect the status quo, those who are abject tend to be excluded and
contained as they are deemed a threat.

Agency. The ability to make meaning and choices about one’s experiences including corporeal
experiences within and outside of discourse. Agency is discovered and enacted through
transgression.

Chora. The preverbal sensations of a fetus. The Chora is Kristeva’s concept of communication
before a language.

Ego-Ideal. A Psychoanalytic term that refers to our mind imposing ideal social standards,
behaviours, and concepts of the self upon itself.

Heterology. Bataille’s study of the excluded parts of religion. Particularly the irrational elements
such as chance, which demonstrate its imperfect construction.

Herethics. Kristeva’s concept of a new ethics founded on love, respect, and vulnerability.
Herethics is modelled after an ideal mother-child relationship.

Ideal-Ego. A Psychoanalytic term that refers to our mind after it overcomes the Ego-Ideal. It is
the actual ideal form of the self.
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Left Sacred. That aspect of the sacred which invokes fear and disgust in order to strengthen
belief.

Object. Tools in the profane world. Objects are things that already have a pre-existing intended
use.

Phenomenology. Our social framing and evaluation of experiences, including corporeal
experiences. Our perception of experiences is created through symbols, collective
representations, and experiences outside of discourse.

Profane. For Bataille, profane is the everyday, ordinary, mundane world of tools.

The Real. Lacan’s conception of a place of trauma or rupture in both the Imaginary and
Symbolic that language cannot adequately conceptualize or convey. The real is a place where
subjects experience a “lack of lack” and is related to Kristeva’s conception of the abject.

Right Sacred. That aspect of the sacred which invokes awe and benevolence in order to
strengthen belief.

Sacred. In Bataille’s Radical Durkheimian concept, the sacred is set apart and forbidden,
strengthens social bonds, involves ritual and uses both the left and right sacred to structure
behaviours.
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Semiotic. Kristeva’s concept of a rhythmic corporeal communication that extends from the
chora and is achieved through transgressing symbolic elements.

Subject. The being as fragmented, social, and corporeal. The subject has agency, is foremost a
speaking being within the Symbolic Realm but can engage in the semiotic through transgression.

Symbolic Realm. Kristeva’s concept of the language based social world.

Symbolic Elements. Kristeva’s concept of language, symbols, and structures which organize our
social world and together belong to the Symbolic Realm. Symbolic elements are not inherently
oppressive but are restrictive and are constructed.

Symptomatic Reading. A method of theorizing whereby one finds new answers to questions
that were never asked in the text in order to yield new, fruitful analysis.
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